Problems of Communism

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1990



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COVER: Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church celebrate their return to St. George's Cathedral in Lviv after nearly 45 years on August 19, 1990; in the center, Greek Catholic Metropolitan Volodymyr Sterniuk of Lviv. Photo courtesy of Bohdan R. Bociurkiw.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

The Ukrainian Catholic Church in the USSR Under Gorbachev

Bohdan R. Bociurkiw

An unintended consequence of Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost'* and democratization in the USSR has been the emergence from the underground of the banned Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. In their drive to realize a fully legal status for their Church, Ukrainian Catholics have been hampered by Gorbachev's vacillating nationality and religious policies and by the strong opposition of the Moscow Patriarchate, which had absorbed the Ukrainian Catholic Church in 1946. Frustrated by the center's policy of offering "too little too late," the believers have begun to reclaim their former churches on their own and have turned for help to the newly elected local organs of people's power to complete the "half-way" legalization conceded to the Ukrainian Catholic Church under the October 1990 USSR law on freedom of conscience.

The Future of the KGB

Amy W. Knight

Ever since Lenin created the infamous Cheka in 1917, a political police has served as the "sword and shield" of the party, or, more precisely, of the party leadership. Gorbachev—like other party leaders who lacked a public mandate—has made himself enormously dependent on the KGB. But the insistent demands of the reformers and the growing movement of the Soviet republics toward independence are outpacing Gorbachev's own program and challenging the prerogatives of a strong, centralized secret police. Gorbachev will find it increasingly difficult to maintain his association with this organization without losing his credibility as a reformist leader. In short, while the KGB may be crucial to maintaining Gorbachev's rule as discontent mounts, it is also a serious political liability.

***Perestroyka*, Social Justice, and Soviet Public Opinion**

David S. Mason and Svetlana Sydorenko

As Mikhail Gorbachev strives to improve the efficiency of the Soviet economy, he has invoked a perspective of social justice that points to the unfairness of slothful workers' receiving the same pay as productive fellow workers. However, a portion of the Soviet intelligentsia and a wide sector of the public at large are increasingly focusing on an egalitarian version of social justice that rejects increased differentiation in pay and worries about the state of those large numbers of people at the bottom of the social ladder. The tension between efficiency and social justice constitutes one of the Soviet leader's primary dilemmas.

Hungary's New Political Elites: Adaptation and Change, 1989–90

Rudolf L. Tőkés

The spring 1990 elections in Hungary, which voted out of power the communist government and most of the communist-dominated legislature, represent a triumph for the country's middle class intelligentsia. This intelligentsia was largely the product of reforms introduced under the rule of János Kádár, but the Kádár regime was unwilling to grant it political power and input into economic decision-making commensurate with its status. In response, some members of the intelligentsia cooperated with the regime to effect change from within, while others opted to work for a change of the system itself. Over the course of 1989, the intelligentsia within the regime and the intelligentsia outside the regime worked to transform Hungary into a democratic polity. However, the agreements negotiated to effect this transition all but excluded workers and farmers. To be truly effective in promoting further change, the new government and parliament must become more representative of the interests of Hungary's non-elites.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Essay-Reviews

Marxist Disaster and Cultural Survival in Ethiopia

Paul B. Henze

The willful attempts by Ethiopian strongman Mengistu Haile Mariam to impose an alien Marxist-Leninist government on one of the world's oldest empires has wrought untold suffering upon its peoples and imperiled the very unity of the country. Programs of "resettlement" and "villagization" threatened either to annihilate large portions of the peasantry or turn them into a rural proletariat as occurred in the Soviet Union. In the face of this onslaught, traditional Ethiopian culture has shown remarkable resilience, which may help the country survive despite the lateness of Mengistu's March 1990 admission of failure of his policies.

Chinese Nationality Policy and "The Tibetan Question"

Donald R. DeGlopper

One of the major obstacles to understanding the Tibetan situation is the myth of Tibetan exceptionalism, which is the notion that because the landscape is extreme and exceptional, the people too must be exceptional. The positive version is that Tibetans are exceptionally spiritual, religious, and unworldly; the negative is that they are exceptionally backward, superstitious, and cruel. Both of these versions must be avoided. If "the Tibetan Question" is to be understood it must be brought into the realm of ordinary political discourse and considered in a wider comparative framework.

Peasants and Regime in Vietnam: Perspectives on Transition

Ronald J. Cima

Literature on Vietnam's peasantry and the socialist revolution reveals that despite the image of "being in touch" with the peasants, communist rural policy has committed some of the same mistakes as the imperial regime and the French colonial administration. Recent attempts to reform the economy have stopped short of political reform, and a regime that has produced a low standard of living for its people might just be on the verge of losing its authority.

Contemporary Russian Nationalism

Robert Otto

As a consequence of Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost'* and *perestroyka*, the Russian nationalists have come forward as political actors in the Soviet Union. However, the image projected by them is not an appealing one. The anti-Semitism of the Russian nationalists is joined to a profound distaste for the West that is often expressed in condemnations of Western mass culture and the Western democratic tradition. Anti-Semitism has also prepared the ground for the rise among Russian nationalists of all persuasions of National Bolshevism—an ideology seeking to preserve the Russian empire under communist leadership.

The Destruction of East-Central Europe, 1939–41

Robert Blobaum

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, with its secret protocols dividing East-Central Europe into Soviet and German spheres of influence, helped launch a series of events that eventually resulted in total Soviet domination over this region and its disappearance from the world's political map. This communist domination came at the expense of civil society, the repository of "real power"—the power to create and produce. Thus, the first, most difficult task for the "post-communist" governments of these countries is the reconstruction of civil society from what was left behind by nearly five decades of totalitarianism. Only the reemergence of civil society will signify the rebirth of the regional entity once known as East-Central Europe.

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The Ukrainian Catholic Church in the USSR Under Gorbachev

Bohdan R. Bociurkiw

The Soviet occupation of eastern Poland under the terms of the Hitler-Stalin Pact in September 1939 brought under Moscow's rule the Galician Metropolitanate of the Greek Catholic Church[1]—the largest subdivision of the surviving Uniate Church, which had been wiped out in the 19th century on the territories acquired by the Russian Empire as a result of the partitions of Poland.[2] The preparations by the Soviet authorities for the eventual expansion of the Russian Orthodox Church into this "Piedmont" of Uniate Catholicism and Ukrainian nationalism were cut short by the outbreak of the German-Soviet war in June 1941.[3]

In the summer and fall of 1944, the Soviet army not only recaptured eastern Galicia from the Germans but also occupied Carpatho-Ukraine with its Greek Catholic diocese of Mukachiv-Uzhhorod, and soon expanded Soviet hegemony over all adjacent territories where Ukrainian Uniates lived, namely, in Poland (part of the Peremyshl/Przemyśl diocese and the Apostolic Administration for Lemkivshchyna) and in Czechoslovakia (the Priashiv/Prešov diocese).[4] Thus, the Communist heirs to the Russian Empire for the first time had the opportunity to destroy Rome's remaining bridgehead to the Orthodox East, and simultaneously to strike at the most important cultural and institutional preserve of Ukrainian national identity in the newly conquered lands.

After some initial vacillation,[5] Stalin ordered the suppression of the Greek Catholic Church and its forcible merger with the state-controlled Russian Orthodox Church.[6] On April 11, 1945, the political police, the

[1]Dating from 1156, the Halych diocese acceded to the Union of Brest in 1700 and, after Austria acquired Galicia in 1772 in the first partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was raised by Pope Pius VII in 1807 to the status of a metropolitanate comprising the eparchies of Lviv and Peremyshl and, since 1885, Stanislaviv (renamed Ivano-Frankivsk in 1962). Under the 1939 Hitler-Stalin Pact, the USSR annexed Eastern Galicia to the San river, including the city and most of the diocese of Peremyshl (although the city returned to Poland in 1945).

[2]For differing interpretations of the suppression of the Uniate Church in the Russian Empire, see T. Kostruba, *Yak Moskva nyshchyla Ukrainsku Tserkvu* (How Moscow Destroyed the Ukrainian Church), Toronto, "Dobra Knyshka," 1961; Wasyl Lencyk, *The Eastern Catholic Church and Czar Nicholas I*, Rome, Ukrainian Catholic University, 1966; E. Likowski, *Dzieje Kościoła Unickiego na Litwie i Rusi w XVIII–XIX wieku* (History of the Uniate Church in Lithuania and Rus' in the 18th and 19th centuries), Warsaw, 1902, 2 vols.; M. O. Koyalovich, *Istoriya vozsoyedineniya zapadnorusskikh uniatov starykh vremen* (History of the Reunification of the Western Russian Uniates of Old Times), St. Petersburg, 1893; and Ivan Vlasovskyi, *Narys istorii Ukrainskoi pravoslavnoi tserkvy* (Outline of the History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church), Vol. 3, New York—Bound Brook, NJ, Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the USA, 1961.

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[3]In 1941, the Moscow Patriarchate ordained an Orthodox bishop for Lviv. On its part, the NKVD sought unsuccessfully to recruit a prominent representative of "Eastern" orientation within the Greek Catholic Church, Fr. H. Kostelnyk, to head a "reunion" campaign.

[4]See B. Bociurkiw, "The Suppression of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Postwar Soviet Union and Poland," in Dennis J. Dunn, Ed., *Religion and Nationalism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1987, pp. 97–119 (hereafter, cited as "The Suppression . . ."); Vasyl Markus, *Nyshchennya Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy v Mukachivskiy Yeparkhii v 1945–1950* (The Destruction of the Greek-Catholic Church in Mukachiv Eparchy in 1945–1950), Paris, Zapysky N. T. Sh., Vol 59, 1962; and Julius Kubinyi, *The History of the Prjasiv Eparchy*, Rome, Ukrainian Catholic University, 1970, Chs. 21–24.

[5]Upon the reoccupation of Galicia, the Soviet authorities assured the Greek Catholic Church of their good will and invited it in December 1944 to send a delegation to the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults in Moscow to discuss a modus vivendi. But while the Council's chairman, I. V. Polyanskiy, was saying that the Uniate Church would enjoy freedom of worship, the delegation was presented by the Soviet high command with a demand to bring about the surrender of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army guerrillas and the nationalist underground in Western Ukraine. See P. Vasiliev's interview with M. Odintsov, "Uniates," *Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), Oct. 7–13, 1989, pp. 6–7; Georgiy Rozhnov, "It Is We, Oh Lord," *Ogonek* (Moscow), Sept. 16–23, 1989, pp. 6–8; and the unpublished memoirs of Cardinal Yosyf Slipyi, "Spomyny," *Archivum Patriarchale Sanctae Sophiae* (Rome). See also M. Odintsov, "Tribulations, 1939–54," *Nauka i Religiya* (Moscow), August 1990, pp. 18–19.

[6]*Argumenty i Fakty*, Oct. 7–13, 1989, p. 7. An outline of "reunion" measures was drafted for Stalin by the then Chairman of the Council for the

(footnote continued on p. 2)

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NKGB, arrested Metropolitan Yosyf Slipyi and four other bishops in Galicia.[7] While the bishops and those clergymen who refused to "convert" to Orthodoxy were charged with assorted political crimes and sent to concentration camps, the secret police staged an allegedly "voluntary" movement for "reunion" with the Russian Orthodox Church.

An "Initiative Group for Reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church"[8] installed by the NKGB made its appearance on May 28. On that date the Group issued two letters. The first was directed to the Soviet Ukrainian government, asking it to approve and recognize the right of the Group to carry out a "reunion" campaign.[9] The second missive informed the Greek Catholic clergy that the Group had been created "with the permission of the state authorities" and that the latter "will not recognize any other administrative authority within the Greek Catholic Church."[10] On June 18, 1945, Pavlo Khodchenko, the republic's Plenipotentiary of the Council for Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, replied on behalf of the Soviet Ukrainian government, recognizing the Initiative Group as

the sole provisional organ of church administration, which is authorized to direct all affairs of the existing Greek Catholic parishes in the western oblasts of Ukraine and to carry out the task of reunion of the above parishes with the Russian Orthodox Church.[11]

The Initiative Group was empowered "to settle with the government all legal matters concerning the administration of the Greek Catholic parishes." Ominously, the letter instructed the "Initiative Group" to forward to Khodchenko "lists of all deans, parish priests, and superiors of monasteries who refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of the Initiative Group of the Greek Catholic Church for Reunion with the Orthodox Church."[12] Khodchenko's letter is the only published official document confirming direct governmental involvement in the suppression of the Uniate Church. This action was in clear violation of the Soviet constitution and the existing legislation on religion.

The "reunion" campaign culminated in the "nullification" of the 1596 Union of Brest at the so-called Lviv Sobor in March 1946.[13] Rather than publish a law banning the Uniate Church, the Soviet authorities chose to maintain the fiction that this Church "dissolved itself" and "ceased to exist."[14] By 1949, the Greek Catholic Church in Carpatho-Ukraine (Transcarpathia) was also forced into the Russian Orthodox Church,[15] and an analogous "reunion" was carried out in the Priashiv Uniate diocese in Eastern Slovakia.[16] The Greek Catholic Church was abolished *de facto* in Poland in 1947–49,[17] while the suppression of Uniates in Romania in 1948 also imposed Orthodoxy on some ten Ukrainian Greek Catholic parishes in the area adjoining Transcarpathia.[18]

Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, G. G. Karpov (a high-ranking NKVD officer); the document, dated March 15, 1945, was signed by Stalin (ibid.). According to Rozhnov's KGB source, Nikita Khrushchev told the then NKVD chief in Ukraine, General Serhiy Savchenko, already in February that Stalin had "personally decided on the speediest possible liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church" (see *Ogonek*, Sept. 16–23, 1989, p. 7).

[7]In addition to Metropolitan Yosyf Slipyi of Lviv, Bishops Mykolay Charnetskyi and Nykyta Budka, as well as Bishop Hryhoriy Khomyshyn of Stanislaviv and his auxiliary bishop Ivan Lyatyshevskyi were arrested. After they were arrested by the Polish police in September 1945, Bishop Yosafat Kotsylovskyi of Peremyshl and his auxiliary bishop Hryhoriy Lakota were handed over to the Soviet secret police in January 1946, but soon after were allowed to return to Peremyshl. They were rearrested and handed over to the Soviets in late June 1946. A number of priests were arrested at the same time.

[8]The three "founding" members of the "Initiative Group" were the priests Havryil Kostelnyk of Lviv (whom the Soviets had already courted in 1940), Antoniy Pelvetskyi of Stanislaviv, and Mykhail Melnyk of Drohobych. All three were apparently "broken" by the secret police, and all perished in circumstances suggesting liquidation at the hands of the police. See Bociurkiw "The Suppression . . . ," pp. 102, 112, 115.

[9]*Diyanniya Soboru hreko-katolytskoi tserkvy v m. Lvovi 8–10 bereznya 1946 r.* (Proceedings of the Greek-Catholic Church Council in Lviv, March 8–10, 1946), Lviv, 1946, pp. 16–19.

[10]Ibid., pp. 20–24. The Initiative Group's appeal prompted a group of Lviv clergy to address a letter of protest to V. M. Molotov, rejecting the Group's claims and demanding that the Church's constitutional rights be respected, its bishops released, and, pending their release, the Church be governed by a canonical authority as provided by its rules; 300 priests reportedly signed this protest. The document is in *Svoboda sumlinnya u bilshovykiv. Pro vozyednannya hreko-katolytskoi tserkvy z rosiyskoyu pravoslavnoyu* (Freedom of Conscience under the Bolsheviks: On the Unification of the Greek Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church), n.p., Zakordonne Predstavnytstvo Ukrainskoi Holovnoi Vyzvolnoi Rady, Mar. 23, 1946, pp. 13–15.

[11]*Diyanniya Soboru,* pp.19–20.

[12]Ibid.

[13]See Bociurkiw, "The Suppression . . . ," pp. 103, 114–115; and Ivan Hrynyokh, "The Destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church by the Russian Bolshevik Regime," *Suchasnist* (Munich), September 1970. For an "inside" account of the Lviv Sobor's stage-management by the secret police, see Rozhnov, loc.cit. It took the Sobor approximately six hours to "dissolve" the Union with Rome and to "vote" for "reunion" with the Russian Orthodox Church. See *Diyanniya Soboru,* pp. 40–43. By hastily publishing the proceedings of the sobor, Kostelnyk, Pelvetskyi, and Melnyk let slip firsthand evidence of the arbitrary and uncanonical nature of the gathering.

[14]See, e.g., a sanitized collection of "documents" brought out by the Moscow Patriarchate in several languages, *Lvivskyi Tserkovnyi Sobor. Dokumenty i materialy, 1946–1981* (The Lviv Church Sobor: Documents and Materials, 1946–1981), Kiev, Vydannya Patriarskoho Ekzarkha Vsiyei Ukrainy, Metropolyta Kyivskoho i Halytskoho, 1984, which, significantly, omits P. Khodchenko's letter to the Initiative Group.

[15]Markus, op.cit.

[16]Kubinyi, op.cit., pp. 165–87.

[17]See Bociurkiw, "The Suppression . . . ," pp. 104–07.

[18]Sevastyan Sabol, *Holhota Hreko-katolytskoi tserkvy v Chekho-Slovachchyni* (The Golgotha of the Greek Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia), Toronto, Ukrainska dukhovna biblioteka, 1978, pp. 239–40.

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The Greek Catholic Church within the post–World War II Ukrainian SSR had embraced four dioceses with 2,326 parishes and over 4,000 churches, and somewhere between 3.5 and 4 million faithful.[19] Serving the Church were eight bishops and approximately 2,400 priests.[20] The four dioceses maintained a theological academy, four diocesan seminaries with a total of 565 students, as well as 35 monasteries with 155 monastic priests and 347 brothers, and 123 convents with 979 nuns.[21]

Nevertheless, the forcible "reunion" did not end the existence of the Greek Catholic Church. It survived within formally Orthodox structures as a "crypto-Uniate" Church, in the Gulag and places of exile, and in the underground in the West Ukrainian oblasts.[22] Moreover, in the course of 1989–90, the church has been able to assert its right to a legal existence. How this came about and what this tells us about Mikhail Gorbachev's policies will be the subject of this article.

The Uniate Church After Stalin

Stalin's death in March 1953, the subsequent succession struggle, and Nikita Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" campaign had a profound effect on the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Within months of the dictator's death, the primate of the Uniate Church, Metropolitan Yosyf Slipyi, whose eight-year sentence had ended in April 1953, was brought from a Mordovian camp to Moscow on the orders of Lavrentiy Beria, the secret police chief. Seeking to rally support in Ukraine and other non-Russian republics in his struggle for power, Beria mounted an attack on Russification in Western Ukraine. His emissaries began secret negotiations with Slipyi about the normalization of Soviet relations with the Vatican and the legalization of the Uniate Church in Western Ukraine. The talks with Slipyi were abruptly terminated with Beria's arrest; and after he rejected renewed secret police offers to repudiate his allegiance to the Papacy in exchange for freedom and a high post in the Russian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Slipyi was re-sentenced *in absentia* to an administrative exile in Krasnoyarsk Kray, where he remained in semifree status until his next arrest in 1958.[23]

Meanwhile, as a result of Khrushchev's dismantling of the Gulag empire, several hundred Uniate priests and monks were released from the camps and returned to Western Ukraine during 1955–56. Among them were two bishops, Mykolay Charnetskyi, who came back to Lviv, and Ivan Lyatyshevskyi, a Stanislaviv diocese

Yosyf Cardinal Slipyi, Archbishop Major of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (1892–1984).

—Courtesy of the author.

[19]The Soviet figure of 2,326 Greek Catholic congregations as of July 1, 1945, based on data from the Party History Archives of the CC CPU, appeared in Ye. V. Safonova, *Ideyno-vykhovna robota komunistychnoi partii sered trudyashchykh vyzvolenykh rayoniv Ukrainy v roky Velykoi Vitchyznyanoi Viyny, 1943–1945 rr.* (Ideological-Educational Work of the Communist Party among Workers in the Liberated Counties of Ukraine in the 1943–45 Years of the Great Fatherland War), Kiev, Vydavnytstvo Kyivskoho Universitetu, 1971, p. 117. The total number of churches and faithful has been calculated by me on the basis of church registers for 1938–39 (Galicia and the Apostolic Administration for *Lemkivshchyna*) and 1944 (Transcarpathia), while taking into account the partition of the Peremyshl diocese by the postwar Soviet-Polish border.

[20]For brief biographies of the bishops, see endnotes to "The Suppression . . . ." The number of priests was calculated on the basis of church registers, based on data about the Greek Catholic clergy in Poland (provided in a March 18, 1948, report to Bishop Ivan Buchko in Rome from the Vicar General of the Peremyshl eparchy in Poland, Canon Vasyl Hrynyk) and the 1947 church register of the Ukrainian Catholic clergy for West Germany.

[21]For details, see the statistical table in "The Suppression . . . ," pp. 100–01.

[22]Metropolitan Yosyf Slipyi attempted intermittently to maintain contact during his imprisonments and exile. During the years 1945–54, a series of illegal Uniate priests served clandestinely as administrators or vicars in the three Galician dioceses, and since 1949, in the Mukachiv eparchy. Most of them were discovered eventually by the secret police.

[23]Slipyi, "Spomyny," pp. 159–73.

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auxiliary bishop, who returned to Stanislaviv.[24] Though prohibited from engaging in pastoral activities, they resumed their episcopal duties, eventually ordaining a number of priests. As many former Uniate priests who were serving as "Orthodox" pastors approached the bishops for absolution and readmittance to the Greek Catholic Church, Bishop Charnetskyi made a fateful decision in 1956 to receive them back secretly but to allow them to continue serving their flock within the Orthodox Church.[25] In this way, the illegal Church, barred from openly serving its faithful, could maintain its presence in the formally Orthodox Church through a "crypto-Uniate" clergy, and even replenish to some extent its priests through "crypto-Uniate" seminarians from Ukrainian dioceses dispatched to study in Orthodox theological schools, especially in Leningrad.

De-Stalinization, as well as the re-emergence of the Greek Catholic Church in Poland, raised hopes during 1956–57 that the Uniate Church in Western Ukraine could be legalized. There was a flurry of petitions on behalf of legalization from the faithful, and even the repudiation of Orthodoxy in some parishes.[26] These hopes were dashed by the publication, in December 1957, of a resolution adopted at a conference of deans of the Lviv diocese held at Pochaiv monastery in October. The resolution clearly indicated that the government position regarding the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church remained unchanged:

Rumors spread by Uniate fanatics and other opponents of Orthodoxy that the Union will be restored in the western oblasts are inventions of our enemies calculated to deceive both the non-reunited clergy and the believers . . . . The Union is a tool of the enemies of our Fatherland.[27]

An even more unambiguous signal of the hardening Soviet line on the Uniate Church was the arrest of the exiled Metropolitan Slipyi, in spring 1958, on charges of illegal contacts with his clergy and transmission of his pastoral letters and other writings. After lengthy interrogations, the Metropolitan was sentenced in June 1959 at a closed trial in Kiev to seven more years of imprisonment.[28]

A rapprochement between Pope John XXIII and Nikita Khrushchev in 1961–63 brought about, after complex negotiations, the release from imprisonment of Metropolitan Slipyi in late January 1963; he left Moscow for Rome on February 4, 1963, after secretly ordaining Vasyl Velychkovskyi as his bishop-exarch for Lviv.[29] But the rapprochement did not improve the status of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine, where repressions against the underground Uniate bishops and clergy soon resumed.[30]

The relative improvement of Kremlin-Vatican relations coincided with the final phase of Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" of Soviet church policy. The main beneficiary of Stalin's new religious policy introduced during World War II—the Russian Orthodox Church—found itself at the end of the 1950's the main target of Khrushchev's antireligious campaign. By the time of his removal in the fall of 1964, many Russian Orthodox churches, monasteries, and seminaries had been closed down. In seeking to ingratiate itself with the Kremlin, the Moscow Patriarchate had reactivated —with the government's blessing—its role as a promoter and apologist for Soviet foreign policy. The Russian Orthodox Church joined the World Council of Churches in 1960 and initiated contacts with the Vatican.

A central issue in the Patriarchate's relations with the Vatican became the illegal Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the USSR. It is safe to say that Moscow's maximal objective in this respect was the abandonment of the Uniates by the Papacy in order to achieve a "genuine" rapprochement between Russian Orthodoxy and Catholicism, while a minimal objective was maintaining the status quo and deterring the Vatican from bringing the issue of legalization of the Greek Catholic Church into the open. The Moscow Patriarchate, acting in this case as a surrogate for the Soviet

[24]Charnetsky returned to Lviv in 1956 and died there on April 2, 1959, without having consecrated a successor. Lyatyshevskyi returned to Stanislaviv in June 1955. Before his death in November 1957, he ordained Fr. Ivan Slezyuk as successor bishop of Stanislaviv.

[25]See the letter from Fr. V. Prokopiv, dated December 14, 1970, in *Cardinal Slipyi Papers* (Rome).

[26]*Pravoslavnyi visnyk* (Lviv), March 1957, p. 70, and July 1957, p. 255; *Zhovten* (Lviv) February 1957, pp.120–26.

[27]*Pravoslavnyi visnyk*, December 1957, pp. 371–72.

[28]I. Khoma, *Shlyakhamy katorhy Blazhennishoho Yosyfa Slipoho* (Tracing the Sufferings of the Most Reverend Josyf Slipyi), Rome, Vydavnytsvo "Bohoslovii," No. 57, 1987, pp. 25–27; see the appended *Spravka* from the MVD issued on the Metropolitan's release from imprisonment, dated January 26, 1963 (viii–ix).

[29]Slipyi, "Spomyny," pp. 198–200. See also Norman Cousins, "The Improbable Triumvirate: Khrushchev, Kennedy, and Pope John," *Saturday Review* (Washington, DC), Oct. 30, 1971, pp. 24–35.

[30]On April 4, 1963, the KGB arrested Bishops Ivan Slezyuk and Symeon Lukach; they were each sentenced to five years in prison for engaging in "religious instruction." In 1963–64, the police uncovered a clandestine convent and workshop producing Catholic religious objects in Lviv. See *Ogonek*,.No. 46, November 1963. In 1964, Fr. Mykhaylo Vinnytskyi was sentenced to a second term of three and a half years' imprisonment and five years' exile for secretly instructing candidates for priesthood. See O. Zinkevych and T. Lonchyna, Eds., *Martyrolohiya Ukrainskykh Tserkov. Ukrainska Katolytska Tserkva* (Martyrology of Ukrainian Churches: The Ukrainian Catholic Church), Vol. 2, Toronto-Baltimore, Smoloskyp, 1985, p. 608.

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state, apparently hoped that closer relations with the Papacy would neutralize émigré Uniate pressures on the Vatican to espouse legalization as well as demoralize the underground Church in Ukraine. In both respects, the Patriarchate has scored some successes during the pontificate of Paul VI, which coincided with most of Leonid Brezhnev's rule.

Seeking Legalization Under Brezhnev

Undeterred by a crackdown in 1965–66 on political dissent in Ukraine, the Greek Catholic clergy began since mid-1966 to test the limits of Soviet "toleration" by openly celebrating heavily attended liturgical services on Sundays and major feasts in unused churches in Western Ukraine. By August 1967, some 200 churches were thus "reopened" by Ukrainian Catholics in Galicia, and a number of the "reunited" Orthodox priests sought secret readmission to the Uniate Church.[31]

Yet, numerous petitions for the "registration" of Ukrainian Greek Catholic parishes were being turned down by the authorities. In July 1967, the Lviv KGB and the oblast commissioner of the Council for Religious Affairs told Bishop Velychkovskyi that

- the activities of the Greek Catholic clergy (reopening of churches, public celebration of the liturgy, sermons) are against the law and would soon be severely punished;
- Greek Catholic congregations cannot be registered because the Greek Catholic Church was allied with the Germans, is treasonous, compromised, condemned by the people, and liquidated;
- individual Ukrainian Catholics can attend Roman Catholic churches;
- even under another name, e.g., as Catholics of Eastern Rite, the Uniates will not be registered and recognized, because there is no law authorizing such measures.[32]

Despite these warnings, the more activist clergy continued to hold church services in the open. The re-legalization of the Greek Catholic Church in neighboring Czechoslovakia in June 1968 (which was not retracted after the Soviet invasion in August) and the subsequent return to it of the overwhelming majority of parishes seized in 1950 by the state-supported Orthodox Church emboldened the Uniates in Galicia and prompted Cardinal Slipyi, the exiled primate of the Greek Catholic Church, to address a memorandum to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine in 1968 calling for the legalization of the Church.[33] Soviet President N. Podgornyy's meeting with Pope Paul VI on January 30, 1969, also helped create false hopes for an imminent "breakthrough" in the Vatican-Soviet negotiations about legalization of the Greek Catholic Church.

As in 1957, however, the prospect that the Uniate Church would emerge from the underground reportedly led the Russian Orthodox Church in 1968 to request that the state authorities forestall such a development.[34] In October 1968, a new wave of repressions against the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church began. It culminated in the arrests and imprisonment of Bishop Velychkovskyi and two underground priests in 1968–69.[35] In the countryside, vacant churches used for Ukrainian Catholic church services were either vandalized by the local authorities or turned over to various secular uses; a few were transformed into antireligious (actually, anti-Uniate) museums. In some localities, these actions provoked clashes between the militia and believers, and in a few cases, priests were roughed up or temporarily detained by the police. Heavy fines were levied on priests caught celebrating mass.[36]

This renewed repression of the Ukrainian Catholic Church coincided with Moscow's attack on political dissent in Ukraine as the authorities became alarmed by the espousal of the Greek Catholic Church's cause by Ukrainian dissidents. The early 1970's also witnessed a marked upsurge in slanderous and intimidating anti-Uniate publications, many of them authored by KGB veterans of previous anti-Ukrainian campaigns.[37]

These new attacks divided the Uniate clergy as to the prospects for legalization of their Church. Some re-

[31]Report by Fr. Mykhaylo Sopulak after a 1968 visit to Lviv, in *Cardinal Slipyi Papers*.

[32]Letter of Bishop Velychkovskyi dated Aug. 19, 1967, to Cardinal Slipyi, in *Cardinal Slipyi Papers*.

[33]See M. A. Morozov and E. I. Lisavtsev, *Aktualnyye zadachi ateisticheskogo vospitaniya* (The Pressing Tasks of Atheist Education), Moscow, "Znaniye," 1970, p. 18.

[34]*Ukrainskyi visnyk* (Paris), January 1971, pp. 53–63.

[35]In October 1968, the KGB searched the residences of bishops Velychkovskyi and Volodymyr Sterniuk and of underground priests, confiscating documents, archives, and funds, as well as liturgical and devotional objects. In January 1969, the KGB imprisoned Bishop Velychkovskyi; he was sentenced to three years of severe regimen camp. See *Vilna Ukraina* (Lviv) Dec. 14, 1969.

[36]In November 1969, the military had to be called to the village of Pynyany (Sambir rayon), where the militia's attempt to arrest a priest serving in a "closed" church had led to a major riot (Basilian Archives, Rome).

[37]Most notably, Serhiy Tarasovych Danylenko (pseudonym of S. T. Karin) and Klym Dmytruk (reportedly a pen name of Klymentiy Halskyi). See S. T. Danylenko, *Uniaty*, Moscow, Politizdat, 1972; *Dorohoyu hanby i zrady* (On the Road of Shame and Treason), Kiev, "Naukova dumka," 1972; and K. Ye. Dmytruk, *S krestom i trezubtsem* (With Cross and Trident), Moscow, Politizdat, 1979.

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signed themselves to the idea that the regime would never recognize the Church and that any possible "compromise" solutions hinted at by the KGB officials in their recurrent interrogations of the activist clergy were really stratagems to subvert, divide, and demoralize the catacomb Church. Others kept searching for some modus vivendi, and hoped in particular for some Vatican-Moscow solution regarding the status of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, only to become discouraged when better Orthodox-Catholic understanding was interpreted by the local Russian Orthodox clergy as the Vatican's abandonment of the Union and its adherents.[38]

A number of Ukrainian Catholic petitions for legalization of the Church were addressed to the government in 1972–73, although fear of repressions made it difficult to collect many signatures. A petition, brought to Moscow in February 1973 by a delegation led by Fr. Volodymyr Prokopiv, had 1,200 signatures. According to Fr. Prokopiv, he was told in Moscow: "Why are you not registering your Church?. . . If you do not want a Latin [Roman Catholic] one, then register it as an autonomous body. But give us your *credo,* the conditions on which we can register it."[39] A few priests were willing to accept the condition that "when the Catholic Church of Slavic Rite starts its activities, it will be subordinated to bishops appointed by the Pope in agreement with the Soviet government. The training of new priests [will be] in [Roman Catholic] seminaries in the Baltic [republics]. Other conditions [will be the same] as in the Catholic Church of the Roman Rite."[40] Father Prokopiv's initiative to attempt registration on these terms did not find much support among the Uniate clergy, which viewed these proposals as but another attempt to split the Church from within.

The Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in August 1975 marked an important step toward international monitoring of the Soviet observance of human rights, in particular the right to religious freedom. For the catacomb Uniate Church—the largest banned religious group in the USSR—the Helsinki process, with its regular review conferences and with the emergence of official monitoring bodies abroad and informal Helsinki groups within the USSR (the Ukrainian monitoring group was established in November 1976), opened the door to the internationalization of the Uniate cause. Beginning with the Belgrade review conference in the fall of 1977, the matter of the continued violation of the religious rights of Ukrainian Catholics was brought up directly or indirectly in US, Canadian, Vatican, and other Western speeches and documents—no doubt posing for the Soviet government the problem of how to remove the Uniate issue from the East-West agenda.

In late spring 1978, another attempt was made, apparently on suggestions from Soviet Ukrainian authorities, to seek recognition in the form of a "Roman Catholic Church of Eastern Rite." An initiative group drafted a statute for this Church, providing for Roman Catholic church services in either Church Slavonic or Ukrainian, the appointment by the Pope of a Roman Catholic bishop from Lithuania as its head who would assign clergy to parishes, and the restriction of the clergy's activities to liturgy and rites (finances and the administration of parish affairs were to be the domain of a lay parish executive committee as provided in the Soviet law on "cults").[41] On June 5, 1978, this draft statute was submitted to the Council for Religious Affairs in Moscow.[42] However, nothing came of this elaborate scheme, which—if had it been successful—would have bitterly divided the Church. Even if the authorities had not procrastinated with their response, uncertainties about the future direction of Vatican *Ostpolitik* may have soon doomed this project. On August 6, 1978, Pope Paul VI died. After the sudden death on September 29 of his successor, John Paul I, a Polish Cardinal, Karol Wojtyła, was elected to the See of St. Peter on October 16, 1978.

John Paul II and the Moscow-Vatican Confrontation over the Uniate Church

The accession of Pope John Paul II marked the beginning of a more supportive Vatican policy toward the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Soviet misgivings about the new Pope's intentions were confirmed by the publication of his letter to Yosyf Cardinal Slipyi, written on March 19, 1979, regarding the Millennium of the baptism of Kievan Rus' in 1988. In his letter, John Paul II underlined the continuing validity of the 1596 Union of Brest and paid homage to the Ukrainian Catholic epis-

[38]A particularly common "argument" used by Orthodox priests against the catacomb Greek Catholic priests was that "the Second Vatican Council has dissolved the Uniate Church" and that "the Pope instructed the Uniates to attend the Orthodox churches because there is no difference now." Particularly galling to the Ukrainian Catholics was the failure of Jan Cardinal Willebrands to protest when, in his presence as the Vatican's representative, a 1971 Local Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church ratified the 1946 "reunion" of the Greek Catholic Church with Moscow.

[39]See Fr. V. Prokopiv's letter (March 23, 1973), in *Cardinal Slipyi Papers.*

[40]Ibid.

[41]See a 1978 letter from Bishop Volodymyr Sterniuk to Cardinal Slipyi, in ibid.

[42]Ibid.

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copate, clergy, and faithful, "who have endured sorrows and injustices for Christ" and demonstrated "fidelity toward the Cross and the Church." Indirectly addressing the Soviet government, the Pope invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, calling on states to permit "every believing person to profess his own faith and also to be a participant in the community of the Church to which the person belongs."[43]

The Papal letter to Slipyi, according to Hansjakob Stehle, "evoked dismay and apprehension" in the Vatican's Secretariat for Christian Unity, then headed by Cardinal Willebrands, and also provoked a hostile reaction from Moscow. Undoubtedly reflecting the Kremlin's views, the Moscow Partriarchate promptly postponed a theological colloquium with the Roman Catholic Church in Odessa and, on September 4, 1979, its foreign affairs spokesman, Metropolitan Yuvenaliy, wrote to Cardinal Willebrands "threatening 'public criticism' if Willebrands did not quickly communicate the 'exact meaning' of the papal letter to Slipyi."[44] Not reassured by Willebrands's diplomatic response, Moscow protested again after John Paul II convened an extraordinary world synod of Ukrainian Catholic bishops in spring 1980 and confirmed the synod's election of Archbishop Myroslav Lubachivsky as coadjutor with the right of succession to the aged Archbishop Major of Lviv, Yosyf Slipyi, thus assuring the continuity of the Uniate Metropolitanate in Galicia.[45]

The Moscow-Vatican confrontation became more acute when the synod of Ukrainian bishops reconvened in Rome and adopted a resolution on December 2, 1980, declaring the "Lviv Sobor" canonically invalid, and null and void. (This position has always been maintained by the Ukrainian Catholic Church, but this time the synod's resolution was adopted in the presence of a papal representative, Cardinal Rubin, and so seemed to be backed by the authority of the Pope himself). Upon the "unofficial" publication of this document, the Patriarchate dispatched Metropolitan Yuvenaliy to Rome and, when the latter failed to secure a papal repudiation of the resolution, Patriarch Pimen wrote to Pope John II on December 22, 1980:

I strongly entreat and urge you to initiate, without delay, such action as not only would grant no validity to this declaration but would also inform the churches that Your Holiness neither approves nor supports the direction selected by the Ukrainian Catholic bishops.[46]

The Patriarch's protest must have precipitated a major debate in the Curia over priorities in the Vatican's political and ecumenical relations with Moscow and the effect of Moscow's displeasure on the position of the Roman Catholic Church in the Soviet bloc. The Pope's reply was sent only on January 24, 1981, and bore the marks of being a compromise that was unlikely to satisfy either the Patriarchate or the Ukrainian Catholics:

The Holy See, standing firmly on the position that it always held in relation to the rights of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, regrets that communiqués appeared in the press, before I had occasion to study the documents. Therefore, the [Holy See] immediately notified all nunciatures in countries where there are Ukrainian Catholic communities of the fact that these texts have not received approval and therefore were devoid of any official character.[47]

The Patriarchate was not satisfied with the Pope's response. Yuvenaliy was relieved of his external relations post and, early in April, the two letters were unilaterally made public by the Patriarchate's Department of External Ecclesiastical Relations, presumably to embarrass the Pope before Ukrainian Catholics since Cardinal Slipyi had not been informed about the exchange.

The anti-Papal barrage in the Soviet press in spring 1980 left no one in doubt that John Paul II was perceived as a clever and dangerous enemy of world communism, that "having undertaken to renew the influence of the Catholic Church [in Eastern Europe], the Pope inevitably has taken the road toward the rehabilitation of its child—the Ukrainian Catholic Church."[48] Reporting to an all-Union conference on nationality problems held in Riga in June 1982, a leading Communist party propaganda official from Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, voiced concern about the impact of the Pope's Eastern policy on believers in his republic:

There is a plan to resurrect the Uniate Church and to use it as a religious nationalistic opposition . . . to unite all anti-Soviet elements under the protection of religion and to encourage religious dissent. . . .

Under the influence of enemy propaganda, the Catholic clergy has intensified its activities. The for-

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[43]The Pope's 1979 letter can be found in Appendix II of Ivan Hvat, *The Catacomb Church and Pope John Paul II*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Ukrainian Studies Fund, 1985.

[44]Hansjakob Stehle, *Eastern Politics of the Vatican, 1917–1979*, Athens, OH, Ohio University Press, 1981, p. 381.

[45]Ibid., p. 382. The colloquium was eventually held in March 1981. Archbishop Volodymyr Sterniuk has served since 1972 as Exarch in Lviv of the Archbishop Major.

[46]Cited in Russel P. Moroziuk, *Politics of a Union*, Montreal, McGill University Press, 1983, pp. 11–12.

[47]Ibid., p. 113.

[48]N. O. Safonova, *Uniatska tserkva i fashyzm* (The Uniate Church and Fascism), 2nd rev. ed., Lviv, "Vyshcha Shkola," 1981, p. 53.

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mer Uniate clergy has been attempting to psychologically prepare the believers to demand the resumption of activities by the Uniate Church. A policy has been initiated of preparing new Uniate priests and monks from among the youth.[49]

Krawchuk informed the conference that the authorities in Ukraine had launched a massive program of propaganda and administrative countermeasures to combat the Vatican-supported "nationalist-clericalist" subversion in Ukraine, involving the party and state agencies, the media, mass organizations, the Council on Religious Affairs, and, implicitly, the local Russian Orthodox Church.

Renewed Drive for Legalization

The closing years of the Brezhnev era and the transitional regimes of Yuriy Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko witnessed a tightening of police-state controls, an attack on all forms of dissent, and an escalation of the so-called counterpropaganda against such alien influences as nationalism, Catholicism, religious fundamentalism, Zionism, and American imperialism. While "patriotic" rapprochement between the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church was gradually taking place, the banned Ukrainian Catholic Church was exposed to another wave of repressions. During the first half of 1980, three Uniate priests were murdered, and in early 1981, three other priests were imprisoned.[50] At the same time, new and more sophisticated efforts were undertaken by the Soviet secret police to penetrate, manipulate, and divide the underground Church and to undermine its credibility abroad through disinformation.

However, it was also in the early 1980's that some younger and more politicized elements among the Ukrainian Catholic laity and clergy mounted new efforts at publicizing abroad both the Uniates' predicament and their attempts to secure a re-legalization of the Church. In September 1982, an "Initiative Group for the Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church" was formed under the leadership of Yosyf Terelia. After the latter was arrested and sentenced to one year's imprisonment in December 1982, the leadership of the Group passed to Vasyl Kobryn, who was in turn imprisoned in November 1984 and sentenced to three years of forced labor. Beginning in early 1984, the Initiative Group began to circulate an irregularly appearing bulletin, "The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine," put together for the most part by Yosyf Terelia.[51]

One of the reasons for the emergence in what were most inhospitable conditions of the movement for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church was the activists' sense of a deepening crisis in the catacomb Church. The source of this crisis was the aging and dying of those of its clergy who had been educated in "normal" conditions—before the suppression of the Church—and who could not be replaced in the same numbers by equally prepared younger priests. Another concern was that during nearly 40 years, more and more "crypto-Catholics" who were attending Orthodox churches—served now by a new generation of Orthodox priests who had not been raised in the Uniate tradition—were gradually becoming estranged from the Ukrainian Catholic Church and might not return to it unless it emerged from the underground and secured recognition for itself from the regime.

Meanwhile, on September 7, 1984, Cardinal Slipyi died in Rome. He was succeeded, as planned, by Archbishop Myroslav-Ivan Lubachivsky, who was named Cardinal by Pope John Paul II on May 25, 1985. Before long, Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to leadership in the Soviet Union and the unfolding struggle over his economic reforms (*perestroyka*) triggered a series of political concessions. During 1986–87, nearly all Ukrainian religious and political prisoners were released, and they provided the backbone of the revived movement for human, national, and religious rights in Ukraine.

As the fear of massive police reprisals gradually receded, the catacomb Church became bolder and more visible, prodded into testing the limits of Gorbachev's reforms by the revived Initiative Group that was reorganized in late 1987—after Terelia's departure for Canada—as the Committee for the Defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, headed by a recently released political dissident, Ivan Hel.[52] The Committee began to publish an uncensored journal, *Khrystyyanśkyi holos* (Christian Voice), replacing "The Chronicle." Taking advantage of *glasnost'*, the Ukrainian Catholic activists organized a campaign for the restoration of the Church's status quo ante 1945, held public religious

[49]L. M. Kravchuk, "Atheist Upbringing of Workers and the Tasks of Counter-Propaganda," in *Neprimirimost' k burzhuaznoy ideologii, pereshitkam natsionalizma* (Intransigence toward Bourgeois Ideology and the Remnants of Nationalism), Riga, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya," 1982, pp. 35–53..

[50]Zinkevych and Lonchyna, op. cit., pp. 121, 130; and Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 416/80, Nov. 6, 1980.

[51]Zinkevych and Lonchyna, op. cit., pp. 661–62.

[52]Ibid., pp. 651–65.

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The millennium of the baptism of Kievan Rus' was solemnly celebrated in St. Peter's in Rome in July 1988.

—Marta Kolomayets/The Ukrainian Weekly.

services for large numbers of Uniate believers, especially at pilgrimage sites, collected petitions calling for the reopening of the Ukrainian Catholic churches and the complete rehabilitation and legalization of the Church, and invited publicized confrontations with the authorities over the constitutional right of Ukrainian Catholics to worship. Enlisting support from non-Ukrainian human and religious rights dissidents in the Soviet Union, the Committee also began supplying Western media with written, recorded, and videotaped evidence both of the large-scale grass-roots support for the re-legalization of the Greek Catholic Church and of the repressive countermeasures adopted by the Soviet authorities.

In early August 1987, a group of Ukrainian Catholic clergy, monastics, and laymen, including Bishops Pavlo Vasylyk and Ivan Semediy, declared that they were "leaving the underground" and called upon the Pope to "promote by all possible means the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the USSR."[53] Before long, other Ukrainian Catholic bishops joined in the demand for legalization, including Metropolitan Volodymyr Sterniuk of Lviv, and Bishop Sofron Dmyterko of Ivano-Frankivsk. With Pope John Paul II repeatedly speaking out on behalf of the Ukrainian Catholics in the USSR, great hopes were associated with the forthcoming celebrations of the Millennium of Christianity of Rus'-Ukraine. The Pope, who celebrated the Millennium with the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy and pilgrims in Rome in July 1988, made his future visit to the USSR conditional on his ability to make a pastoral visit to the Ukrainian Catholic Church and exacted a symbolic price for sending a high-ranking delegation to the Millennium celebrations in Moscow and Kiev: an official meeting between Cardinals Agostino Casaroli and Willebrands and a delegation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church led by Bishops Fylymon Kurchaba and Pavlo Vasylyk, which eventually took place in Moscow on June 10.[54]

But the Soviet authorities in Moscow and especially in Ukraine, who have long denied the existence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, rebuffed the initiatives for its legalization. Soviet spokesmen have been arguing, not very consistently, that legalization is an internal matter for the Russian Orthodox Church, which opposes any changes in the status quo in Western Ukraine. Alternatively, officials have been claiming that the "so-called" Ukrainian Catholic Church is not a religious entity but a "purely political," "nationalist," "separatist" organization, and hence ineligible for "registration," or that the Uniate Church would not be legalized unless it repudiated all "nationalist" Ukrainian Catholic lead-

[53] *Khrystyyanskyi holos* (Lviv), February 1988.

[54] See ibid., January through March 1988.

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ers abroad and local nationalist "extremists," and "proved" its "loyalty" to the state.[55]

The Russian Orthodox Church—its own status dramatically improved since 1987—has been actively lobbying at home and abroad against the reversal of Stalin's prohibition of the Greek Catholic Church and, of course, against the surrender by the Moscow Patriarchate of its forcibly "reunited" dioceses and parishes in Galicia and Transcarpathia. Indeed, since the fall of 1988, Soviet authorities have reacted to the drive for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church by transferring over 700 hitherto "closed" Uniate churches in the countryside to hastily-formed Orthodox "twenties" in the predominantly Greek Catholic communities.[56] At the same time, new repressive decrees against "unauthorized" public gatherings and demonstrations were adopted in the summer of 1988 and were applied against the Ukrainian Catholic clergy and lay activists, subjecting them to extremely high fines and administrative detentions.

It was widely expected (as various Soviet officials intimated in 1987–89) that the forthcoming new law on the freedom of conscience would legalize the Ukrainian Catholic Church. However, in May 1989, Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev announced at a news conference in Lviv —in the presence of the chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs in Ukraine, M. P. Kolesnyk—that the new law would not "reanimate" the Union and suggested that "Ukrainian Catholics" should attend the working Roman Catholic churches, while those Uniates who felt strongly about their Eastern rite should attend Orthodox churches. A legalization of the Uniate Church, he argued, would merely provoke Uniate-Orthodox clashes.[57]

Legalization Drive Radicalizes

Responding to Metropolitan Filaret's declaration that the Ukrainian Catholic Church would never be legalized, four bishops and 10 of its priests addressed an appeal to Gorbachev on May 16. In it, they rejected the political charges against the Church, declared their support for Gorbachev's reforms, and requested the Church's legalization. A delegation led by bishops F. Kurchaba, S. Dmyterko, and P. Vasylyk flew to Moscow for a promised meeting with the Supreme Soviet Presidium on May 17. When they were denied such a meeting, the bishops and priests staged a hunger protest in Moscow that attracted foreign TV and press coverage. The next day, the delegation was received by an official of the Presidium to whom the delegates gave the petition for Gorbachev. After the delegation's departure on May 19, rotating groups of Ukrainian Catholics staged hunger protests in Moscow for four months.[58]

The hunger strikes in the center of Moscow were combined with public religious services and the lobbying of Ukrainian deputies to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, four of whom unsuccessfully tried to raise the issue of the Uniate Church's legalization at the Congress sessions. The actions by Ukrainian Catholics in Moscow not only attracted international publicity but also support from Russian Orthodox dissidents and democratic circles.[59] However, the biggest achievement of the Ukrainian Catholic hunger strikers in Moscow was the sympathetic publicity they received from the reformist *Moscow News*. Having first reported on their "pray-in" in the capital on June 11, *Moscow News* followed up an angry reaction to this report from Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev with a point-by-point rebuttal of his charges against the Uniate Church. For the first time ever, a Soviet newspaper challenged the official version of the "reunion of Uniates" and charged that the Russian Orthodox Church "consistently supported Stalin's repressive measures against the followers of the Uniate Church." The author of the commentary, Sergey Filatov, urged the Russian Orthodox Church to return the Cathedral of St. George in Lviv to its rightful Uniate claimants, observing that "attempts to continue a repressive policy against the Uniates threaten to aggravate social tension, interethnic conflicts, and to complicate the USSR's relations with other countries."[60]

The legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church —which would seriously undermine the position of the

[55]See e.g., P. L. Yasotskyi and O. I. Utkin, "The Uniate Church: Historical Truth and the Present," *Pid praporom leninizmu* (Kiev), No. 23, 1988, pp. 72–77; M. P. Kolesnyk's interview, "Bells over the Desna," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Feb. 1, 1989; interview with Yu. Reshetylo, "Religion or Politics?" *Lyudyna i svit* (Kiev), January 1989, p. 18–23.

[56]The regulations specify that 20 believers can petition to register themselves as a religious community. See also Kolesnyk in *Izvestiya*, Feb. 1, 1989; his interview in *Radyanska Ukraina* (Kiev), Mar. 28, 1989; and his presentation at the US Institute of Peace conference in Washington, DC, June 20, 1990.

[57]Metropolitan Filaret's interview in *Visti z Ukrainy* (Kiev), No. 23, June 1989; and *Pravoslavnyi visnyk*, August 1989.

[58]"Ukrainian Bishops in Moscow," Ukrainian Press Service, Rome, May 19, 1989. Cf. E. Pyle, "Calls for Legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), July 21, 1989, pp. 24–26.

[59]See *Ogonek*, Sept. 7, 1989; *Keston News Service* (Keston College, Kent—hereafter, *KNS*), No. 327, June 8, 1989; and *Literaturna Ukraina* (Kiev), June 29, 1989. The Ukrainian Catholic demonstrators in Moscow were supported by a number of Russian Orthodox believers, including Frs. G. Yakunin and G. Edelstein, and, among public figures, most prominently by the late Andrey Sakharov, whose speech at the Congress of People's Deputies was interrupted by Gorbachev before Sakharov could make his appeal for legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Representatives of the banned "True Russian Church" also showed their solidarity.

[60]*Moscow News*, July 30, 1989.

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Russian Orthodox Church in Western Ukraine and was therefore bitterly opposed by the Moscow Patriarchate and Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi's party machine in Ukraine—had by May-June 1989 apparently caused division among Soviet policy-makers, delaying the adoption of the long-awaited "Law on the Freedom of Conscience" and contributing to the replacement of Konstantin Kharchev by Yuriy Khristoradnov as chairman of the USSR Council for Religious Affairs.[61] Kharchev made his position on this issue clear after his removal from the CRA chairmanship:

In the spirit of the Vienna accords, one must finally resolve the problem of the Uniates. To the state, all churches are equal. There should be no favorite churches and no stepchild churches. We cannot not recognize the Uniate Church, even if we proceed from the legislation of 1929; there is no alternative. And one must now think how to secure politically this step—so that it would not lead to destabilization and a confrontation between supporters of the two churches.[62]

A similar view was expressed by the Foreign Ministry spokesman on human rights, Yuriy Kashlev, who had headed the Soviet delegation to the Vienna conference:

Any faith has every right to be registered. In disputes about the Uniate Church the old internal problem between Catholics and the members of the Orthodox Church is transferred to the sphere of the state's rights and duties. But the state must solve this problem without delay because, under certain circumstances, it may turn into a serious abscess.[63]

The major event that helped to weaken the opposition to legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church was an unprecedented public demonstration in Lviv on September 17, 1989, in which, by official Soviet accounts, "more than 100,000 adherents of the illegal Ukrainian Catholic Church took part."[64] Similarly large demonstrations were held in other West Ukrainian cities. The movement for legalization headed by Ivan Hel had been reinforced by the Ukrainian urban intelligentsia, which was organized in various informal associations, including *Rukh,* the Popular Movement for Restructuring in Ukraine.

On September 20, Shcherbytskyi and Viktor Chebrikov—the two hardliners who were certain to oppose any relaxation of the party's nationality and religious policies in Ukraine—were removed from the Politburo, and four days later Shcherbytskyi was replaced as first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine by Volodymyr Ivashko. The Central Committee plenum on October 18 reflected a deepening uncertainty in the Ukrainian party leadership about the future status of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.[65] Of special importance in exploding the long maintained official myth about an allegedly "voluntary reunion" of the Greek Catholics with the Russian Orthodox Church in March 1946 were the articles in the mass circulation *Ogonek* in late September 1989 and in the early October issue of *Argumenty i Fakty.*[66] These revelations shattered the pretense of canonicity of the Russian Orthodox Church in Galicia and Transcarpathia and were widely perceived as a sure portent of a policy shift in Moscow.

As tensions mounted in Galicia over the future of the local Russian Orthodox Church, the Lviv parish of SS. Peter and Paul declared itself part of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) on August 19, 1989. It was soon followed by two other city parishes and eventually several hundred congregations in Galicia.[67] Though the authorities initially threatened administrative sanctions, they did not actually carry out their threat, either because of their wish to avoid confrontations with the parishioners and the local *Rukh* organization that extended its support to the UAOC as well, or because the officials saw the Autocephalists as "a lesser evil" than the Uniates. Most likely, the authorities expected this development to cause division and

[61]See Aleksandr Nezhnyy's interview with K. M. Kharchev, "Third Conversation," *Ogonek,* No. 44, October 1989, pp. 9–12. Cf. *KNS,* No. 329, July 6, 1989. One of the objections to the draft law at the CC CPSU Ideological Commission's meeting came from the Ukrainian Communist Party's ideological secretary, Yu. Yelchenko, who warned of the growing "danger of a clerical-nationalist allliance." See *Izvestiya Tsk KPSS* (Moscow), No. 6, 1989, p. 77.

[62]*Ogonek,* No. 44, October 1989.

[63]*Moscow News,* Nov. 5, 1989.

[64]Ibid., Sept. 24, 1989. The more likely total was 150,000. See *KNS,* No. 334, Sept. 21, 1989.

[65]See *Radyanska Ukraina,* Oct. 19 to 21, 1989.

[66]Rozhov, loc. cit., pp. 6–8 (*Ogonek*'s print run at the time was 3.3 million.); and P. Vasilev's interview with M. Odintsov, "Uniaty," *Argumenty i fakty* Oct. 7–13, 1989. At the time, the newspaper had a print run of 22.1 million.

[67]See *Pravoslavya nasha vira* (Kiev), Nos. 1, 2–3, 1989; *KNS,* No. 333, Aug. 7, 1989; and Volodymyr Hula, "Stepchildren: On the Way to Freedom of Conscience," *Literaturna Ukraina,* Nov. 16, 1989. The impetus for the restoration of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church dates back to the formation in Kiev of an Initiative Committee in mid-February 1989, led by Fr. Bohdan Mykhaylechko, a pastor of a Russian Orthodox Church parish in Jelgava, Latvia. He was instantly suspended from his parish duties following his participation in the inaugural conference of the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society in Kiev on February 11–12. See Bohdan Nahaylo, "Initiative Group for Restoration of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, *Report on the USSR,* Mar. 3, 1989, pp. 24–27. See also "Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church Holds Lviv Sobor," *The Ukrainian Weekly* (Jersey City, NJ), Oct. 29, 1989.

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strife in the Ukrainian national movement and to deflect energies of the Autocephalists and the Uniates from combating the Russian Orthodox Church to combating each other. On October 22, Bishop in the Russian Orthodox Church Yoann Bodnarchuk (a native Galician), who had just been granted a leave from his Zhytomyr see, accepted the leadership of the Autocephalous Church.[68]

On October 29, 1989, the Ukrainian Catholics peacefully took over the Transfiguration church (the largest church in Lviv), led by its young assistant pastor Yaroslav Chukhnyi.[69] Until the return of the Lviv Cathedral of St. George, in August 1990, the Transfiguration Church in effect became the center of Ukrainian Catholicism in Galicia. To demonstrate the continued strength of the popular demand for the restoration of the Uniate Church, another mass demonstration of well over 100,00 believers was organized on November 26, a week before Gorbachev's meeting with Pope John Paul in Rome.[70]

Qualified Recognition of Eastern Rite Catholics

Since the warming of Soviet-Vatican relations in the early 1960's, the Holy See has raised the issue of Ukrainian Catholic rights in numerous direct and indirect contacts with Soviet leaders, but without getting a satisfactory response. John Paul II's long-standing demand for legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church was once again conveyed to the Soviet government in June 1988 when a high-level Vatican delegation led by Cardinals Casaroli and Willebrands attended Russian Orthodox celebrations in Moscow of the Millennium of the baptism of Kievan Rus'. It was not until August 1989 that Gorbachev responded to the Pope's 1988 proposals. This led to the initiation of a series of exchanges between the Kremlin and the Moscow Patriarchate, on the one side, and the Holy See, on the other. In line with Gorbachev's position that the Uniate issue must be resolved by consensus between the Vatican and the Moscow Patriarchate, the latter proposed a "solution" (conveyed in Patriarch Pimen's letter of August 16, 1989, to the Pope) that was unacceptable to the Holy See: a de facto dissolution of the Uniate Church by having those Uniates valuing their Eastern rite more than Catholic dogmas join the Orthodox Church,[71] and absorbing into the Roman Catholic Church those valuing their adherence to Catholicism more than the Eastern rite. This was the same formula as the one advanced by Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and his government patrons in May, except that by August it seemed that the newly formed Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church would pull away from the Greek Catholic Church the first category of Uniate believers. Moscow's strategy apparently meant to take advantage both of a historical "fault line" in the Greek Catholic Church between its "Eastern" and "Roman" orientations and of the accumulated frictions between the Vatican establishment and the autonomist ("Patriarchal") movement in the émigré Ukrainian Catholic Church.

A compromise formula was devised during the October 19–21 visit to Moscow by Archbishop Angelo Sodano, the Vatican's Secretary for Interstate Relations, who met with Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and Yuriy Khristoradnov, chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs. The Holy See was assured that the new law on freedom of conscience and religious organizations would legalize the Ukrainian Catholic Church, but the Soviet side insisted that the practical aspects of legalization be resolved through agreement among the Holy See, the Soviet government, and the Moscow Patriarchate in the context of closer ecumenical dialogue between the Roman Catholic and the Russian Orthodox Churches.

The Pope's insistence on the recognition of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the USSR was reiterated in his reply to Patriarch Pimen's August letter, delivered to the Holy Synod by Cardinal Willebrands and his successor as president of the Pontifical Council for Promotion of Christian Unity, Archbishop E. Cassidy on November 1. The Moscow Patriarchate, however, merely agreed with the government that "Catholics of Eastern Rite" should have the right to worship legally. The question of their "access to churches" and other unresolved problems were to be left to future negotiations between the Vatican and the Patriarchate. This, in essence was the "final" position of the Russian Orthodox Church communicated to the Pope in Patriarch Pimen's message brought to Rome by Metropolitan Yuvenaliy on Novem-

[68]Bodnarchuk was immediately stripped of his hierarchical status (as were the priests who joined the Autocephalous Church) by the Russian Orthodox Church. "Resolution of the Holy Synod of the Rus' Orthodox Church on November 14, 1989," *Pravoslavnyi visnyk*, February 1990, pp. 2–4.

[69]"Episcopal Conference of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Lviv," *Postup* (Winnipeg), Nov. 19, 1989.

[70]*KNS*, No. 339, Nov. 30, 1989. The local authorities, fearing that the planned demonstration might end in a Greek Catholic seizure of St. George's cathedral, negotiated with Ivan Hel before the event to prevent conflict. The demonstration ended with a religious service near the cathedral and the adoption of appeals for full legalization of the Church. See *Lyudyna i svit*, February 1990, p. 31.

[71]See Yu. Valuyev's interview with Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev, "Our Church Desires Peace, Unity, and Good," *Visti z Ukrainy*, No. 23, June 1989.

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On December 1, 1989, in the Library Hall of the Vatican Palace, Pope John Paul II meets with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ber 27.[72] Gorbachev's meeting with Pope John Paul II on December 1, 1989, symbolized above all the rapprochement between the Kremlin and the Vatican. While the Pope reiterated his desire that Catholics of both Latin and Eastern rites be free to practice their religion, Gorbachev assured John Paul II that under the forthcoming law on the freedom of conscience all believers would enjoy religious freedom. Agreement in principle was reached to establish diplomatic relations between the two sides, and the Pope accepted Gorbachev's invitation to visit the Soviet Union. Arguing that an outright legalization of the Uniate Church would cause inter-religious clashes in Western Ukraine and create tension with the Moscow Patriarchate, Gorbachev declined to assume direct govenmental responsibility for resolving the problem of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, leaving this issue to be worked out through an intensified "ecumenical dialogue" between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Vatican.[73]

On December 1, 1989, the Novosti Press Agency and the media in Western Ukraine carried a brief "Declaration of the Council for Religious Affairs attached to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR," dated November 20. The Novosti dispatch from Lviv called the CRA "Declaration" a "*de-facto* recognition of the rights of the hitherto underground-existing Ukrainian Catholic Church (UCC), which had been prohibited by the Lviv Church Sobor in March 1946."[74] However, the actual text merely stated:

subject to their unconditional observance of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and the legislation on cults, Greek Catholics may enjoy all rights which are provided by the law on religious associations in the Ukrainian SSR. . . . All cult structures seized illegally by the believers should be returned to the local soviets of people's deputies. The transfer of these buildings to religious associations will be realized in accordance with established procedure. Questions of the registration of these or other religious congregations will be decided in accordance with the will expressed by the believers themselves.[75]

To ascertain the preferences of the believers—continued the "Declaration"—referenda will be conducted when necessary, possibly involving independent observers. In the meantime, "any attempts to influence the choice of confession by the believers are, in the Council's opinion, inadmissible."[76] While the "Declaration" clearly attempted to slow down the dynamics of the reestablishment of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the subsequent commentary by the chairman of the Ukrainian CRA, M.P. Kolesnyk, made clear that the Council did not recognize the corporate, canonical structure and the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, but only the right of "groups of believers" to apply for government

[72]This discussion of the Vatican-Moscow negotiations is based on a series of unpublished sources, as well as on reports in *KNS*, No. 337, Nov. 2, 1989; *The New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1989; and, especially, the reports and documents in Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, *Information Service* (Rome), Vol. 71, 1989, Nos. III–IV, pp. 129–134, covering developments until the end of February 1990. See also Oxana Antic, "Gorbachev's Road to Rome," *Report on the USSR*, Dec. 8, 1989, pp. 8–9.

[73]*Information Service*, Vol. 71, 1989, pp. 133–35. See a commentary, "The Pope-Gorbachev Summit," *KNS*, No. 340, Dec. 14, 1989, p. 15.

[74]Actually, the "Declaration" was first read on Lviv TV by the oblast Council for Religious Affairs plenipotentiary, Yuriy Reshetylo. On December 4, Ivan Hel and the committee's legal adviser, Mykola Muratov, stated that they consider the "Declaration" as falling short of the full legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the entire USSR, criticized the proposed "referenda" as open to governmental manipulation and distortion, and demanded the return of churches belonging to the Greek Catholic Church before 1946, and a political rehabilitation of the church by the authorities. See *KNS*, No. 340, Dec. 14, 1989, pp. 17–18.

[75]*Lyudyna i svit*, January 1990, pp. 8–9.

[76]Ibid.

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registration (recognition) and to seek from the authorities leases on unused houses of worship. There was no question of "returning" Greek Catholic churches or any other ecclesiastical property which had been nationalized, nor would the government nullify the decisions of the 1946 Lviv Sobor, rehabilitate the Church, or compensate it for damages suffered. The main thrust of Kolesnyk's comments was to accuse the Committee in Defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church of exploiting the Uniate problem, deliberately obstructing the normalization of the religious situation in Western Ukraine, and inflaming anti-Orthodox sentiments.[77] In another interview published in February 1990, Kolesnyk further clarified the government's position vis-à-vis the Church:

I think that . . . there is no need to determine whether the Lviv sobor was canonical, whether it had the right to decide these or other questions . . . the Russian Orthodox Church rejects the Union, does not recognize this artificial symbiosis. Why should then the government authorities intervene in this strictly theological question? Therefore, we are registering Greek Catholic congregations as new religious associations . . . the church in our country is separated from the state; therefore we have no right to interfere in its internal affairs, including the proceedings of church sobors. . . . The Council on Religious Affairs will not register those congregations which exist illegally, which themselves seize cult structures, and which arouse hostility on religious grounds.[78]

The immediate response of Ukrainian Catholic believers to the belated and limited promise of legalization was to take over their former churches from the Russian Orthodox Church. By early January 1990, over 120 churches had been reclaimed in Galicia; by the end of the month, the number had increased to 230 churches in the Lviv and Ternopil dioceses, and 140 in Ivano-Frankivsk diocese.[79] By June, according to Ukrainian Catholic sources, 803 churches were taken over by the newly formed, though still mostly unregistered, Uniate parishes in the Lviv diocese, some 500 in the Ivano-Frankivsk eparchy, and 12 in Transcarpathia.[80] Some 370 Orthodox priests had joined the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Galicia. This raised the number of Uniate clergy there to 767, including 186 monastic priests. By June, a total of 1,592 Greek Catholic congregations were formed in Galicia, reclaiming 1,303 churches. For theological seminaries that were yet to be restored, 485 candidates for priesthood had been selected from a larger number of applicants.[81] Approximately 700 nuns were active in the Greek Catholic Church in West Ukraine. In the same period, about 500 Orthodox parishes joined the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church.[82]

The mass takeover by Ukrainian Catholics of their former churches evoked a flurry of protests from the Moscow Patriarchate, Exarch Filaret of Kiev, and Orthodox bishops in Western Ukraine. They charged the Uniates with the use of "violence" in the "illegal seizure of churches," "intimidation" of Orthodox believers, and "persecution" of the Orthodox clergy—accusations that were instantly publicized by some Soviet media. Spokesmen for the Russian Orthodox Church appealed to Gorbachev and to law enforcement agencies for protection and help against the "nationalist," "separatist extremists" in Galicia, who allegedly masterminded and exploited for their own political ends the Uniate resurgence that, the Patriarchate warned, was leading to a religious "civil war." Under these circumstances, the Patriarchate argued, no referenda could be carried out fairly to determine the believers' preferences.[83]

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[77]"The Way Out of a Blind Alley," ibid. Kolesnyk's commentary apparently sought to answer the Hel Committee's critical reaction to the CRA "Declaration."

[78]Zinoviy Kovtun's interview with M. P. Kolesnyk, "Everyone's Right to Believe," *Soyuz* (Moscow), February 1990, p. 16.

[79]*Radyanska Ukraina*, Jan. 6, 1990; and *Argumenty i fakty*, Feb. 17–23, 1990.

[80]Fr. Iwan Dacko and Marko Tomashek, "The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Today," an unpublished paper presented at the annual congress of "Aid to the Church in Need," Koenigstein, Germany Mar. 26, 1990. The figures given in this paper for Galicia have been updated on the basis of information from the Church in Ukraine as of early June 1990.

[81]Ibid. According to the information presented by M. P. Kolesnyk at the US Peace Institute conference on June 20, "over 800" former Russian Orthodox parishes in Ukraine joined the Greek Catholic Church. The total includes Transcarpathia.

[82]M. P. Kolesnyk, June 20, 1990. On November 4, 1990, *Radyanska Ukraina* reported that the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church has 1,043 parishes, all but 10 of which are in Galicia.

[83]*KNS*, No. 338, Nov. 16, 1989. For the Russian Orthodox Church's charges of Uniate "violence," see "Declaration of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church Regarding the Situation in the Western Oblasts of the Ukrainian Exarchate," of December 15, 1989; an "Open Letter to His Holiness Pope John Paul II" from Archbishop Iriney of Lviv; and "Appeal of the Hierarchs of the Ukrainian Exarchate to the Clergy, Monastics, and All Believers of the Ukrainian Exarchate," of December 15, 1989 (all in *Zh. M. P.* (Moscow), March 1990. For the Ukrainian Catholics' refutation of these charges, see commentary by M. Bojcun, "Ukrainian Catholics Reject Orthodox 'Violence' Charges," *KNS*, No. 341, Jan. 11, 1990. Following a November 9 refutation of the TASS report on alleged violence in the takeover of the Transfiguration Church by Cardinal Lubachivsky (see a release by the Press Office of the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the same date), extensive documentation (including a videotape) supporting the Ukrainian Catholic Church's refutation became available. Representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate did not dispute the Greek Catholic refutation when it was presented by the Ukrainian Catholic bishops at the Vatican–Moscow Patriarchate bilateral commission meeting on January 16, 1990, in Moscow. Meanwhile, the chairman of the Committee for the Defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Ivan Hel, activist Stepan Khmara,
(footnote continued on p. 15)

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In the meantime, in anticipation of further Vatican-Moscow negotiations about the future of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, its supporters, representing a wide spectrum of Lviv intelligentsia and informal organizations, held a conference on "The Juridical-Legal Status of Religious Organizations in Conditions of Restructuring" on January 10, 1990. The gathering issued a "Declaration" spelling out the terms on which the Greek Catholic Church should be legalized:

- the Greek Catholic Church should be politically rehabilitated;
- the Church should have the rights of a juridical person restored to it, and accordingly, all its property, including churches, art treasures, relics, and cathedrals, should be returned;
- the 1946 Sobor should be declared a violent, anticonstitutional act of Stalinism;
- the hierarchical structure of the Church should be restored and recognized;
- conditions should be created to allow for theological seminaries, publication of religious literature, religious instruction of children, access by the clergy to the sick, imprisoned, homeless, kindergartens, and old age homes;
- in case of dispute over it, a church building should be given to the majority in a parish, but services for the minority should be scheduled in it. The minority in a parish may restore inactive churches, or build new ones for its own use.[84]

The "Declaration" accused the Soviet media and the Russian Orthodox Church of spreading disinformation about alleged religious violence and "seizure" of churches by Uniate believers; the document declared the interpretation of registration procedures by the CRA plenipotentiaries to be "illogical and provocative" and charged the "administrative apparatus" with deliberate obstruction, as none of the 158 Catholic parishes that had applied for registration had yet been registered.[85]

Participants in the January 10 conference also wrote a memorandum for the Moscow meeting of the Vatican and Moscow Patriarchate delegations, reiterating the demands of the "Declaration," calling for the return of St. George's Cathedral, and warning that failure to address the grievances of the Ukrainian Catholics would result in a "radicalization" of the popular mood in Western Ukraine.[86]

On January 23, the first local council of bishops, clergy, and representatives of believers of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Galicia and Transcarpathia met in Lviv to condemn and declare null and void the "so-called Lviv Sobor" of 1946, reaffirm the Church's canonical integrity and unity of its hierarchy, and to formulate the Church's desiderata in terms similar to those in the January 10 "Declaration."[87]

Meanwhile, Vatican and Russian Orthodox Church delegations met in Moscow from January 12 to 17 and produced "Recommendations on the Normalization of Relations Between the Orthodox and Catholics of the Eastern Rite in Western Ukraine," which were apparently acceptable to the Soviet government and were subsequently ratified by the Pope and the Russian Orthodox Synod of Bishops.[88] The agreement was bound to disappoint the Uniates by failing to recommend the full recognition of their Church and to acknowledge the existence and authority of the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy in Western Ukraine. The "Recommendations" stated:

In the wish to pursue and intensify the efforts toward unity, it would be very desirable that the establishment of a hierarchical structure for Eastern Rite Catholics in Western Ukraine be the subject of contacts between our Churches in order to avoid giving the impression of opposing one hierarchy to another.[89]

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and Uniate priests A. Maslyuk and I. Bilyk were charged by the authorities under articles of the Ukrainian Criminal Code. See *KNS*, No. 342, Jan. 25, 1990. On December 15, 1989, Ivan Hel was "invited" to the Lviv KGB and accused of "spreading slanderous inventions" about the alleged KGB "inspiration of hostility between believers of various confessions." See *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), Jan. 6, 1990. For refutations of charges of "violence," see *Lyudyna i svit*, February 1990, pp. 29–35; a speech in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet by a Ternopil oblast deputy, L. T. Horokhivskyi, who accused the Russian Orthodox Church of "artificially creating conflict from above," *Radyanska Ukraina*, May 30, 1990. For outside accounts of Orthodox-Uniate conflicts, see Volodymyr Hula, "To Unity," *Literaturna Ukraina*, Mar. 29, 1990; and Ihor Natochiy, "With the Cross against the Cross," *Ukraina* (Kiev), May 27, 1990, pp. 6–7.

[84]Materials of a Scholary Conference, "The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church: 1946 and the Present Situation," Lviv, January 10, 1990.

[85]Ibid.

[86]"Memorandum Regarding the Meeting of Vatican-Moscow Delegations," *Novyi shlyakh* (Toronto), June 9, 1990. The memorandum was apparently presented to a member of the Vatican delegation, Archbishop Myroslav Marusyn, during the Moscow meeting in mid-January.

[87]See *Tserkovnyi visnyk* (Chicago), June 10, 1990.

[88]*Information Service*, Vol. 71, 1989, Nos. III–IV, pp. 130–34. First to publish the communiqué and "Recommendations" of the January meeting was RATAU (the official news agency of Soviet Ukraine). See *Pravda Ukrainy*, Feb. 6, 1990, which reported that the agreement was ratified by the Pope on January 25, 1990. It is worth noting that the *Information Service* published together with the "Recommendations" a letter from Archbishop E. Cassidy conveying to the Moscow Partriarchate the Pope's approval of this document, dated February 19, 1990; but the letter also mentions the Holy See's reservations about "historical judgments" in the accord (presumably about the 1596 Union of Brest) and possible misinterpretations of certain parts of it. Cassidy's letter was conceivably a reaction to Uniate disapproval of the Vatican's seeming retreat from its previous insistence on the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

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Meeting in spring 1990 of the Quadripartite Commission for the resolution of practical problems arising in the course of normalizing relations between the Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. On the left side are representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church; on the right, are representatives of the Vatican and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.

—B. Krishtul/TASS from Sovfoto.

The most important recommendation of the Moscow meeting involved the creation of a joint quadripartite commission for the resolution of practical questions emerging in the process of normalizing relations between the Orthodox and Eastern Rite Catholics. The commission was to include representatives from the Holy See, the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Orthodox as well as the Greek Catholics from Western Ukraine. A particularly urgent task of the commission was to "regulate the situation in churches occupied by the Catholics of the Eastern Rite without the consent of local congregations or prior to the Uniate community's "registration."[90]

When the quadripartite commission assembled in Kiev on March 6, the Vatican was represented by Archbishop Myroslav Marusyn (Secretary of the Congregation for Eastern Churches) and Ukrainian Catholic Metropolitan Stepan Sulyk of Philadelphia, while the elderly Archbishop Volodymyr Sterniuk of Lviv and Bishop Sofron Dmyterko of Ivano-Frankivsk were summoned at the last moment to represent the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine. According to Archbishop Sterniuk, the delegation of the Moscow Patriarchate and its Ukrainian Exarchate quickly took control of the commission's agenda and skillfully manipulated the proceedings and the subsequent visit to Western Ukraine so as to isolate and alienate the two Uniate representatives from Western Ukraine.[91] On March 13, Sterniuk walked out of the quadripartite commission's meeting in protest over the Moscow Patriarchate's refusal to concede that the 1946 Lviv Sobor was invalid and to recognize the canonical, corporate nature of the Greek Catholic Church and its hierarchy.[92] The action of Sterniuk and his 14 demands that the Commission refused to consider were endorsed on March 17 by the other Uniate bishops in Ukraine.[93] It may well have been part of the Patriarchate's strategy to split the Catholic side in the Commission and to place the blame for the delay of legalization squarely on the shoulders of the Uniate episcopate and their "extremist" lay entourage.

[89]*Information Service*, Vol. 71, Nos. III–IV, 1989, p. 133. In the communiqué prefacing the "Recommendations," the two delegations referred to the Eastern Rite Catholics' "possibility of organizing their ecclesiastical structures within the *Roman* Catholic Church." This formulation seemed to confirm what some Autocephalist polemicists have been saying, namely, that the "Polish Pope" is replacing the Greek Catholic Church with a "Polish *Kościół* (Latin Church)."

[90]Ibid.

[91]Dacko and Tomashek, loc. cit., pp. 7–9.

[92]Ibid.

[93]For Sterniuk's 14 points and the Ukrainian Catholic bishops' declaration endorsing his walking out from the quadripartite commission, see "Declaration of the Bishops of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine on the Negotiations of the Quadripartite Commission on Relations between the Orthodox and Catholics," *Leninska molod* (Lviv), Mar. 23, 1990.

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The breakdown of the quadripartite commission had several immediate consequences. It stepped up the confrontation between the Ukrainian Catholics and the adherents of the Moscow Patriarchate over the churches in Galicia, especially St. George's Cathedral in Lviv, the historical center of the Greek Catholic Church.[94] The Patriarchate escalated its anti-Uniate campaign, and formed together with other pro-regime supporters a "Republican Committee for Defense of the Rights of Believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church."[95] Seeking to pacify the increasingly restive Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Pope summoned all bishops in Ukraine and in the diaspora for a two-day meeting in Rome on June 25–26, to review the ecclesiastical situation in Western Ukraine and to explain the Holy See's negotiations with Moscow.[96]

Meanwhile, the Soviet authorities in Kiev and Moscow continued to procrastinate with the registration of the Ukrainian Catholic congregations and to block the "leasing" of once Uniate churches to these congregations. According to Ukrainian Catholic bishops, by June nearly 1,600 Ukrainian Catholic congregations in Galicia had applied for "registration," but most of these applications were returned by the Kiev Council for Religious Affairs on the grounds that the forms were improperly filled out. To make matters even more difficult, in April 1990 the authorities introduced new registration forms.

A Changed Public Climate

Meanwhile, the revival of civil society, its growing politicization, and the rapid growth of the national democratic movement could not help but affect the religious situation in Ukraine. The most important stimuli to political mobilization of Ukrainian society were the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in early 1989 and the direct, and less manipulative, elections to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and the lower-level soviets in March 1990. Suddenly, articulators of national, cultural, linguistic, and religious demands discovered that they could influence the resolution of these demands through the deputies they had elected and, to some extent, even through the communist officials against whom they voted. This was particularly true in Western Ukraine, where the democratic bloc won overwhelmingly.

The new popularly-elected local and oblast authorities adopted immediate measures to break the deadlock over the legalization of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Thus, on April 25, the new Ivano-Frankivsk oblast soviet of people's deputies passed a resolution "On the Basic Principles [Governing] Relations of the Organs of State Power in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast to the Existing Confessions, and on Ensuring the Free Development of Religious-Ecclesiastical Life in Subcarpathia."[97] While confirming the principle of equality of all denominations before the law and endorsing democratic referendum procedures in resolving local conflicts over church buildings, the oblast soviet ruled that: (1) the resolutions of the so-called "Lviv sobor" of 1946 are invalid; (2) local government organs are authorized to assign to Uniate congregations churches that Uniates had used prior to 1946; and (3) disputes over those church buildings cannot be resolved without the consent of the clergy and faithful of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. These principles were meant to apply until the adoption of a new law on the freedom of conscience by the USSR and Ukrainian supreme soviets.

The accelerating process of change in Ukrainian politics, however much it was braked by the still dominant conservative forces in the Ukrainian party-state apparatus, had to affect yet another conservative institution—the Russian Orthodox Church. By 1989, the leadership of the Exarchate found it necessary to make some token concessions to the Ukrainian language and, in January 1990, the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church was given another name, "the Ukrainian Orthodox Church."[98] After the June 1990 Local Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church

[94]St. George's Cathedral was kept locked for months by the Orthodox. When the new democratically-elected authorities ruled that St. George's Cathedral and the Metropolitan's palace be transferred to the Greek Catholic metropolitan, the Moscow Patriarchate and its Kiev Exarch protested, and the republican and all-Union authorities overruled the Lviv council. See *Radyanska Ukraina*, Mar. 25 and Apr. 13, 1990.

[95]N. Protsenko, "Passions in God's Churches," *Pravda Ukrainy*, Mar. 30, 1990. See also *Radyanska Ukraina*, Mar. 31 and May 13, 1990.

[96]All 10 bishops from Ukraine were summoned to Rome by the Pope for their *ad limina* visit, where they were joined by the 18 Ukrainian Catholic bishops from the diaspora led by Cardinal Myroslav-Ivan Lubachivsky. See *Svoboda* (Jersey City, NJ), July 7, 1990. The first two days were devoted to reports, briefings, and a wide-ranging review of the situation in West Ukrainian dioceses; the Vatican-Moscow ecumenical dialogue and the Ukrainian Church's role therein; and, various internal problems of the Ukrainian Church as well as how to resolve its conflicts with the Exarchate. The Pope was accompanied at the session by chief officials of the Curia. The third day (June 27) was declared an Extraordinary Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. By calling this meeting, John Paul II laid to rest the long-standing Soviet governmental excuse for not registering the Ukrainian Catholic Church ("Papal non-recognition of the secretly ordained bishops in Ukraine").

[97]*Dzvony Pidhirya* (Kalush), June 2 and 3, 1990.

[98]Hula, "To Unity," loc.cit; "Documents of the Episcopal Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, January 30–31, 1990," *Pravoslavnyi visnyk*, April 1990, pp. 4–12, and "Resolutions of the Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church," (February 8, 1990), in ibid., pp. 16–18.

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voiced its concern over the Church's losses in Western Ukraine to the Uniates and the Autocephalist "schismatics," the newly elected Patriarch Aleksiy II of Moscow and a special commission of the Holy Synod visited Ukraine. In response to Soviet Ukraine's declaration of sovereignty on July 16, the Russian Orthodox Church granted a "self-governing" status in October to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which, however, remains an integral part of the Moscow Patriarchate.[99] The resurgence of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church—though, so far, largely confined to Galicia[100]—represents, in the long run, a much greater challenge to the Russian Orthodox Church than the revival of the Greek Catholic Church, because the Autocephalous Church is bound to spread in the traditionally Orthodox parts of eastern Ukraine.[101]

In the meantime, on August 19, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church officially repossessed its historic St. George's Cathedral in Lviv, and, on November 1, the adjoining metropolitan's palace.[102] In September, archdiocesan seminary classes began in Rudno, near Lviv, with some 250 students; another 47 seminarians are studying in Drohobych. In Ivano-Frankivsk, about 300 theology students have been attending improvised lectures. The Basilian monastic order opened a small seminary with some 70 candidates, and a novitiate in its Krekhiv monastery.[103]

Amidst a continuing Orthodox-Uniate tension, delegations of the Vatican and the Moscow Patriarchate met again in Moscow on September 10, and were subsequently joined by the three Greek Catholic bishops and their Orthodox counterparts. But on September 14, the Russian Orthodox delegates walked out of the talks after the Catholic side unanimously rejected their claims to the now Uniate churches in Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk.[104] Soon after, a tripartite oblast inter-church commission in Lviv fell apart after the UOC and UAOC representatives withdrew from it, alleging that the local authorities favor the Greek Catholic side in the allocation of church buildings.[105] Meanwhile, the Archbishop Major of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Myroslav-Ivan Cardinal Lubachivsky announced that he plans to visit his flock in Ukraine next spring.[106]

Conclusions

Gorbachev's political reforms (rather than any specific new nationality policy on his part) made it ultimately impossible to maintain his newly won international credibility without making concessions on a long-standing human rights issue—the ban of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. However, concerned as they are about the interdependence of religion and nationalism in Western Ukraine, the Soviet authorities have chosen to abstain from government action to correct the wrong, and to resort to the time-tested method of "ecumenical dialogue" between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Vatican. They hoped thus to minimize the losses to the Russian Orthodox Church and to maximize the government's influence on the nature, structure, and hierarchy of the hitherto underground Church so as to isolate it as much as possible from the increasingly powerful Ukrainian national-democratic movement in Galicia and its supporters abroad. The authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church may have welcomed the emergence of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Galicia as a way of turning a Russo-Ukrainian ecclesiastical struggle into an intra-Ukrainian religious conflict. The largely cosmetic Ukrainization of the Kiev Exarchate seems to have been motivated by concerns about the Autocephalist challenge, and by the need for some accommodation with the growing political power of *Rukh* and its allies.

These concessions on the part of the state and the Moscow Patriarchate offered "too little, too late" to the

[99]Press conference of Metropolitan Filaret, *Pravda Ukrainy*, Nov. 2, 1990.

[100]*Radyanska Ukraina*, Nov. 4, 1990.

[101]The Council for Religious Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR published an announcement (*Radyanska Ukraina*, May 16, 1990) recognizing the right of Orthodox religious communities to determine which ecclesiastical authority (the Moscow Patriarchate or the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church) to recognize, and stating that the latter "may be created at a duly convened synod or congress." On June 5–6, 1990, an "All-Ukrainian Sobor of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church met in the Kiev House of Cinema in the presence of seven bishops and 547 delegates from the clergy and laymen. It adopted statutes, determined the diocesan organization of the church, proclaimed an "All Ukrainian Patriarchate," and elected in absentia Metropolitan Mystyslav Skrypnyk as Patriarch of Kiev and All Ukraine, and Metropolitan Yoann Bodnarchuk as the Patriarch's *locum tenens*. See Larysa Lokhvytska, *Literaturna Ukraina*, June 21, 1990. According to the Ukrainian CRA Chairman Kolesnyk, the authorities recognized the synod and its decisions (Kolesnyk's remarks at Washington, June 20, 1990). However, Patriarch Mystyslav was refused a Soviet visa until October. After his arrival in Ukraine on October 20, he was received by L. M. Kravchuk, the Soviet Ukrainian head of state, and treated initially with courtesy in the official press. But following an October 28 confrontation between the UAOC supporters and those of the ROC/UOC over St. Sophia Cathedral in Kiev, *Radyanska Ukraina* published on November 4 a lengthy diatribe against Skrypnyk and, indirectly, the Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, the authorities provided both St. Andrew's and St. Sophia's cathedrals in Kiev for two-day ceremonies (November 17–18) of enthronement of Mystyslav as the UAOC's Patriarch of Kiev and All Ukraine. The enthronement ceremony was attended by Kolesnyk which signified the republican government's recognition of the UAOC and its Patriarch. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, Nov. 25, 1990.

[102]*Vira Batkiv* (Lviv), No. 13–14, Aug. 19–26, 1990; *Svitlo* (Toronto), November 1990, pp. 368–69.

[103]*The Ukrainian Weekly*, Nov. 18, 1990; conversation with Ivan Hrechko of Lviv, Nov. 15, 1990.

[104]*Svitlo*, November 1990, pp. 368–69.

[105]*Za Vilnu Ukrainu* (Lviv), Oct. 13, 1990.

[106]*Novyi Shlyakh* (Toronto), Nov. 24, 1990.

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Ukrainian Catholic Church and its mass constituency in Western Ukraine. They have thus failed to prevent the takeover of once Uniate churches by the Ukrainian Catholics and have limited the hoped-for capacity of the Vatican to subdue the explosive mixture of long-standing religious and ethno-national grievances.

The sweeping victory of the *Rukh*-dominated Democratic Bloc in local and oblast elections in Western Ukraine in March 1990 has offered the Greek Catholic Church an alternative political venue for satisfying its demands, and simultaneously deprived the Russian Orthodox Church of privileged treatment by local government.

The much reworked draft law "On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" was finally approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet and promulgated by President Gorbachev on October 1, 1990.[107] Its provisions bear the marks of a compromise between progressive reformers who wanted this law to reflect international human rights norms, and the conservative ideological and security establishments who have insisted on continuing state control and manipulation of institutional religion. Most of the articles are devoted to the still far-reaching state regulation of religious statutes and organizations through the old system of "registrations" (permits) for those religious groups that seek the status of a juridical person (including property rights), and for religious centers, monastic and theological institutions, etc. As in the past, ambiguous wording and extensive, overlapping powers of republican and central authorities leave too much room for administrative arbitrariness, interference, discrimination, and political manipulation. The law's provisions that are likely to ease the situation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church include the ending of an obligatory registration for local groups of believers, as long as they do not seek a person-in-law status; the right to appeal administrative rulings to courts; and a special provision for those religious groups whose religious center lies outside the Soviet Union (an agreement between the Soviet government and such a foreign center as, e.g., the Vatican, would apparently replace the registration of the given religious groups' statutes).

Glasnost' and democratization have made it possible for the Ukrainian Catholic Church to leave the catacombs, yet Gorbachev's indecisiveness on nationality problems and his reluctance to alienate the Russian Orthodox Church and its conservative supporters in Ukraine resulted in belated half-measures that merely deepened the Uniates' distrust of the Kremlin's motives. At the same time, the course of the Vatican-Moscow negotiations has created doubts about the Vatican's capacity to press the Kremlin and the Patriarchate for a full recognition and restoration of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. In frustration, the Uniates proceeded to take back many of their confiscated churches without waiting any longer for administrative fiat or decisions from above, and as the largest constituency in Galicia, they have turned to the newly elected organs of people's power to complete the unfinished task of the Church's legalization.

[107] *Pravda*, Oct. 9, 1990.

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The Future of the KGB

Amy W. Knight

The Soviet political police, known today as the KGB (*Komitet po Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti*—Committee for State Security), has always had a special relationship with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Ever since Lenin created the infamous Cheka in 1917, a political police has served as the "sword and shield" of the party, or, more precisely, of the party leadership.[1] As the party gradually extended its dominance over newly conquered regions, it relied heavily on the coercive might of the police to incorporate them into the Soviet state or create puppet regimes. When Gorbachev became party leader in March 1985 he inherited a vast, highly-centralized police apparatus that extended throughout Eastern Europe. Today, almost six years later, this police empire is crumbling, and its mainstay, the CPSU, is losing its grip. The communists have been swept out of power in most of Eastern Europe, party organizations in the Soviet republics have declared their independence from Moscow, and the CPSU leadership has formally given up its political monopoly. What do these developments portend for the KGB? Will it share the fate of its surrogate police organizations in Eastern Europe, which were dismantled after the demise of the communist parties there?

It has been one of the paradoxes of *perestroyka* that despite the substantial progress toward a freer and more democratic system, the KGB has maintained a highly visible presence in the Soviet Union. Indeed, it has retained greater political status than have other institutions, such as the military. This can be explained by the fact that Gorbachev, like earlier party leaders who also lacked a public mandate, has had to rely on the KGB for support. Now that the party has lost authority, and Gorbachev's claims to the country's leadership rests primarily on his position as president of the Soviet Union, the future of the KGB is becoming even more closely bound to his personal political fortunes. But the insistent demands of the reformers and the growing movement of the Soviet republics toward independence are outpacing Gorbachev's own program and challenging the prerogatives of a strong, centralized secret police. Gorbachev will find it increasingly difficult to maintain his association with this organization without losing his credibility as a reformist leader. In short, the KGB may be crucial to maintaining Gorbachev's rule as popular discontent mounts, but it is also a serious political liability for him. How Gorbachev deals with this problem will have a tremendous impact not only on the future of the KGB as an institution but also on the course of political change in the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev's Strategy Toward the KGB

Gorbachev decided early in his tenure as party leader that he could ill afford to seriously weaken the KGB at a time when he was introducing potentially destabilizing changes within the system, changes that were bound to give rise to discontent in many quarters. And

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[1]Emphasizing this bond, Lenin once declared that "a good Communist is at the same time a good Chekist [a Cheka employee]." As quoted in George Leggett, *The Cheka, Lenin's Political Police*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 351.

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indeed, he has been forced to call upon the KGB for support on numerous occasions when civil strife has erupted in the national republics. The KGB's elite body of 40,000 Special Troops is insufficient for quelling large-scale outbursts of violence—a task that has been left mainly to the Internal Troops and special riot squads (OMON) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and to the regular army.[2] But the KGB performs the highly sensitive function of ensuring the political reliability of MVD and army troops by means of so-called "special sections," and it is also charged by law with investigating the causes of public violence and arresting those responsible.[3] In some cases, KGB Border Troops, which number some 220,000 men, have been used to contain unrest. In December 1989 and January 1990, for example, there were severe outbreaks of violence along the Soviet-Iranian border in Azerbaijan, where Soviet Azerbaijanis wishing to cross over to Iran destroyed border installations, causing 3 million rubles' worth of damage. Because of rising tension in border areas an extra military division was transferred to the KGB Border Troops in early 1990.[4]

Gorbachev's response to the growing ethnic unrest has been to give the KGB and the regular police (the MVD) broader powers under the law. In July 1988, the government issued a decree banning unauthorized public demonstrations and making participants liable to punishment.[5] Less than a year later, in April 1989, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet passed an amendment to the USSR Law on State Crimes. In what was on the surface a concession to reformers, the term "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" was deleted from the infamous Article 7 (the equivalent of Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code) that had long be used by the KGB to suppress even the mildest forms of political dissent. But the new version of this article was actually subject to broader interpretation and hence greater abuse than the initial one. Furthermore, another amendment added a new clause (11–1) to Article 11 (Infringement of National or Racial Equality), making it a crime to insult or defame state organs or officials and elected deputies in public.[6]

The new Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet elected in May 1989 managed to force the Gorbachev leadership to modify these amendments in the summer of 1989. The most egregious features of Article 7 were eliminated, making it more explicit and less open to abuse by the KGB, and Article 11–1 was done away with altogether.[7] But once Gorbachev became president in March 1990, he immediately used his new, awesome powers to strengthen criminal laws. Not surprisingly, one of his first targets was Article 7. As part of a sweeping new "USSR Law on Enhanced Responsibility for Encroachment on the National Equality of Citizens and Forcible Violation of the Integrity of USSR Territory," a new clause, on the "violent disruption of the unity enshrined in the USSR Constitution" was added to Article 7, and stiffer criminal sanctions were mandated. The law also amended the 1988 decree outlawing spontaneous demonstrations by prohibiting participation in public associations, movements, or parties that kindle ethnic hostility or violate the integrity of the USSR's territory. Fines for such violations were raised from 1,000 to 10,000 rubles.[8]

Gorbachev has also used his recently acquired powers to strengthen KGB and MVD troops. On March 21, 1990, following attempts by the Lithuanian government to form its own border guard, he issued a decree specifying measures for reinforcing the Lithuanian border with additional USSR troops and weapons.[9] Ten days

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[2]This point was made by a KGB official in the KGB's regular column,"The KGB Informs and Comments," *Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), No. 27, July 7–13, 1990, p. 6. For a discussion of paramilitary forces available to protect public order, see Mark Galeotti, "Police and Paramilitaries: Public Order Forces and Resources," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), June 8, 1990, pp. 6–9. See also Viktor Yasmann, "The Power of the Soviet Industrial Security Forces," *Report on the USSR*, Oct. 26, 1990, pp. 12–15.

[3]On the KGB's role of political control within the MVD forces, specifically to prevent these forces from sympathizing with nationalist groups, see an interview with Major G. M. Kazimir in *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Oct. 23, 1990. The KGB is authorized to investigate crimes committed under Article 16 of the All-Union Law on Crimes Against the State (Article 79 of the RSFSR Code), which sets criminal sanctions for organizing or participating in mass disorders.

[4]KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov revealed the transfer of this division in a speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet, reported on Moscow Television on Sept. 24, 1990. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Sept. 25, 1990, pp. 38–39. On the border disturbances in Azerbaijan, see *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 1, Jan. 6–12, 1990, p. 8; and an interview on Moscow Television with KGB Colonel I. N. Prelin, Jan. 31, 1990, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 1, 1990. Interestingly, just around this time a new Border Guards chief, Lt. Gen. I. Ya. Kalinichenko, was identified in the Soviet press. See *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Jan. 20, 1990. Kalinichenko replaced V. A. Matrosov, who had held that post since 1972.

[5]See *Izvestiya*, July 29, 1988.

[6]The amendments were published in ibid., April 11, 1989. For further discussion of these changes, see Amy W. Knight, "The KGB and Democratization: A New Legal Order?" in Uri Ra'anan, Ed., *The Soviet Empire: The Challenge of National and Democratic Movements*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1990, pp. 41–62, esp. pp. 50–53. Gorbachev may have underestimated the public reaction to these changes. According to an article by Nina Belayeva, "Rule Out Loopholes in the Law" (*Moscow News*, May 21, 1989), there was widespread indignation.

[7]The text appeared in *Izvestiya*, Aug. 5, 1989. Also see *Vedomosti S'yezda Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Moscow), No. 9, August 1989, item 203.

[8]Almost any government official can instigate such a ban, which then must be declared by the Supreme Court (at any level). The President is also empowered to ban associations and parties. For the text of the law, see *Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 6, 1990.

[9]For a discussion of the decree, see an interview with the Chief of Staff of the USSR KGB Border Troops, Lt. Col. V. Shlyakhtin, in *Pravitel'stvennyy Vestnik* (Moscow), No. 14, April 1990, pp. 1, 9.

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later, a new law on the MVD Internal Troops was promulgated that granted them substantial powers to combat civil disturbances.[10] This was followed on April 10 by enactment of a law, signed by Gorbachev, that set out the procedures for declaring martial law and specified that KGB troops could be used alongside those of the MVD and the Army "to protect public order."[11] Then, on July 25, Gorbachev issued a strongly-worded decree ordering militant groups in the republics to surrender their weapons and authorizing KGB and MVD troops to seize these arms forcibly if these groups failed to comply within two weeks.[12]

Clearly, Gorbachev is attempting to provide a legal basis for putting down eruptions of ethnic violence and national self-assertiveness. But these laws are being made hastily, by fiat from above, while the long-awaited new criminal codes and codes of criminal procedure —which are crucial for protecting the public against police abuse—have yet to be enacted. For those who consider such legal protections the cornerstone of any democratic order, the continued postponement of these reforms is discouraging.[13]

KGB Initiatives

For its part, the KGB has adopted a strategy of avowed support for *perestroyka,* and has taken the initiative in introducing changes within its organization. However, these changes are mainly cosmetic and have not diminished the KGB's powerful coercive apparatus. In early 1990, for example, the KGB announced the abolition of the Ninth Directorate, which was charged with guarding government leaders and buildings. But a new Guards Service, with essentially the same functions, was created in its place.[14] Earlier, KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov had declared that the KGB's Fifth Directorate, which had been responsible for suppressing political and religious dissent, had been abolished.[15] It was replaced by a new, unnumbered, Directorate for the Protection of the Soviet Constitution, whose stated function was to suppress "organized anti-socialist groups aimed at destabilizing the internal political situation" and "persons attempting to overthrow or change forcibly the Soviet state and social system."[16] In other words, this directorate was charged with containing ethnic unrest and moving against the independence movements in the republics, which are threatening the viability of the USSR as presently constituted. Participants can be punished, in the case of violent confrontations with Soviet authorities, under Article 7 of the USSR Law on State Crimes. Thus, both a legal basis and an institutional structure for the use of police coercion to deal with recalcitrant republics or nationalist groups that threaten the Soviet order have been established.[17]

As the troop strength of the Soviet armed forces was reduced, the KGB reportedly cut its military counterintelligence staff by 10 percent.[18] But there have been no overall reductions in its manpower because the KGB has expanded its operations in other areas. For example, it has devoted more resources to the fight against organized crime. According to Soviet government officials, such crime—embezzlement, bribery, smuggling, and other forms of corruption associated with the so-called "shadow economy"—is assuming alarming proportions. In an all-out effort to tackle this problem, the Soviet leadership has created KGB-MVD coordinating councils to implement collaboration between the two police organizations. Joint KGB, MVD, and Procuracy teams now are operating together at the local and regional levels to expose and arrest those engaged in economic crimes, and Gorbachev recently proposed a plan to create directly under him a special body to coordinate the work of law enforcement agencies in combatting such crime.[19]

The KGB has responded to the improved international climate by moderating its harsh, xenophobic stance and adopting a more benign posture toward the West. Nevertheless, KGB officials insist that foreign intelli-

[10] *Izvestiya,* Mar. 31, 1990.

[11] The text of the law appeared in *Izvestiya,* Apr. 10, 1990. In fact, as was noted above, KGB troops had frequently been called upon in the past to help suppress unrest.

[12] See *FBIS-SOV,* July 25, 1990, p. 43 (a report from TASS). On the response to the decree, which was directed primarily against perpetrators of ethnic strife in the Transcaucasus, see *Pravda,* Aug. 1, 1990. On August 12, Gorbachev extended the deadline for surrendering weapons by two months.

[13] In Gorbachev's defense, however, it might be recalled that it was some five and a half years after Stalin died before the Khrushchev leadership issued new "Fundamentals of Criminal Law and Procedure" to replace the Stalinist laws.

[14] See an interview with the new chief of the Guards Service, Yu. S. Plekhanov, in *Pravda,* Mar. 29, 1990.

[15] *New Times* (Moscow), Aug. 8–14, 1989.

[16] See a report on a meeting of the USSR KGB Collegium in *Izvestiya,* Nov. 2, 1989.

[17] Although the KGB has, for the most part, ceased arresting individuals for criticizing the government or for expressing political dissent, it uses its full arsenal of punitive powers to punish those inciting ethnic disturbances. See, for example, a report on KGB actions in the Osh oblast in Kirgizia following unrest there in June 1990, in *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya* (Frunze), Sept. 6, 1990.

[18] For a discussion of these cuts, see *Krasnaya Zvezda,* Mar. 31, 1990.

[19] See a report by USSR Minister of Internal Affairs V. V. Bakatin to the Congress of Peoples' Deputies, published in *Izvestiya,* Dec. 24, 1989; and Gorbachev's address to the Supreme Soviet on November 17, 1990, which appeared in *Krasnaya Zvezda,* Nov. 18, 1990. As will be discussed below, KGB Chairman Kryuchkov has been especially emphatic about the need to struggle against economic crime.

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

The Lubyanka—KGB headquarters in Moscow—fronted by a statue of Feliks Dzerzhinskiy, the founder of the Soviet secret police.

—A. Solovyov/TASS from Sovfoto.

gence and counterintelligence are more important than ever. As one KGB colonel expressed it: "Let us not delude ourselves. The most important decisions, even under conditions of a détente between military blocs, are made in secret. These decisions affect the interests of the Soviet state. In many cases intelligence is the only possible way to obtain a realistic picture of what is happening and of the genuine intentions of both sides."[20]

In an apparent effort to prevent cuts in the KGB budget, spokesmen for the organization claim that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has doubled its expenditures on intelligence since the beginning of 1989. They argue that given this development and the greater numbers of Soviet citizens traveling abroad, counterintelligence operations must be stepped up rather than curtailed.[21] Protecting commercial and economic secrets is one aspect of counterintelligence that is said to deserve special efforts, because of increased business contacts with the West.[22]

Although the KGB does not admit to it publicly, the disruption of its extensive network in Eastern Europe has placed great burdens on its intelligence-gathering and counterintelligence apparatus. In the past, the KGB depended heavily on intelligence provided by the Warsaw Pact states, which contributed, in the early 1980's, about one half of the secret technological information passed on to the Soviet leadership.[23] Now that most security services of these states have been dismantled, the KGB must fill these intelligence requirements largely on its own.[24]

Beyond *Glasnost'*

The KGB has also taken the initiative in the area of *glasnost'* by conducting a bold public relations campaign to create a new image. Of course, KGB officials have always endeavored to present their organization in a favorable public light, but their current media blitz is

[20]*Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 13, July, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 7, 1990, p. 15.

[21]Ibid.; also an interview with L. V. Shebarshin, head of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, in *Moskovskaya Pravda* (Moscow), Mar. 1, 1990.

[22]V. Ugarov, "The Secret 'Seal': Spy Mania or Necessity?" *Ekonomika i Zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 30, July 1990, p. 15; and an interview with KGB official A. Ovidiyev in *Rabochaya Tribuna* (Moscow), Mar. 11, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 30, 1990, pp. 58–61.

[23]On the role of satellite intelligence before the changes of 1989 and early 1990, see Henri Regnard, "Eastern Europe Serves the Soviet Union By Gathering Intelligence in the West," *Aussenpolitik* (Hamburg), No. 4, 1987, p. 355. East Germany was an especially valuable source of intelligence for the KGB.

[24]It is widely assumed, however, that the KGB has kept many former satellite intelligence officers on its staff. For a fascinating discussion of the relationship between the KGB and its counterpart in Czechoslovakia and how it has been affected by democratic change in Czechoslovakia, see "State Security and the Prague Variety," *Moskovskiye Novosti* (Moscow), July 29, 1990, p. 16; "Yet Again on the Prague Variety," ibid., Oct. 7, 1990, p. 11; and a letter from Col. V. Kosolapov in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Sept. 15, 1990.

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unprecedented in scope and audacity. It all began in November 1987, when the KGB forwarded a memorandum to the Politburo, outlining a plan for improving the KGB's public image by publicizing its activities in the media. In response, the Politburo passed a resolution extending the policy of *glasnost'* to the operations of the KGB.[25] As part of this campaign, which has been described in the West as the "selling of the KGB," the KGB conducts press conferences and television phone-ins, regularly contributes columns to two publications, and has recently come out with its own *KGB Digest,* priced at two rubles.[26]

In May 1990, the KGB announced the creation of a new USSR KGB Center for Public Relations, headed by A. N. Karbainov, a former deputy chief of the Directorate for the Defense of the Constitution. According to *Pravda,* Karbainov is "an intellectual with a tendency toward figurative thinking," and the center, which occupies several rooms on the third floor of the Lubyanka, includes a "cozy cafe," where visitors can talk to KGB employees "in the light of crystal chandeliers instead of the light of investigators' lamps."[27] In early October 1990, under the press center's auspices, a KGB museum was opened and the KGB's very own beauty queen, "Miss KGB," was introduced to the public.[28]

This dauntless publicity drive is designed to convince Soviet and Western audiences that the KGB is a forward-looking, reform-minded organization with a legitimate role to play in the era of *perestroyka,* a message that KGB Chairman Kryuchkov seeks to convey in his frequent speeches and interviews, which have even included appearances on US television. Time and again, he reminds his audiences of the crucial function the KGB carries out in fighting the mounting problems of organized crime, public violence, and drug smuggling, as well as in protecting state secrets.[29]

At times, the 66-year-old Kryuchkov, whose career in the KGB dates back at least to the 1960's, sounds quite liberal. He has welcomed the creation of a Supreme Soviet committee to oversee the KGB; he has claimed that the exile of Andrey Sakharov to Gorky during the "era of stagnation" was a gross mistake; he has spoken favorably of developing cooperation between the KGB and Western intelligence agencies; and he has frequently mentioned the importance of rehabilitating the victims of Stalin's purges, making much of the fact that KGB officials are playing a leading role in the special Central Committee commission that is directing the rehabilitation process.[30]

But it is difficult to take seriously Kryuchkov's claim that the KGB is "restructuring" itself, when so many old-timers, including, of course, Kryuchkov himself, remain in its leadership. Indeed, the fact that Gorbachev has been unwilling or unable to inject new blood into the KGB attests to his reluctance to force changes on this organization. Of the six top KGB officials (the chairman and his deputies) on whom information is available, all joined the KGB in the 1960's or earlier. Kryuchkov's most senior deputy, F. D. Bobkov, became a member of Stalin's People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) in 1945 and has been in the police apparatus ever since. Bobkov, who used to head the Fifth Directorate, now oversees domestic security and is rumored to be the man actually running the KGB on a day-to-day basis. KGB officials ignore Bobkov's lengthy police career when they assert, as they often do, that the current generation of security police had nothing to do with Stalin's police regime.[31]

Kryuchkov's close association with former KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov also raises questions about the credibility of the KGB's "new" image. The KGB has clung tenaciously to the line that Andropov was a reformist and a democrat, referring proudly to his legacy. The standard KGB response to the criticism that Andropov presided over the organization during a period

[25]See a discussion of the KGB memorandum and its results in *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* (Moscow), November 1989, pp. 22–26.

[26]The publication of *Sbornik KGB* was announced in *Rabochaya Tribuna,* May 9, 1990. The KGB has also continued its tradition of giving prizes for literary works. Over 5,000 articles on the history of the police are produced annually. See *Krasnaya Zvezda,* Dec. 29, 1989; and *Izvestiya TsK KPSS,* November 1989, p. 25.

[27]See V. Chertkov, "The Formerly Closed Door," *Pravda,* May 25, 1990. The center officially opened on Sept. 11, 1990.

[28]See *Krasnaya Zvezda,* Oct. 11, 1990; and *The Washington Post,* Oct. 31, 1990.

[29]In addition to speeches and addresses to party and state conclaves, Kryuchkov gave no less than 18 interviews in the Soviet and Western media during the first two years of his tenure as KGB Chairman, which began in September 1988.

[30]It is not surprising that KGB officials would be drawn into the process of examining cases of purge victims. By virtue of the fact that their predecessors were responsible for these cases they are still in control of all the files. But the KGB has portrayed its involvement as a humanitarian effort, stressing that police employees were among the purge victims. See an interview with USSR KGB Deputy Chairman V. P. Pirozhkov, a member of the rehabilitation commission, in *Nedelya* (Moscow), June 26–July 2, 1989, pp. 1 and 8.

[31]A report from the KGB press service on KGB participation in a memorial tribute to the victims of Stalin expressed indignation over the "gross prejudice" of those who "equate the NKVD of the past with the KGB." See *Pravda,* Nov. 1, 1989. Discussing its work on rehabilitating citizens "who were subjected to unwarranted repressions in the 1930's–1940's and the early 1950's," the USSR KGB Collegium stated categorically that "the current generation of security officers has nothing in common with the organizers of arbitrary rule." Ibid., Feb. 14, 1990. Interestingly, Bobkov has not shunned the limelight. In March 1990, he was interviewed for a documentary on the KGB that was produced by a Japanese television network. Introduced as the "KGB's No. 2 man," Bobkov said that the KGB's most important task was "to bring success to *perestroyka.*" See *FBIS-SOV,* Mar. 6, 1990, pp. 66–69. He gave a more recent interview to a Spanish newspaper. See *FBIS-SOV,* Aug. 17, 1990, pp. 2–4.

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when dissidents were subjected to extreme repression is that its officers were simply enforcing laws that were on the books. As public relations chief Karbainov observed: "What can one say about the trials of the 1960's and 1970's concerning dissidents? These were criminal processes conducted in accordance with legislation in force at that time. It is obvious now that some of these processes were marked by subjectivism. Such were the times."[32] The problem with this explanation is that nearly all of these laws are still on the books. Aside from the changes made in Article 7 of the USSR Law on State Crimes, changes that Gorbachev has recently watered down, no criminal laws utilized by the KGB have been repealed or revised since the 1960's.[33]

Increasingly, it seems the KGB is carrying *glasnost'* beyond the limits that any effective intelligence agency would impose. It has identified most of its top personnel in the press, delineating their functions and having them give surprisingly outspoken interviews. The head of the KGB's foreign operations, Lt. Gen. Leonid Shebarshin, for example, recently admitted that since 1975 there had been 15 defections by KGB intelligence officers, nine of whom remain abroad.[34] And the head of the highly secret Eighth Chief Directorate (responsible for signals intelligence), Lt. Gen. Nikolay Andreyev, gave an unprecedented interview in *Pravda* in mid-September 1990. Andreyev revealed, among other things, that the East European revolutions of 1989 had jeopardized Soviet enciphering equipment in Warsaw Pact countries.[35] Apparently the KGB has resorted to such unfettered openness in a desperate attempt to salvage what is left of a declining public image.

Indeed, the KGB has not been successful in its campaign to convince public opinion of its virtues. In an opinion poll conducted in March 1990 by *Moscow News*, only 32 percent of those questioned expressed confidence in the KGB, as compared with 38 percent just three months earlier.[36] Since then, the hue and cry against the KGB has become more intense, with newly formed democratic movements demanding significant limitations on its powers. Boris Yel'tsin, president of the Russian republic, has called for the subordination of the security apparatus to republic governments, rather than to the central authorities. He has also advocated cuts in the KGB budget and proposed that its investigatory powers be transferred to an independent Investigative Committee, an arrangement that would transform the KGB into a straightforward intelligence organization, without punitive powers.[37] Lithuania now has its own state security department, set up in September 1990, and Yel'tsin has recently suggested that the RSFSR might also create one.[38]

In the non-Russian republics, the KGB has been threatened with force by nationalist groups, who see the political police as the ultimate symbol of Russian domination. The Lithuanian Freedom League attempted a blockade of KGB headquarters in Vilnius in January 1990 to prevent KGB officials from removing incriminating documents and shipping them to Moscow for safekeeping.[39] In April, members of the Armenian Pan National Movement gathered outside KGB headquarters in Yerevan and began throwing stones and torches through windows. They also attempted, unsuccessfully, to break into the KGB building.[40] The most serious incident thus far occurred in September 1990, when a crowd of at least 100 persons stormed KGB headquarters in Tbilisi, breaking windows and furniture and stealing a number of secret documents.[41] The Soviet media have reported these dramatic confrontations to the general public. Gradually, the KGB is coming to be seen as an institution under siege; it is no longer viewed as an invincible police apparatus.

Dissension in the Ranks

Even more damaging to the KGB's public image has been the growing phenomenon of "whistle-blowing" by disaffected former and current staffers. The new phenomenon of sensational revelations by KGB insiders poses a greater threat to its institutional well-being than attacks by reformers and other critics. One of the first incidents of KGB disaffection occurred in July 1989 with the appearance in the popular weekly *Ogonek* of

[32]Yu. Shabanov, "Security Officers Relate: Behind the Wall of Secrecy," *Moskovskaya Pravda*, Sept. 20, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 3, 1989, pp. 82–85.

[33]Article 190–1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code (and the corresponding article in the codes of the other republics), which was widely used to persecute dissidents, has been eliminated, but it was not under the formal purview of the KGB.

[34]See a TASS interview with Shebarshin, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 29, 1990, p. 64. Some former KGB officers have spoken of 20 or more defections during this time.

[35]*Pravda*, Sept. 16, 1990.

[36]See "Crisis of Confidence," *Moskovskiye Novosti*, No. 21, May 27, 1990, p. 9. Thirty-five percent expressed confidence in the army, and only 16 percent in the CPSU.

[37]The emergency economic plan devised by the economic advisers of Yel'tsin and Gorbachev envisages a 20 percent cut in the KGB budget. See *The New York Times*, Sept. 4, 1990.

[38]*Report on the USSR*, Oct. 5, 1990, p. 33; and Moscow, TASS, as cited in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 20, 1990, p. 71.

[39]See a report in *The Washington Post*, Jan. 30, 1990.

[40]TASS International Service, Apr. 15, 1990, as cited in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 16, 1990.

[41]*Krasnaya Zvezda*, Sept. 18, 1990; *Pravda*, Sept. 20, 1990.

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an article by a retired KGB Colonel, Yaroslav Karpovich.[42] Karpovich described the cruel campaign waged against political dissenters in the 1960's and 1970's, expressing his shame that he had participated. *Ogonek* followed up with several letters critical of Karpovich's article, including one signed by some of his former colleagues, which defended the KGB's integrity and tried to discredit Karpovich by accusing him of seeking cheap popularity by dishonorable means. But other letters published supported Karpovich, who subsequently rebutted his critics and urged them to denounce the KGB's earlier illegalities. Later, he revealed that the KGB had stripped him of his badge for slandering the organization and allegedly divulging its secrets. Karpovich took the stance that his only offense was his participation in past KGB reprisals against innocent persons, an offense for which his former KGB colleagues should also be punished.[43]

In early 1990, *Ogonek* published yet another sensational article. It was based on revelations by three former Rostov KGB staffers who had been forcibly retired as part of an effort to cover up a 1985 scandal that had resulted in the execution of one of their colleagues.[44] According to the article, which was written by Anatoliy Golovkov, the Rostov KGB's Fifth Department had infiltrated religious groups in order to spy on them. Golovkov also maintained that overspending and cheating on expense accounts were commonplace in the Rostov KGB, which doubled in size from the late 1970's to the early 1980's, despite the fact that not a single enemy agent had been exposed in the region since the 1950's. During this period, most of the KGB's efforts were devoted to covering up malfeasance by local party officials. Moreover, Golovkov made the point that the USSR KGB was fully aware of what was going on and did nothing. In an indignant response to Golovkov's article, a group of Rostov KGB staffers claimed that they were victims of a campaign to denigrate law-enforcement organs and warned about the consequences of "an open call for attacks on the KGB organs of the type that have occurred in the GDR."[45]

The apparent inability of the KGB to suppress critics from within probably emboldened the most sensational "whistle-blower" to date—Major-General Oleg Kalugin. Kalugin, an experienced intelligence officer who was well-known to Western intelligence circles, served as chief of the counterintelligence section of the First Chief Directorate from 1973 to 1980, when he was abruptly transferred back to domestic service because of a conflict with his superiors. He was appointed to the post of first deputy chief of the Leningrad KGB, where he remained until he was demoted to a lesser post and subsequently retired on a pension in 1987 after writing letters to Gorbachev complaining about the KGB's leadership.[46]

Kalugin made his first media appearance in May 1989, when he published a lengthy article on the role of intelligence services in foreign policy in the prestigious Soviet journal *International Life*.[47] With surprising candor, Kalugin argued that it was necessary to reassess the Soviet intelligence apparatus and to prevent it from interfering in the formulation of foreign policy. He also urged that more direct public control be exercised over the KGB, noting that "the threat to peace and civil liberties stemming from special services that are not controlled by legislative organs and the public is recognized today by the most wide-ranging circles." Given that Kalugin was a former high-ranking KGB official (although he was identified in the journal merely as an expert on diplomatic affairs), the article was highly unusual and must have raised many an eyebrow at KGB headquarters.[48]

Kalugin was not heard from again until June 1990, when he made a dramatic appearance before a conference of the CPSU's insurgent Democratic Platform. In a lengthy statement, Kalugin portrayed himself as politically disillusioned with both the party and the KGB.[49] After endorsing the reformist goals of the Democratic Platform, he launched into a scathing criticism of the KGB and its leader, Vladimir Kryuchkov. Kalugin became an overnight sensation. He gave a succession of

[42]"I Am Ashamed to Remain Silent," *Ogonek* (Moscow), No. 29, July 8–15, 1989. For a discussion of the article and its ramifications for the KGB, see a commentary by Peter Reddaway in *Report on the USSR*, Dec. 22, 1989, pp. 24–26.

[43]*Ogonek*, No. 34, Aug. 19–26, 1989, p. 25; No. 37, Sept. 9–16, 1989, p. 25; No. 3, January 13–20, 1990, p. 27.

[44]Anatoliy Golovkov, "Preliminary Diagnosis," ibid., No. 8, Feb. 17–24, 1990, pp. 28–29.

[45]The response, an open letter, appeared in the conservative newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1990.

[46]According to Kalugin, he was demoted in 1980 because he interceded with KGB officials on behalf of a scientist who had been unjustly arrested. See *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 26, June 30–July 6, 1990, pp. 6–7.

[47]"Intelligence and International Politics," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), May 1989, pp. 61–71.

[48]Curiously, one other reformer had already emerged from the KGB and published his ideas in a leading journal. In September 1988, V. A. Rubanov, identified as a section head in the KGB's Scientific Research Institute, published an article in *Kommunist*, advocating a complete overhaul of the secrecy rules. See *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 13, September 1988, pp. 24–36. Less than a year later, Rubanov, this time identified as a jurist, so perhaps no longer in the KGB, wrote a vague and unremarkable piece on democracy and national security for the same party theoretical journal. See *Kommunist*, No. 11, July 1989, pp. 43–55.

[49]See Bill Keller, "Ex-KGB Officer Asserts Spy Agency Is Unchanged," *The New York Times*, June 17, 1990; *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 26, June 30–July 6, 1990, pp. 6–7.

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media interviews, in which he became increasingly outspoken about the KGB's failings. In view of the fact that he had worked directly under Kryuchkov, his revelations were particularly embarrassing to the KGB. Like other KGB critics, Kalugin insisted that the KGB had not changed in the least since *perestroyka*'s initiation: "The new image of the KGB is cosmetic and just consists of applying rouge over the quite flabby face of the old Stalin-Brezhnev system." He maintained that although the KGB presents itself as pro-reform, it hypocritically continues to engage in covert political surveillance, disinformation, and persecution of its political opponents.[50]

Kalugin also focused on the symbiotic relationship between the KGB and the CPSU leadership, asserting that "the KGB is the foremost accomplice and the right hand of the supreme leadership of the Central Committee." As an example, he cited a secret regulation that requires the KGB to destroy any compromising material on members of the party's *nomenklatura,* no matter how much corruption is involved.[51]

Kalugin himself had ties with one leading party official, Gorbachev's close adviser Aleksandr Yakovlev. After joining the KGB in 1958, Kalugin began his espionage career using as a cover his status as an exchange student at Columbia University. Yakovlev was also part of a group of Soviet students attending Columbia in the 1950's; he and Kalugin were shown together in a photograph that appeared in *The New York Times* in 1959. When asked in a recent interview whether he was the only KGB employee in the student group at Columbia, Kalugin replied, "Certainly not."[52]

Whether or not Yakovlev ever worked for the KGB, his association with Kalugin draws attention to the close career ties that have existed between party and KGB officials. In the 1960's, Yakovlev joined the group of up-and-coming *apparatchiks* who worked in the Central Committee when Yuriy Andropov was a Central Committee secretary and head of the Department for Liaison with Socialist Countries. Several of Gorbachev's current colleagues and advisers also worked in Andropov's department—Georgiy Arbatov, Gennadiy Gerasimov, Georgiy Shakhnazarov, and Vladimir Kryuchkov. Although Andropov moved to the KGB in 1967, taking Kryuchkov with him, Andropov's ties to the party remained intact. The fact that Kalugin and others are now demolishing the myth of Andropov's liberalism and questioning his ethics and competence must be demoralizing for KGB employees, as well as awkward for the Gorbachev leadership.

Kalugin challenged the image of the KGB as incorruptible and efficient by claiming that more KGB operatives sold state secrets to the West over the past decade than in all previous years of Soviet power. And he added that "the people who prosper were the direct superiors of traitors and turncoats."[53] Kalugin also claimed that the KGB staff was enormously inflated; he estimated that in the Moscow KGB headquarters alone, the number of employees exceeded the total number of CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) employees combined.[54]

Although the KGB was able to contain the damage inflicted by Karpovich and the Rostov staffers, the Kalugin affair has presented greater problems. Because he was so senior in the KGB, Kalugin has had greater credibility and more to tell. The KGB cannot easily dismiss his revelations and discredit him. Also, the KGB must show some restraint toward Kalugin to avoid appearing to be the ruthless and arbitrary organization Kalugin and others say it is. To persecute Kalugin would make him a martyr, but to do nothing gives encouragement to other potential whistle-blowers. The KGB's handling of Kalugin thus far illustrates its vulnerability in the face of full-fledged *glasnost'*. Initially, the KGB responded with a flurry of the usual disclaimers. Kryuchkov himself got into the fray at the 28th CPSU Congress in July 1990. He argued that Kalugin was a liar and a hypocrite, who had turned against the KGB because he was demoted for incompetence.[55]

The KGB was not the only source of attacks on Kalugin. Even before the congress, on June 30, Gorbachev issued a presidential decree stripping Kalugin of all honors and awards, and the Council of Ministers followed by depriving him of his general's rank and his pension. Finally, *Izvestiya* announced on July 25 that the USSR Procurator's office had instituted criminal proceedings against Kalugin for violating Article 75 of the RSFSR Criminal Code (divulging a state secret). The preliminary investigation was entrusted to the Main

[50]See Kalugin's interview with *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Moscow), June 20, 1990; an interview with Vienna Domestic Radio, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 25, 1990, pp. 37–38; and *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 26, June 30–July 6, 1990, pp. 6–7.

[51]*Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 26, June 30–July 6, 1990, pp. 6–7.

[52]*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 20, 1990. On Yakovlev's background and career, see Bill Keller, "Moscow's Other Mastermind," *The New York Times Magazine*, Feb. 19, 1989.

[53]*Sobesednik* (Moscow), No. 29, July 1990, pp. 4–5; *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 26, June 30–July 6, 1990. Kalugin mentioned Vitaliy Yurchenko, who defected to the United States in 1985 and then changed his mind, returning to the Soviet Union. Kalugin insisted that Yurchenko had not acted as a double agent and noted that many KGB officers were bitter because Yurchenko was not punished.

[54]*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 20, 1990.

[55]Moscow Television, July 9, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, July 10, 1990, pp. 15–19. See also KGB attacks on Kalugin in *Pravda*, June 23, 1990; and *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 27, July 7–13, 1990, p. 6.

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Military Procurator General's Office. But Kalugin was subsequently elected as a deputy to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies from the district of Krasnodar, a post which protects him from prosecution without the consent of the Supreme Soviet, which is unlikely to be forthcoming. As a deputy, Kalugin is causing more trouble for the KGB. Continuing his vociferous campaign against the KGB, he has promised to reveal what he knows about KGB "political murders" to a closed committee session of the Supreme Soviet. He also has suits pending in court against Gorbachev, Kryuchkov, and Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov for illegally depriving him of his rank and pension.[56]

New voices have joined the chorus of KGB renegades in the wake of the Kalugin affair. Mikhail Lyubimov, a former head of the Administration Department of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, has defended Kalugin and confirmed what the general said about the KGB:

Is it possible to talk about perestroyka *when a part of the KGB leadership and a part of its elite were the architects of the KGB policy in the stagnation period [and] formed its party and cadre structures? These people of rather venerable age for such work continue to fight for their political survival. How can they restructure themselves?*[57]

Lyubimov, it turns out, had once been the boss of famed KGB double agent Oleg Gordievskiy, who defected to Great Britain in 1985. Writing in *Komsomolskaya Pravda,* Lyubimov blamed the "avalanche of traitors" in the KGB on its immoral policies and its subservience to the party.[58]

An equally devastating condemnation of the KGB came from a retired officer, Lt. Col. Valentin Korolov, who had worked for many years in domestic operations, serving in the Moscow branch of the Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence). Korolov portrayed the KGB as a vastly inefficient, demoralized, and corrupt bureaucracy, where nepotism was rampant and much of the work consisted of mere paper-shuffling. He also observed that the KGB had enough



Ex-KGB Major-General Oleg Kalugin (center) is seen smiling outside the Moscow City Court, where deliberations started on October 2, 1990, on his legal action against KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov.

—A. Morkovkin/TASS from Sovfoto.

forces to stage a coup and seize power.[59]

Criticisms and revelations have also come from active employees. In an August interview with *Komsomolskaya Pravda,* KGB Lt. Col. Vladimir Morozov criticized the new draft Law on the KGB (more on this below) and urged the adoption of far more radical proposals such as those he and a group of other employees in the KGB's central apparatus had devised. Morozov went on to say that the KGB was initiating criminal proceedings against him, and he speculated that he would not be a "reformer from within" much longer and may well join radicals like Kalugin.[60] In early September, *Argumenty i Fakty* published letters from KGB staffers commenting on Kalugin's allegations. Although some were highly critical, others attested to the truth of his claims and praised him for speaking out.[61] That same month the Communist Youth League weekly *Sobesednik* published an interview with an anonymous KGB colonel who claimed to have 30 years of experience in foreign intelligence. The unidentified colonel confirmed Kalugin's allegations that the KGB had cov-

[56]For details see *Izvestiya,* Aug. 15, 1990, and *FBIS-SOV,* Oct. 16, 1990, pp. 38–39. In a bizarre twist to the Kalugin story, a KGB captain named Sakharov suggested in the press that Kalugin himself might have been responsible for the failings of Soviet counterintelligence in the 1970's because he was working for the CIA. See *Rabochaya Tribuna,* Aug. 18, 1990.

[57]*Moskovskiye Novosti,* No. 27, July 8, 1990. This was not the first article by Lyubimov to appear in print. In 1989, he wrote a piece criticizing the KGB for interfering in foreign policy decisions and violating human rights. See ibid., No. 9, Mar. 5–12, 1989.

[58]*Komsomolskaya Pravda,* Oct. 12, 1990. Another Lyubimov article has appeared, denouncing the KGB for its past practice of political killings and murders. See *Moskovskiye Novosti,* Aug. 26, 1990.

[59]Valentin Korolov, "Secrets of the Secret Service," *Ogonek,* No. 43, Oct. 20–27, 1990, pp. 28–31. See also an interview with Korolov on Moscow Television, as reported in *FBIS-SOV,* Oct. 23, 1990, pp. 54–56.

[60]*Komsomolskaya Pravda,* Aug. 11, 1990.

[61]*Argumenty i Fakty,* No. 36, Sept. 8–14, 1990, p. 3.

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ered up corruption in the party and that large numbers of KGB officers had defected to the West, adding that the KGB has been penetrated at the highest levels by American and British agents. He also strongly attacked Andropov and his protégé Kryuchkov, accusing them, among other things, of having fed distorted information to the Kremlin that encouraged the military interventions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan.[62]

Reform from Within?

Sensational as they are, the appearances of these "whistle-blowers" do not necessarily signify that a movement for reform is growing within the KGB. The KGB, at least at the higher levels, has always represented a privileged elite with a strong sense of solidarity and esprit de corps. Like those in the upper echelons of the party apparatus and the military, KGB officials have a big stake in preserving the Soviet system and a great deal to lose if that system disintegrates. They need only to look at what happened to their counterparts in Eastern Europe to realize what fate has in store for them if a real revolution occurs in the Soviet Union and the current regime is replaced by a full-fledged democracy, or a group of separate democratic states. In East Germany, 85,000 employees of the security police, the Stasi, lost their jobs overnight. They have become social outcasts, and only a small percentage have found new employment. Many face the possibility of arrest and criminal prosecution.[63] In Czechoslovakia, the state security apparatus was abolished and replaced by a new Committee to Protect the Constitution that has no powers of arrest. *Moscow News* reported that 8,000 Czechoslovak security police are without jobs and several have committed suicide.[64]

Some of the KGB's most outspoken critics may have been moved to renounce the KGB more out of a sense that the KGB is a sinking ship than from a genuine change of heart. Kalugin, for example, on more than one occasion, referred to the fate of the security police in Eastern Europe; he has also mentioned his close acquaintance with Markus Wolf, the legendary chief of East German intelligence, who suddenly resigned in 1987. Although Wolf maintained that he left his post because he had become a reformer, many believe that he foresaw the collapse of the communist regime in his country and chose to dissociate himself from the intelligence service that had served that regime.[65] The fact that Kalugin, like Wolf, spent decades trying to undermine democratic Western governments on behalf of a repressive communist regime makes it difficult to believe his claim to have suddenly embraced democratic values.

At lower levels of the KGB, there is said to be considerable disaffection, particularly in the republics where nationalist movements are strong. Younger, native KGB staffers in Lithuania and Georgia, for example, are reportedly deeply resentful of their superiors and some are quitting or leaking classified documents to the local press. During the September attack on Georgian KGB headquarters, the intruders knew exactly where to locate highly sensitive secret materials, an indication that there are informers on the republic KGB staff.[66] But the intention of these staffers is to subvert the KGB rather than reform it.

Are there KGB employees who want actually to change their organization instead of discarding it altogether? In early October 1990, four active KGB officers, including the above-mentioned Morozov, sent a letter to *Komsomolskaya Pravda* calling for a radical reorganization of the KGB and urging that it give up its association with the Communist party.[67]

It is doubtful, however, that such officers represent a large group within the KGB. The reaction of most high-level KGB employees to the turmoil that *perestroyka* has wrought is to retrench rather than to reassess the situation and modify their own views. To be sure, with Marxism-Leninism discredited, they are losing the ideological force that unified them and that served as a source of appeal for potential recruits. But the threat they now face gives them common cause to band together and protect their interests. This is particularly so with those working in remote regions and national republics. Isolated and besieged by ethnic turbulence and demands from democratically elected local officials, they are raising a cry of alarm over the growing public unrest in their regions. They seem unable to grasp the depth and extent of popular support throughout the country for democratic change and respond to crises by issuing threats of criminal sanctions.

Members of the Tajik KGB, in response to riots that broke out in the city of Dushanbe in February 1990, asserted in an open letter that the unrest was provoked

[62] *Sobesednik*, No. 36, Sept. 1990, pp. 6–7.

[63] Steven Emerson, "Where Have All the Spies Gone?" *The New York Times Magazine*, Aug. 12, 1990.

[64] "State Security—The Prague Variety," *Moskovskiye Novosti*, No. 30, July 29, 1990.

[65] Emerson, loc. cit. On Kalugin's acquaintance with Wolf, see Vienna Radio, June 22, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 25, 1990, pp. 37–38.

[66] On the situation in Lithuania, see *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 12, 1990, p. 74. Information on the Georgian KGB comes from interviews conducted in Tbilisi in October 1990.

[67] *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Oct. 10, 1990.

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by criminal elements as well as by individuals using *perestroyka* as a cover. They went on to state: "KGB members are exposing the inspirers, organizers, and participants in the mass disorders who tried to use the crowd to seize power. Not a single one of them should escape retribution, regardless of the position held. This is our firm and unanimous stance."[68] Tajik KGB Chairman V. V. Petkel sees much of Tajikistan's ethnic unrest as foreign-inspired, observing that "activities by secret services operating against the USSR have not subsided by a jot over time . . . On the contrary, subversive activities against Tajikistan have been stepped up."[69] Ukrainian KGB chief N. M. Holushko has also been uncompromising toward nationalist sentiment, speaking derisively of "self-proclaimed associations that do not conceal their hostile attitude toward socialism . . . and even favor changing the existing system."[70]

A few republic KGB leaders have been more flexible, even engaging in dialogue with their detractors. In Lithuania, the new KGB chief, Romualdas Marcinkus, ventured to say publicly that he had no dispute with the so-called State Security Department of Lithuania recently created by the Lithuanian government as a counterpart to the KGB—even though some of his staffers have left to work there.[71] And recently appointed chairman of the Armenian KGB, Usik Arutyunyan, declared his organization's support for Armenian independence and announced that it no longer has ties with the Communist party.[72] Most republic leaders, however, reject outright any sort of independence from Moscow and advocate stronger punitive measures—a stance that places them on a collision course with the reformers. These officials are growing increasingly frustrated over the strength of the reformers, and they are naturally bitter about accusations from the conservatives that they are not doing their jobs. Moldavian KGB Chairman G. I. Lavranchuk recently complained:

Some see state security bodies as the chief culprits for all the ills of the past. Others expect all the issues that arise in society to be dealt with only by the KGB. . . . In the first place, it is not only, or even mainly, the KGB that is the culprit for all ills. The culprit was the system that operated at that time, while the staff of the state security committee was only an instrument for dealing with many of those problems. . . . On the other hand, it is not right today to expect the KGB to deal with all matters that come up, even if they are of a political nature.[73]

Recently, on August 14, Azerbaijan KGB officers issued a statement to the press denouncing Gorbachev's decision to extend the deadline for groups to surrender their illegal arms. They argued that the decision was only an effort to delay measures to stabilize the situation in the Transcaucasus and an unnecessary concession that would simply encourage further violence.[74] Similar frustrations have been expressed at the central offices of the KGB. In March 1990, a group of employees from KGB headquarters in Moscow took the unprecedented step of appealing to the USSR's Peoples' Deputies. Expressing alarm over the growing lawlessness within the country and claiming that antisocial elements have all but paralyzed Soviet power in certain areas, they urged the deputies to adopt stronger laws to strengthen the ability of the KGB and the regular police to combat crime and ensure security.[75]

Whatever KGB staffers think about the course of political change in the Soviet Union, there is little likelihood of a reform of the KGB itself with Kryuchkov and his like in control. Those who expected some sort of accommodation to democracy from the smooth-talking Kryuchkov must have been disappointed to hear his words at the 28th CPSU Congress in July 1990. The tone of Kryuchkov's statements was defensive and reflected alarm. Speaking of ethnic unrest, he observed that "reports from some regions of the country sometimes resemble battle reports," and that "one has to work literally in the emergency mode to defuse the points of conflict that emerge here and there."[76] Later, he vented his frustration further over the increasing incidence of violence: "Comrades, we are making arrests and passing sentences. But what then? You see, the sickness will remain, and the causes will remain."[77]

Kryuchkov grudgingly acknowledged that a multiparty system would become a reality in the Soviet Union and that the CPSU would no longer have a monopoly on the system—"We must learn to live without Article 6 of the Constitution"—and he said that the KGB would cooperate with other parties. As far as depoliticization of the KGB was concerned, however, he was uncompromisingly opposed: "To cut out the political essence of their activities is to turn Chekists into hacks lacking

[68] *Kommunist Tadzhikistana* (Dushanbe), Mar. 3, 1990.
[69] Moscow TASS, reported in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 20, 1990, p. 75.
[70] *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), Feb. 11, 1990.
[71] Vilnius International Service, Aug. 10, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 14, 1990, p. 53. Marcinkus was appointed to this post in spring 1990, at the height of the tensions between Lithuania and the Kremlin.
[72] *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* (Moscow), No. 42, Oct. 20, 1990.
[73] Moscow Radio, April 24, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 25, 1990, pp. 121–22. Lavranchuk is an old-timer, having been in the security police since 1967.
[74] *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 21, 1990, p. 103.
[75] *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Mar. 7, 1990.
[76] *Pravda*, July 5, 1990.
[77] *FBIS-SOV*, July 10, 1990, p. 16.

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any political principles or guidelines."[78] On numerous occasions, Kryuchkov has proclaimed his devotion to Leninism, which he thinks should be the ideological basis for any type of *perestroyka* within the country, and he has frequently complained about those who are too eager to discard everything from the past.[79] In view of his devotion to the Communist party and to Leninism, it is not surprising that Kryuchkov does not favor the introduction of a free market economy in the Soviet Union. At the 28th congress, he stated: "We are moving toward the market, not toward Adam Smith's market—spontaneous and boundless—but toward a regulated market, because it would be a ruinous mistake to throw the country into the arms of the elemental forces of the market on the eve of the 21st century."[80]

Kryuchkov also expressed grave concern at the party congress over the so-called "shadow economy," which operates outside the state sphere; he linked it with organized crime and called it antisocial because it generates non-labor income. Leonid Abalkin, a deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, later criticized Kryuchkov for grossly exaggerating the size of the shadow economy and for lumping it together with criminal elements. Abalkin observed that the economic situation could not be improved by confiscating money from underground operations. What was needed was a free market system.[81] But Kryuchkov has continued to insist that "even the most approximate estimates show that the scale of the shadow economy is substantial" and that only a "well-conceived system of strict control of financial and economic activity" will help eliminate the problem.[82] At a recent news conference, Kryuchkov and other law enforcement officials called for tighter penalties to curb the black market and assailed the criminal elements that were using joint enterprises to gain illegal profits.[83] *Moscow News* observed that the alarmist calls by the KGB and MVD for an all-out war against "thousands of swindlers" brings to mind Stalin's struggle against the ubiquitous "enemies of the people."[84]

Clearly, Kryuchkov is considerably more dogmatic and uncompromising in his approach to political and economic problems than is Gorbachev, and he has not refrained from an occasional gibe at the Soviet president. In a June 1990 *Pravda* interview, for example, Kryuchkov complained about the lack of order in the leadership bodies, noting that there were too many commissions and committees. He also expressed impatience over the number of party congresses and meetings that Gorbachev had called.[85] Whatever their differences, however, the two continue to agree on the question of law and order and internal security. In his speech to the party congress, Gorbachev was quick to renounce the idea of depoliticizing the police and the military and to endorse Kryuchkov's measures for strengthening the law enforcement organs.[86]

Legal Controls over the KGB

Gorbachev cannot be faulted for trying to enforce order and preserve political stability. But he is trying to accomplish this without a mandate from the people, using a security police that is answerable only to him and his closest colleagues. The effective removal of the KGB from party control might be viewed as a positive step in the reform process. In the past, the CPSU Secretariat, staffed with *apparatchiki* who were sympathetic to the KGB, determined KGB appointments and monitored the KGB budget and operations on behalf of the ruling Politburo. Now that body has apparently relinquished this function, in formal terms at least.[87] But the much hoped for parliamentary control over the KGB has not been established in the party's place, and neither Gorbachev nor his colleagues seem anxious to see this happen.

Official claims to the contrary, the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Defense and State Security does not exercise effective oversight of the KGB. This committee, formed in June 1989, consists of 43 members, the majority of whom represent the defense-se-

[78]Ibid.

[79]See, for example, his address presented on the 72nd anniversary of the October Revolution, in which he said that ideas of Lenin were a "reliable foundation for *perestroyka*." *Pravda*, Nov. 5, 1990.

[80]Ibid., July 5, 1990.

[81]See an interview with Abalkin in *Rabochaya Tribuna*, July 14, 1990.

[82]*Pravda*, Aug. 18, 1990. Kryuchkov blamed participants in cooperatives and joint ventures for much of the illegal economic activity.

[83]The news conference was reported in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 23, 1990, pp. 52–53.

[84]Boris Pinser, "Every Twentieth Person—An Enemy," *Moskovskiye Novosti*, Oct. 21, 1990, p. 15.

[85]*Pravda*, June 21, 1990.

[86]*FBIS-SOV*, July 3, 1990, p. 10. The CPSU program statement issued at the congress called for "the resolute intensification of the struggle against crime and for crime prevention. The use of all available resources—economic, political, and legal—to combat the shadow economy. The urgent adoption of laws to provide a legal foundation for the implementation of emergency measures to overcome the crisis . . . ." In his November 17 speech to the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev was even more emphatic about the need to stem the tide of lawlessness in the Soviet Union. See Note 19 above.

[87]According to Minister of Internal Affairs Bakatin, party control over the KGB and MVD has been abolished; there is no longer any party body that exercises such a function. See an interview with Bakatin in *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 29, July 21–27, 1990, p. 8. As Bakatin mentioned, until recently, Viktor Chebrikov, formerly head of the KGB, was the party secretary in charge of the police.

[88]Originally there were three KGB officials on the committee, but one, I. I. Gorelovskiy, has since left his post as KGB chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR, and his committee status is unknown. The two other KGB officials on the committee are V. G. Baluyev, chairman of the Belorussian KGB, and Nikolay Britvin, chief of the KGB Border Guards Political Directorate.

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curity establishment.[88] The current chairman of the committee is Leonid Sharin, first secretary of the Amur oblast party committee. It is not at all clear how the members were chosen, but it was not by democratic means. Apparently, Gorbachev and Anatoliy Luk'yanov, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, were closely involved in the selection process.[89] Aside from the obvious problem of its members' conflict of interest, other factors inhibit this committee. Most of its members have responsible jobs elsewhere, and they have little time to spend on committee work. Also, the committee is served by a small staff of only 10 persons and has at its disposal only one computer, which has no access to data bases.[90]

Just how much actual authority the Committee for Defense and State Security has over the KGB and how the authority is to be enforced is an open question. According to Articles 120 and 121 of the USSR Constitution, as amended in December 1988 and March 1990, the committee participates in drafting legislation in the area of defense and security, approves the appointment of the KGB chairman, and "makes recommendations" to the KGB, which must be examined and responded to by the latter in due course. The Constitution also says that state organs (in this case, the KGB) must "fulfill the requirements of the committees and provide them with necessary materials and documents." But nowhere is it specified just how Supreme Soviet committees ensure that their requirements are fulfilled, or what recourse they have if state organs do not oblige. It is worth noting that the commissions of the old Supreme Soviet, which existed before 1989, had exactly the same powers under the Constitution but never exercised them! Legal scholars have acknowledged the weaknesses of the Committee on Defense and State Security, but they point out that it is too early to judge what its ultimate role will be. Much will depend, they say, on the extent to which democracy takes hold in the country. The problem is that for democracy to develop successfully, the security police must be made accountable to the public by means of effective oversight and legal controls.

The Law on the KGB, a draft of which has been circulating since spring 1990, falls far short of this goal.[91] The law was actually drafted at KGB headquarters and then submitted to the State Security Subcommittee of the Committee on Defense and State Security for reworking. It is to be debated soon by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Although it was hailed by the KGB as a hallmark of the democratic process, the draft law is yet another example of how the Gorbachev leadership uses formal laws to legitimize nondemocratic, authoritarian practices. The law contains 30 articles, or clauses, 28 of which describe the KGB's rights, areas of competence, organization, and resources. Only two articles deal with the matter of how the KGB is controlled. According to Article 21, the KGB is subordinated to the Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, the President of the USSR, and the Council of Ministers. This oversight (with the exception of control by the Congress of People's Deputies) has long been enshrined in the Constitution, and is nothing new. In the past, it was only a formality, because the party leadership controlled the KGB. Now, it appears that the role has been assumed by President Gorbachev. As far as the Committee on Defense and State Security is concerned, Article 21 merely states vaguely that this committee hears reports from KGB leaders periodically. Judicial oversight is mentioned in Article 22, which reiterates the standard phrases about procuratorial supervision of the KGB. The Procuracy has formally had such supervisory powers since the early days of the Soviet regime but has never made use of them. Moreover, the KGB's budget is to be controlled, not by the Committee on Defense and State Security, but by the Ministry of Finance.

The rights and duties of the KGB set down in the draft law are substantial. If we compare them with the descriptions of the KGB's functions that have appeared in adminstrative law textbooks, the new law actually broadens the KGB's area of competence considerably. The law states explicitly, for example, that Soviet citizens are obliged to cooperate with the KGB in its attempts to ensure security and fight crime, and that compliance with "lawful requests" by the KGB for assistance is obligatory for all citizens (Article 4).[92] Article 16 empowers the KGB to detain for a period of up to three days persons who disturb "the established order" at places being guarded by the KGB or who "commit actions that are harmful to the interests of the state security," whatever that means.[93] The draft law also stresses the KGB's role in helping the MVD combat or-

[89]See Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, "The New Soviet Legislature: Committee on Defense and State Security," US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, Apr. 11, 1990, p. 5. Also see Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Committee for Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet," *Report on the USSR*, May 11, 1990.

[90]G. Sturua, "The Committee on Defense and State Security: Its First Months of Operation," *MEiMO* (Moscow), January 1990, pp. 79–85.

[91]For the text of the draft law, see Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Materialy samizdata* (Munich), No. 6497, June 11, 1990.

[92]The irony of imposing this obligation on Soviet citizens is that in Eastern Europe some public groups are calling for former police informers to be exposed and denounced.

[93]The sanctions for such violations are classified as "administrative measures" and thus do not entail making changes in the criminal codes.

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dinary crime, and it firmly establishes the KGB as the ultimate guarantor of the political reliability of the MVD and the regular armed forces (Articles 13 and 17). As one legal scholar expressed it, instead of narrowing functions and prerogatives, the draft gives the KGB "colossal power."[94]

The End of the KGB?

It may be that the KGB, in anticipation of attempts by liberal deputies of the Supreme Soviet to amend the law, decided to start with a draft that gave it expansive powers so that it would be able to appear to be making concessions during negotiations. If this strategy does not work, Gorbachev, who has voiced strong support for the draft, may try to force it through the Supreme Soviet, as he did with the law on the presidency.[95] In the long run, however, this law, if enacted without significant changes, may serve the KGB ill. It is so obviously counter to democratic ideas that it will be highly objectionable to reformers and hence will further polarize the KGB and its foes. Ultimately, the reformers may simply give up on the USSR Supreme Soviet and focus their efforts on the republics' supreme soviets as mechanisms for bringing the political police under control. This would have grave implications for a highly centralized organization like the KGB, which represents the interests of the Kremlin vis-à-vis the republics.

Even though most reformers accept the necessity for some sort of intelligence and security apparatus, there is little place for the KGB as it exists today in the kind of democratic system that they envisage. Indeed, the recent spate of embarrassing disclosures by former and current KGB officers suggests that the highly secretive KGB is already becoming an anachronism in the current atmosphere of openness. *Glasnost'* alone, however, will not dismantle or reform the KGB. It might cause Kryuchkov and some of his colleagues to resign, and it will certainly damage morale within the organization. But the KGB cannot be expected to relinquish its awesome powers without a struggle, and it will do everything possible to preserve its status as a strong, centralized institution. This will make it difficult for a peaceful transition to democracy to occur in the Soviet Union.

The most probable course of action for the KGB, given the growing pressure from democratic and nationalist groups, will be to use ethnic violence and popular unrest as a justification for a severe crackdown—a suppression of individual rights in the name of law and order.[96] In this case, the military, or some segments thereof, might be a natural ally for the KGB, since the military shares the KGB's concerns about the disintegration of public order and also is loath to relinquish its privileged institutional status. In the long run, the forces of coercion would probably not succeed in reversing the reform process, but there could be a temporary resurgence of repression and a consequent violent upheaval.

It would be extremely difficult for Gorbachev to survive a violent confrontation between the forces of repression and reform. But the resources he has to prevent such a development are becoming fewer, and his options, narrower by the day. Having been reluctant in the past to push for a curtailment of KGB powers, he has, like it or not, made himself increasingly dependent on that organization. As some experts have observed, Gorbachev no longer has the political authority to ensure voluntary compliance with his policies.[97] With his own position threatened by widespread political and economic discontent, he runs a great risk if he were to antagonize the KGB by supporting demands for a true reform of that organization. If he does not move in that direction soon, however, he will lose his credibility as a reformist leader.

[94]Valeriy Savitskiy, "Is the KGB A Threat?," *New Times*, No. 29, July 17–23, 1990, pp. 28–29. Also see an interview on Moscow Television, July 28, 1990, with Savitskiy, who is a professor at the USSR Institute of State and Law, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, July 31, 1990, pp. 38–39; and "Security from the Organs of State Security: Reading the Draft Law on the KGB," *Moskovskiye Novosti*, No. 36, Sept. 1990, p. 6. The law also disappointed those who were expecting that an independent investigative apparatus, separate from the KGB, would be set up. Legal experts have been advocating this for years, but the new law gives the KGB broad investigatory powers.

[95]In a speech to the Supreme Soviet on November 16, Gorbachev urged the deputies to adopt the law as quickly as possible, without turning the debate into an "unbridled campaign against the security organs." See *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Nov. 17, 1990.

[96]As George Breslauer has pointed out, Gorbachev deserves credit for "diluting the national security phobia that had been used to justify the Brezhnevian political order," as well as for preventing, with some exceptions, the use of state violence against political radicals. See George W. Breslauer, "Evaluating Gorbachev as Leader," *Soviet Economy* (Washington, DC), October-December 1989, pp. 299–340. But if the national security phobia is replaced by a phobia of civic unrest, this could serve as a justification for unleasing violence against those demanding change.

[97]See, for example, Aurel Braun and Richard B. Day, "Gorbachevian Contradictions," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1990, pp. 36–50.

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Perestroyka, Social Justice, and Soviet Public Opinion

David S. Mason and Svetlana Sydorenko

In its formulation of plans to reform the economy of the USSR, the Soviet communist leadership has faced a major dilemma: how to reconcile economic efficiency with social justice. *Perestroyka* proposes to accord an increased role to market mechanisms and even private enterprise. However, a market economy tends to create inequalities, and economic inequalities collide with a strong sense of egalitarianism imbued in the population as part of communist ideology.

The issue of social justice, wielded by Mikhail Gorbachev himself as a tool against sloth and underemployment, has stimulated a lively debate among Soviet intellectuals. At the same time, broader public sensitivity regarding the issue is becoming increasingly visible with the widespread use of survey research and the publication of its results. This creates a kind of spiral of discontent: the economy deteriorates and inequalities increase; journalists and academics openly discuss these problems; because of this publicity ("*glasnost*' "), the sense of injustice is heightened; and the regime's legitimacy is further eroded. The whole phenomenon suggests the emergence of the sense of relative deprivation and frustrated expectations that is characteristic of revolutionary situations. The way in which this issue is resolved, or not resolved, will have a major bearing on the fate of *perestroyka*.

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Justice in Communist Ideology

The concept of justice is an elusive one both in Marxist theory and in Soviet interpretations of that theory. Marx's prolific writings are surprisingly devoid of references to justice, and his followers have been reluctant to employ the concept. Under capitalism, they believe, justice is an illusion, unattainable without structural changes that would sweep away the entire system. In a communist society, on the other hand, justice has no meaning for Marxists, because the capitalist sources of injustice have disappeared. According to Robert Tucker, "the ideal of distributive justice is a complete stranger in the moral universe of Marxism."[1] This may overstate the case. Others have argued that despite the lack of explicit references to justice, Marx and Marxists "do have strong beliefs about justice."[2] Roy Medvedev, at one time a dissident Soviet historian and now a member of the Supreme Soviet, who considers himself a Marxist, has said that "the idea of justice and a just society was the basic stimulus for the founders of Marxism and their first followers."[3]

For several years after seizing power in 1917, the Bolsheviks displayed a radical egalitarianism in both rhetoric and policy. In 1918, Lenin stressed that "the foun-

[1]Robert Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1961, pp. 18–19.

[2]G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 12, cited in Kai Nielsen, *Marxism and the Moral Point of View*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989, p. 243.

[3]Roy Medvedev, "Socialism, Justice, and Democracy," in Ken Coates and Fred Singleton, Eds., *The Just Society*, Nottingham, Spokesman, 1977, p. 16.

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Chief engineer Tamara Soboleva prepares to test a new fragrance at Moscow's New Dawn factory, which produces perfume and eau de cologne.

—AP/Wide World Photos.

dations of socialism lay in the ability to distribute evenly."[4] He opposed excessively high wages for anyone and favored limits on income to prohibit unlimited advantages in consumption or accumulation. As a result, there was a substantial reduction of income differentials.[5] However, by 1921, with the retreat from "war communism" and the beginning of the "New Economic Policy," Lenin was enunciating a diluted concept of egalitarianism:

[W]hen we deal with distribution, to think that we must distribute only fairly is wrong; we must think that distribution is only the method, the means to raise productivity.[6]

Although Marx had written in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* that the formula for the constitution of a communist society was "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs," he had also written (in that same work) that in the first stage of communism, i.e., socialism, people would be rewarded according to their labor rather than their needs. Lenin emphasized this latter formula. This utilitarian approach, rejecting utopian notions of justice, dominated official Soviet thinking thereafter.

Through the Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev years, the concept of justice was rarely discussed. When it was, it was treated as a fait accompli. A 1987 booklet on *Socialist Society: Its Social Justice,* for example, argued that the "key factor in understanding the social justice of socialist society" was the transfer of the ownership of the means of production to the working people.[7] To the extent that anyone questioned whether justice had been achieved, the discussion was hidden behind the issue of wages and wage distribution. Even the seemingly central communist concept of "social equality" was rarely mentioned during this period.[8] And when the issue of equality was addressed, the focus was on equality of opportunity rather than on equality of result. The persistence of social and economic inequalities was explained by resorting to the Leninist formula that differentiation was based on the quantity and quality of labor. The adverse effects of such differences were, however, to be mitigated by "social consumption funds" in the form of free education and medical care, student stipends, pensions, subsidized holidays, and other allowances.[9]

Reconsideration of Social Justice

The concept of social justice was reintroduced by the two reformist leaders Yuriy Andropov and Mikhail Gorbachev. Under Andropov, and in Gorbachev's first year as party leader, the concept was used as an instrument against official corruption and privileges. It also came to have broader targets—lazy and inefficient workers who received the same wages as good workers, and those who receive "non-labor income." In all three cases, people were seen as being rewarded by criteria that were based neither on need (the communist formula) nor on work (the socialist one). To the extent that justice was based on the socialist formula of reward for labor, people that received benefits other than from labor were perpetrators of "injustice."

As Gorbachev and his advisers grappled with economic stagnation and living standards that had, according to one source, fallen to the point where they

[4]Vladimir Lenin. *Polnoye sobraniye sochinenii* (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 36, Moscow, Politizdat, 1967–70, p. 488.

[5]V. G. Rogovin, "Social Justice and the Socialist Distribution of Vital Goods," *Voprosy Filosofii* (Moscow), No. 9, 1986, pp. 3–20, translated in *Soviet Sociology* (Armonk, NY), Winter 1987, p. 48.

[6]Op. cit., Vol. 43, p. 359.

[7]M. P. Mchedlov, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1987, p. 13.

[8]Ideological reference books such as the 1984 *Fundamental Concepts of Communist Morality* did not mention it. See Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Soviet Public Opinion and Ideology*, New York, Praeger, 1986, p. 55.

[9]Mchedlov, op. cit., p. 23.

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reached between 50th and 60th among the world's countries,[10] they increasingly focused on the need to create greater financial and material incentives for efficient and productive labor—in the words of one sociologist, to stimulate "the development of talents."[11] Such an approach was bound to increase social inequality and to thrust the issue of social justice into the forefront. Gorbachev tried to harness the concept as a tool against egalitarianism and "leveling." At the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he devoted a whole section of his report on behalf of the Central Committee to social justice. He observed:

[W]hen equal payments are fixed for the work of a good employee and that of a negligent one, this is a gross violation of our principles. And first of all it is an intolerable distortion of socialism's basic principle: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work," which expresses the substance of social justice under the new social system.[12]

However, although Gorbachev's report to the congress asserted that "the unity of socialist society is by no means a leveling of social life," and stressed the necessity of "overcoming egalitarianism in pay, etc.," it also committed the party to overcoming *unjustifiable* differences by expanding public consumption funds, curtailing unearned incomes "and attempts to use public property for selfish ends," and eliminating "*unjustified* differences" in pay.[13]

The concept of social justice is thus two-edged. The tension inherent in the concept reflects a broader tension within the whole structure of reforms in the Soviet Union: Gorbachev wants to achieve a more efficient, market-based economy; but this will lead to inequality in the form of wider income differentials and even unemployment, which tend to undermine the already fragile legitimacy of the communist regime.

Aspects of the Debate

Once the issue of social justice had been aired by political leaders, academics began to develop the concept more fully, often in important philosophical and party journals, including *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy) and *Kommunist* (the party Central Committee's theoretical journal). There has been no consensus among academics, however, either in defining social justice or in deciding how to achieve it. Some people challenge the reforms because of their apparent retreat from the egalitarian principles of socialism. Other prominent theoreticians have argued that inequality is necessary in the short term if there is to be greater equality in the long term.[14]

Despite the differences, commentators do seem to share three common views. First, all writers stress that the present stage of socialism is not able to deliver full social and economic equality. Second, there is an effort to put distance between the concepts of social justice and social equality. And third, it is agreed that although socialist societies will have to put up with inequality in the short run, these inequalities can be mitigated by social consumption funds. This is the extent of the consensus.

Wealth and privilege. One of the features of the reforms was to encourage individuals to earn more money and to permit them to spend it for personal needs. In 1988, Gorbachev stated:

We also must think about why a person in our country who has earned money honestly is sometimes unable to build the kind of house he wants, to buy a cooperative apartment, or to spend his wages in some other way. The principle of socialism is violated in this instance, too. A good toiler and his family should feel that honestly earned money enables them to live better.[15]

This sort of encouragement for people to accumulate wealth seemed to be in conflict with socialist principles. It occasioned a lively debate in the Soviet press, in which the dominant position seemed to say that wealth is justified if it is earned "honestly" and by hard work. One point in the debate revolved around a study from Latvia showing that more than half of the total bank deposits in the republic were concentrated in just 3 percent of the accounts. To the argument by sociologist V. G. Rogovin that such a disparity "should not exist in a

[10] *Moskovskiye Novosti* (Moscow), Aug. 21, 1988, p. 12, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter *CDSP*), Oct. 26, 1988, p. 27. The article also observed that the share of government expenditures going to human needs is higher in the United States than in the Soviet Union.

American estimates show annual average growth in Soviet consumption declining from 5 percent in the late 1960's to just 0.8 percent in the early 1980's. See US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *The Soviet Economy in 1988: Gorbachev Changes Course*, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1989, p. 41.

[11] A. G. Zdravomyslov, "The New Socio-Political Thinking," *Rabochiy Klass i Sovremennyy Mir* (Moscow), No. 6, 1987, pp. 3–15, trans. in *Soviet Sociology*, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 41.

[12] *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1986.

[13] Ibid. (emphasis added).

[14] See, for example, M. N. Rutkevich, "Social Justice," *Sotsiologicheskiye Issledovaniya* (Moscow), No. 3, 1986, pp. 13–25, translated in *Soviet Sociology*, Winter 1987, pp. 56–57.

[15] In a speech to the CPSU Central Committee, *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 13, 1988, pp. 1–3, trans. in *CDSP*, Feb. 10, 1988, pp. 1ff.

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Customers at the window of a savings bank in Vilnius, Lithuania.

—AP/Wide World Photos.

socialist society," Gennadiy Lisichkin, an economist, responded that it was all right, and suggested that it might well be due to honesty, hard work, and thrift. Lisichkin spoke of the need to "teach [people] how to make money" and praised "those healthy people who want not merely to receive more but to earn more."[16] Another sociologist has expressed the issue in language reminiscent of Adam Smith: "Might we not hypothesize that rational calculation, material interests, and the striving for well-being are by no means alternatives to virtue?"[17]

Soviet sociologists have pointed out that income differentiation in the Soviet Union is not large. They cite data showing that, on average, the most highly paid 10 percent of the population earns three times as much as the most poorly paid 10 percent. Other data show the ratio between the minimum and maximum wages to be about 10 to 1.[18] While some see such differences as contradicting the principle of social justice, others defend them as inevitable when profit and cost accounting are introduced. As political scientist Fedor Burlatskiy put it: "You have to choose: either an active society with some kinds of differentiation, or a stagnant society with equality."[19]

While arguing for greater differentiation, most advocates of reform do argue for placing restrictions at the "top," by reducing privileges and restricting non-labor incomes, and for cushioning the impact on the "bottom," by increasing social benefits and minimum wages. Both undertakings are difficult and complex, and they often run counter to the dynamics and imperatives of the market mechanisms that are central to the economic reforms.

Non-labor income. The concept "non-labor income" raises numerous political and economic issues. The struggle against such incomes—earned outside the official economy—has been a prominent issue for those campaigning for social justice. Restricting these incomes is seen as a way to temper the accumulation of wealth that could occur with the greater differentiation allowed in official incomes. One voice in this debate has been that of Tat'yana Zaslavskaya, a reform-minded sociologist who moved from Novosibirsk to Moscow after Gorbachev assumed the party leadership.

Initially, Zaslavskaya and others equated "non-labor" income with "illegal" income. But even before many of the reforms were implemented, it was evident that the distinction between legal and illegal incomes, or labor and non-labor incomes, was not always clear. For example, the press raised questions regarding sales of goods in the farmers' markets, or the peddling of handiworks.[20] Gorbachev touched on the issue at the 27th CPSU Congress, when he warned that "while combating unearned incomes, we must not permit any shadow to fall on those who do honest work to earn a supplementary income."[21] The line between labor and non-labor incomes faded even further with the adoption of new laws concerning cooperatives and "individual labor activity."[22]

The issue of non-labor incomes becomes more complicated yet when social scientists such as Zaslavskaya argue that anyone who benefits from subsidized prices is, in effect, receiving unearned income. She and others propose to eliminate such "income" by raising rents for state-owned housing and reducing subsidies (i.e., raising prices) on meat, dairy products, and other items in short supply.[23] This proposal does, of course, coincide with another central element of the

[16] *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Feb. 19, 1986, cited in Aaron Trehub, "Social Justice and Economic Progress," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (hereafter, RFE-RL), *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 382/86, Oct. 7, 1986, pp. 8–9.

[17] G. S. Batygin, "Virtue Against Interest," *Sotsiologicheskiye Issledovaniya*, No. 3, 1987, pp. 24–36, trans. in *Soviet Review* (Armonk, NY), January-February, 1989, p. 36.

[18] Rogovin, loc. cit., p. 38.

[19] In a lecture at Stanford University, May 2, 1989. See also Rutkevich, loc. cit., p. 59.

[20] Trehub, loc. cit., pp. 7–8.

[21] *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1986.

[22] The "Law on Individual Labor Activity" is reported in ibid., Nov. 29, 1986; the "Law on Cooperatives," in ibid., June 6, 1988.

[23] Janet Chapman, "Income Distribution and Social Justice in the Soviet Union," *Comparative Economic Studies* (Lake Forest, IL), Spring 1989, pp. 36–39.

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economic reform—price rationalization. But benefiting from subsidies on the price of meat is a far cry from profiting from black market operations.

Concern for those less well off. The debate over social justice in the popular and academic literature has also touched on issues of unemployment and of poverty among working-age and retired citizens. Burlatskiy, for example, has expressed concern over managers who talk of reducing their workforces by a quarter or more, when "guaranteed labor and social security constitute the chief gains of the socialist system."[24] With the official poverty level at 75 rubles a month (some Soviet economists say a more realistic figure would be near 100 rubles a month), the press has shown concern for the country's 58 million older citizens (more than a third of whom live on pensions of less than 58 rubles a month) and for some 40 million people earning less than 75 rubles a month.[25] The issue of poverty also surfaced in the miners' strikes in Siberia and Ukraine in the summer of 1989, and was one of the factors that led the government to increase pensions in 1990.[26]

Such issues will become increasingly visible and acrimonious as the economic reforms lead to price increases, a reduction in state subsidies, and layoffs of workers. As a 1988 Novosibirsk seminar on *perestroyka* concluded, "the practice of carrying out transformations here in our country and in other socialist countries has shown that reform cannot be both deep and 'gentle' at the same time."[27] Already, Soviet citizens are feeling the bite of such changes. Unemployment is now estimated at 6 percent of the able-bodied population—some 8 million people—and is expected to double within the next five years.[28] Among other things, the Novosibirsk report recommended "an entire system of socio-economic compensations, equalizers, and shock absorbers" to cope with such problems.

The impoverished state of large segments of the Soviet population has raised new concerns over the system of social consumption funds, which purportedly exist to satisfy basic needs and equalize living standards. Increasingly, however, there are criticisms both of the effectiveness of these resources and the fairness of their distribution. Some argue that they heavily favor the elite, and in fact do not guarantee much to the ordinary citizen. Sociologist Yuriy Levada, for example, states that,

> *in comparison with other developed countries and, more important, as a measure of the growth of our own social needs, we do have not too much, but rather too little real social and economic guarantees. There are no guarantees of a minimum hourly wage, a minimum standard of living, necessary medical services, kindergarten facilities, and so on.*[29]

Levada also sees the constitutional guarantee of employment as empty verbiage in the absence of a system of institutional guarantees such as job retraining programs, dissemination of information about job vacancies, and credits or subsidies for the unemployed.

Others argue that society pays too high a price for the guarantees offered, and that welfare payments should go only to the truly needy. For example, Ludmilla Piyasheva, an economist who openly calls for shifting the Soviet economy toward capitalism, argues that the present system "makes every citizen a petitioner for his share of social benefits that are not given automatically" and forces citizens to depend, therefore, on the benevolence of officials. The social consumption funds, she argues, lead to an excessive concentration and centralization of power, demand enormous expenditures by the state, and give to the state functions "that can and should be accomplished by the citizens themselves." In this sphere, she continues, "the state must radically limit its power and participation, for its services are too expensive, of low quality and, as long experience has shown, contradict the principles of social justice."[30]

Class conflict and social justice. Philosopher Brian Barry has written that "the problem of distributive justice arises only when there is a conflict of interest; it is moot when there is a harmony of interest."[31] With the Soviet economic reforms, we are likely to see increasing tension and conflict as some become wealthy under the new system, and others remain poor. In effect, class conflict looms on the Soviet scene. This will be most pronounced in the Russian republic, although in

[24]"Learn Democracy," *Pravda*, July 18, 1987, p. 3, trans. in *CDSP*, Aug. 19, 1987, p. 8.

[25]Esther Fein, "In Lenin's Classless Society," *The New York Times*, May 7, 1989; and *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Aug. 8, 1990, pp. 1–2.

[26]A new "Law on Pensions" increases most pensions and indexes them to prices. See *Izvestiya*, May 15, 1990, translated in *CDSP*, June 20, 1990, p. 18.

[27]*Nedelya* (Moscow), May 2–8, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, June 22, 1988, pp. 18–19.

[28]*Izvestiya*, Apr. 7, 1990, p. 1, trans. in *CDSP*, May 9, 1990, p. 5.

[29]Yuriy Levada, "Which Resources Are Exhausted?" in F. M. Borodkin et al., Eds., *Postizheniye* (Understanding), Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1989, p. 81.

[30]L. I. Piyasheva, "Outlines of a Radical Economic Reform," in ibid., pp. 270, 275.

[31]Cited in Robert E. Lane, "Market Justice, Political Justice," *American Political Science Review* (Washington, DC), June 1986, p. 393.

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Social worker Katya Pavlova brings food to pensioner Lyudmilla Kuzmina and notes what she has to buy next.

—I. Zotin/TASS from Sovfoto.

other republics, where ethnic issues predominate, class divisions may actually reinforce the ethnic ones.

Already in the late 1960's and early 1970's, some Soviet writers were modifying their treatment of classes and social stratification and admitting that inequality of social groups afflicted socialist as well as capitalist societies.[32] They were also recognizing that such contradictions in a socialist society could be antagonistic rather than harmonious.[33] In the 1980's, sociologist Tat'yana Zaslavskaya led the way in exploring more deeply the bases for conflict among different social groups. She wrote in 1985 that "[t]he driving force of behavior is personal and group interest," and that although Soviet society may be one of "moral and political unity . . . , every social group has its own special interests, which may come into contradiction with the interests of other groups."[34] A colleague of hers, V. G. Rogovin, has even said that these "contradictions" may in some cases become a "conflict between social interests."[35] Radical change of the economy will only exacerbate such conflicts, as Zaslavskaya acknowledged in a 1987 interview.[36] In short, the reforms are sacrificing harmony for efficiency.

Public Opinion and Social Justice

So far we have discussed only the views and positions of Soviet officials and scholars. But, of course, one needs also to explore the attitude regarding social justice of the general Soviet public, which has become increasingly vocal and feisty. The Gorbachev leadership has invited the public to speak out, and has encouraged new public opinion research to allow the regime to gauge popular attitudes. In some cases, however, especially on the issue of social justice, the public mood runs counter to the interests of the reformers.

The role of public opinion research, like so much else in the Soviet Union, is undergoing dramatic change in the Gorbachev era. During most of the years of the Soviet regime, public opinion polling was seen as "a useful and auxiliary instrument of social management,"[37] and the leadership consistently resisted research that might reveal hostility to the system. During the "thaw" of the Khrushchev era, public opinion studies were permitted to explore a wider range of topics. But even then, according to Boris Grushin, a prominent public opinion researcher, social scientists were like "a scientific council for Genghis Khan"—public opinion research did not much influence the authorities, and in-depth, probing research was a dangerous enterprise.[38] After Nikita Khrushchev's removal in autumn 1964, scientific public opinion research generally withered away.

Things have changed radically in recent years. Émigré Soviet sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh has argued that "popular attitudes in the USSR can have an important impact in a period of crisis, when there is no unity at the apex of power, or when the leadership desperately needs the cooperation of the population,"[39] All three conditions now pertain, and consequently, public opinion research has been given a stronger role than ever

[32]See Murray Yanowitch, *Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union: Six Studies*, White Plains, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1977, p. 6.

[33]See Ernst Kux, "Contradictions in Soviet Socialism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1984, pp. 1–27.

[34]T. I. Zaslavskaya, "The Social Mechanism of the Economy," *Znaniye-sila* (Moscow), No. 10, 1985, pp. 3–5, trans. in *Soviet Sociology*, Fall 1987, pp. 35–36.

A group of economists and sociologists led by Zaslavskaya concluded that the well-known Marxist-Leninist criterion for identifying class and social groups—their relationship to the means of production—needed to be refined with the use of such factors as "the extent of their executive authority and prerogatives, the economic sector in which a group operates, the volume and structure of the means of production that a group puts into circulation, and the opportunity to use them for personal ends or to own them." See *Nedelya*, May 2–8, 1988, p. 11, trans. in *CDSP*, June 22, 1988.

[35]Rogovin, loc. cit., p. 30.

[36]"If we want . . . radical changes . . . there will be a relative change in the situation of classes, groups, and strata of society," Zaslavskaya observed, with "advantage for some, . . . disadvantage for others." Cited in Walter Connor, *Socialism's Dilemmas: State and Society in the Soviet Bloc*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1988, p. 127.

[37]Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Soviet Public Opinion and Ideology*, New York, Praeger, 1986, p. 115.

[38]Boris Grushin, "Scientific Council for Ghengis Khan," *Novoye Vremya* (Moscow), No. 43, October 1988, pp. 30–32.

[39]Shlapentokh, op. cit., p. 131.

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before in Soviet history. A number of public opinion research centers have appeared, including the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion, headed by the liberal and iconoclastic Tat'yana Zaslavskaya.[40]

Zaslavskaya has argued both for more honest and sophisticated sociological research and for greater attention by the authorities to the needs and voices of the public. She sees public opinion research as a tool that is both informational and political: one that is necessary for the development and implementation of new policies. Management organs, she wrote in *Pravda*,

greatly need full, accurate, and truthful information about the real state of affairs in any sphere of social life and the requirements, interests, values, and behavior of social groups. . . . the light of sociological research must penetrate the remotest corners of public life, expose the accumulated dust, and stimulate the speediest possible cleaning up of our common house.[41]

What the public opinion surveys reveal, however, is not always pleasing to the reformers. Although Gorbachev and his advisers appear to have won out in the policy and academic debate with "conservatives" on the need to temper commitment to social justice in the interest of economic reform and efficiency, the leadership finds opposition on such matters from the general public.

In particular, "the strong strand of economic egalitarianism" detected by Western scholars of Soviet political culture[42] has proven to have great staying power. The Gorbachev leadership may have considered that such egalitarianism was part of the old system of inculcated values and would be dissipated in the new atmosphere of openness and democratization. Public opinion surveys reveal that this has not happened.

A 1988 survey of Moscow residents, in asking how incomes should be distributed, found fully 38 percent of those questioned agreeing with the proposition that "Society should strictly control incomes so that all its members live in approximately equal material conditions"—a radically egalitarian point of view. A larger share of the sample (48 percent), felt that incomes should be distributed based on the quantity and quality of labor, but should not be "excessive." In identifying various "types of political consciousness," the same survey found the proportion of the sample favoring a system that promoted social justice to be much higher (41) percent than that of those who favored a more pragmatic orientation (14 percent).[43] Reformers intent on introducing Western-style pragmatism to the Soviet economy could find little comfort in these results.

More surprising, a 1989 survey of the Soviet urban population found only 2.5 percent who viewed the current distribution of incomes in Soviet society to be "just." Almost two-thirds of the sample believed that differences in income had increased in the past two to three years. And when asked "do you expect that *perestroyka* will make the distribution of incomes in society more just?" only 31 percent answered "yes"; 25 percent thought "no"; and 44 percent were not sure.[44]

The "conservative" cast of public opinion is also evident in attitudes regarding diverse forms of enterprise ownership. A national survey found that a majority of respondents (71–72 percent) supported collective ownership and joint ventures, but only 31 percent favored private ownership.[45] Even the new cooperatives (which are not based on private property) are widely distrusted. The 1989 urban sample mentioned above found only 25 percent approving of cooperatives, and 50 percent disapproving.[46]

[40]Up to now, Zaslavskaya's group is the only organization conducting nationwide surveys in the USSR. The Center has conducted about two surveys per month through some 23 regional centers in all of the 15 republics. Because of growing ethnic tension in the Soviet republics over the last year, some of these regional centers are no longer operating, and the scope of the "national" surveys has been reduced; they no longer include all of the republics.

This raises the question of whether the Center's surveys genuinely represent the whole country, and in particular whether they obscure important differences among republics and nationalities. Researchers at the Center have responded that on most of the Center's survey questions discussed in this article, there were not significant differences among republics. Nevertheless, these issues have not been systematically explored.

[41]*Pravda*, Feb. 6, 1987, trans. as "Perestroika and Sociology," *Social Research* (New York), Spring/Summer 1988, pp. 268 and 276.

[42]Archie Brown, "Ideology and Political Culture," in Seweryn Bialer, Ed., *Politics, Society and Nationally Inside Gorbachev's Russia*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989, pp. 31–32.

As the USSR divides and disintegrates, a "Soviet political culture" ceases to exist. But elements of that culture, particularly economic egalitarianism, remain in much of the country, and especially among Russians. See, for example, Hedrick Smith's discussion of "The Russian Character," *The New York Times Magazine*, Oct. 28, 1990.

[43]Leontiy Byzov and Nikolay L'vov, "*Perestroyka:* Political Consciousness and Social Relations," *Vek XX i Mir* (Moscow), March 1989, p. 15–16, and 12. Byzov is the director of the scientific research center of the Soviet Sociological Association, another new organization, affiliated with the Academy of Sciences. The poll was conducted in November-December 1988 among 1,231 residents of Moscow—half by a random telephone sample and half by in-person interviews.

[44]All-Union Center for Public Opinion Research, "Attitudes of the Population Toward Radical Economic Reform," *Obshchestvennoye Mneniye v Tsifrakh* (Public Opinion in Figures), October 1989, Moscow, based on a sample of 1,148 residents of 19 cities in the RSFSR and six other republics.

[45]*Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 12, 1989. This antipathy to private ownership was expressed, it might be noted, primarily in connection with ownership of heavy industry.

[46]See fn. 44. The public is agitated about the high prices that cooperatives charge and the high incomes enjoyed by their proprietors. See Anthony Jones and William Moskoff, "New Cooperatives in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1989, pp. 32–35.

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Gorbachev and other leaders are fully aware of these popular perceptions, and frequently voice frustration at "leveling" attitudes and the persistence of a "nonmarket psychology" in the population. Speaking to the Central Committee in early 1988, Gorbachev complained that "our understanding of social justice has been deformed." If the leadership were to implement certain notions advocated in the press, he said, "we would have to take up a big iron and iron out all of our society. Everyone would have to fit the same pattern: the gifted person and the untalented, the conscientious worker and the loafer, the honest man and the thief." He mentioned cases of productive workers who increased output by several hundred percent, but whose wages had grown by "only 50–100 percent." But even such increases, too small from his point of view, cause people to complain and worry that they might lead to a "private-ownership mentality."[47]

Although displeased by these popular attitudes, Gorbachev recognizes their power. At a Central Committee meeting in late 1989, one participant repeated the argument of economist Vasiliy Selyunin that "in a month, the market would put everything in order." Gorbachev interrupted:

I know but one thing. In two weeks this "market" would draw all the people into the streets and sweep away any government, however much it might vow fidelity to its people.[48]

A closer look at the egalitarianism of at least some members of the Soviet public, however, reveals that the prospects for reform are not totally hopeless. There is some evidence that public concern with social justice issues is instrumental in nature, i.e., social justice is seen as a means of achieving a higher personal standard of living. For example, a survey conducted in Leningrad city to determine how the populace evaluated various periods of Soviet history revealed that "the degree of improvement of the material situation" was given much greater weight than "the degree of justice in the differences in the material well-being of various strata" (see Table 1).

The public is also ambivalent, even schizophrenic, about the role of the state in insuring social justice. In an urban survey on economic reform conducted in autumn 1989, 63 percent of the respondents agreed that the state should interfere "as little as possible" in the distribution of incomes. At the same time, 85 percent thought that the state should "give more privileges to people with low incomes," and 84 percent agreed that the state should guarantee to each person a minimum income. Almost half (48.9 percent) also felt that the state "should not allow excessive differences between low and high incomes." Sixty percent supported the rationing of scarce commodities, and only 5 percent favored flexible pricing.[49]

If Soviet citizens feel some ambivalence about the economic reforms and the tension between egalitarianism and efficiency, they are categorically opposed to another element of inequality: elite privileges. Although Gorbachev and his advisers have addressed the issue, many feel that they have not moved forcefully enough. This issue may account in part for the popularity of Boris Yel'tsin, recently elected President of the Russian Republic. Yel'tsin's populism plays on the popular sense of egalitarianism, which is manifested both in concern for the poor and resentment against the rich. At the 27th Party Congress in 1986, Yel'tsin voiced complaints about privileges and "special goods for leaders" and asserted that "the criterion of social justice must always be the interests of the working class above all."[50] He revived these themes at the Congress of People's Deputies in May 1989, wondering aloud "why are tens of millions living below the poverty line while others are wallowing in luxury?"[51]

These powerful themes find a sympathetic hearing among many citizens. After the May session of the legislature, the All-Union Center for Public Opinion Research conducted a poll containing questions about Yel'tsin's proposal to transform the Fourth Division of the Ministry of Health (a special division for high party and state officials) into medical facilities for maternal and child care. Almost everyone agreed with this (75 percent, in full; and 16 percent, mainly); only 2 percent disagreed.[52]

The popular sense of egalitarianism is linked to an underlying support for socialism, and considerable distrust of both capitalism and the entrepreneurial spirit. This basic support for socialism has been noted by sociologists and other observers both in the Soviet Union and in the West. It is due in part to the semi-successful propaganda that has led many Soviet citizens to support "the key official values and beliefs."[53] But it is also

[47] *Pravda*, Jan. 13, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, Feb. 10, 1988, p. 3.

[48] *Pravda*, Nov. 6, 1989.

[49] All-Union Center for Public Opinion Research, "Attitude of the Population Toward Radical Economic Reform," loc. cit.

[50] Cited in Rogovin, loc. cit., pp. 34–35.

[51] Quoted in Aaron Trehub, "The Congress of People's Deputies on Poverty," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), June 16, 1989, p. 6.

[52] *Ogonek* (Moscow), No. 34, August 1989, pp. 2–3. The survey reported in *Ogonek* was based on a sample of 2,100 people randomly selected from 47 cities in most of the republics.

[53] See, for example, Connor, op. cit., esp. pp. 71–75 and 134–135; Gail Lapidus, "State and Society: Toward the Emergence of Civil Society in the Soviet Union," in Bialer, op. cit., pp. 143–34; Shlapentokh, op. cit., esp. pp. 4, 124; and Medvedev, loc. cit., esp. pp. 11–12 and 16–17.

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Table 1: Criteria Used by Soviet Citizens to Evaluate Historical Periods

Criterion	Percentage of respondents citing criterion, by educational level		
	Higher education	Secondary education	Less than secondary
The degree of improvement in the material situation	73	56	38
The development of the economy of the country	60	36	23
Degree of support for the personal incentive of the worker	52	38	31
Degree of justice in the differences in the material well-being of various strata	27	28	23
The character of sacrifices required for development	26	20	21
Rate of economic growth	25	25	21
Degree of order, labor discipline in the country	16	19	33
Hard to say	5	25	32

SOURCE: A March-June 1989 survey of Leningrad citizens by the Institute of Sociology. See B. Z. Doktorov, "Materials for A Summary Account on the Theme: Social and Economic Problems of Development of Large Cities," presented at a Soviet-American Colloquium on Public Opinion, Moscow, December 1989. The survey was based on a mail canvass of 900 randomly selected Leningrad residents. They were asked to evaluate a range of historical periods from the New Economic Policy of the mid-1920's on through collectivization to *perestroyka*.

a result of the real success of the Soviet state in raising the standard of living and assuring most citizens a basic level of security, at least up to the 1970's. As Roy Medvedev has put it, "our country has achieved no mean progress in the area of individual economic, cultural, and social rights that to all intents and purposes did not exist in tsarist Russia."[54] From the point of view of many Soviet citizens, capitalism may produce wealth, but it also requires hard work, brings uncertainty and insecurity, and fosters inequality. Such perceptions pose a real obstacle to efforts of the reformers to move the economy toward competition, market pricing, and greater economic and social differentiation.

Ironically, the tendency of the public to look to the state to ensure social justice carries within it the seeds of a solution to some of the reformers' dilemmas. In the past, Soviet citizens largely accepted the centralized role of the state and conceded politics to the authorities. The official ideology postulated equality and social welfare, and the citizens supported that. Now, however, Gorbachev is reshaping the ideology, demanding hard work, legitimizing competition and differentiation, and giving credence to the market. If Soviet citizens (or, at least, Russian ones) continue past patterns of accepting the vision of the world proffered by their leaders, then eventually they might come around to Gorbachev's point of view, and be more accepting of these new concepts and ways of life. If they do not, the reforms will fail.

These social and political obstacles to reform are, of course, increasingly compounded and complicated by the growing nationalities disputes and the step-by-step fragmentation of the Union. The task of bringing the population over to the market will be no less difficult in an environment of national conflict, political instability, and the decay of central authority.

But even without the nationalities problem, Gorbachev's task is a big one. He must, essentially, reshape the political culture of the population. As Samuel Barnes points out in a comparative study of politics and culture, "culture suggests the 'easy' behavior. . . . cultural patterns provide the routine, largely unexamined options followed by most people most of the time."[55] For most Soviet citizens, it was "easy" to accept the Soviet welfare state, its centralized political structure, and the system's undemanding work ethic. In trying to alter these patterns, the Gorbachev leadership will have to disrupt the easy behavior of citizen compliance with them. The end result may be attractive, with more citizen participation and a higher standard of living, but the transition period will be a difficult and wrenching one for both the society and the leadership.

For now, Gorbachev's economic and political reforms do not attract a broad constituency. The only clear "winners," to borrow from Peter Hauslohner's analysis, are the professionals.[56] In the working class, there may

[54]Medvedev, loc. cit., pp. 11–12. Although popular trust in the party has been declining steadily over the last two years, in August 1990, some 38 percent of a group surveyed expressed full or partial confidence in the organization (compared to 42 percent who did not). Data based on national samples, and from the archives of the All-Union Center for Public Opinion Research. For a report of even higher levels of trust in the party, see Lev Gudkov and Yuriy Levada, "Who Is Ahead?" *Ogonek*, No. 25, June 1990, p. 1. Given the events of the last year, it is difficult to know whether to be surprised more by the decline or by the persistence of any support at all.

[55]"Politics and Culture," a paper presented at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, March 1989, p. 28.

[56]Peter Hauslohner, "Gorbachev's Social Contract," *Soviet Economy* (Washington, DC), January-March 1987, p. 83. That support for reform only comes from those engaged in creative work, highly skilled specialists, and high-level managers was confirmed by the 1988 Novosibirsk seminar on restructuring. See Aleksey Ulyukayev, "Restructuring: Who's For It and Who's Against It?" *Nedelya*, May 2–8, 1988, trans. in *CDSP*, June 22, 1988, pp. 18–19.

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also be a new stratum of winners in those who capitalize on the new economic incentives and entrepreneurial possibilities, but probably not many workers see themselves fitting into that category just yet. These constituencies are much too small to sustain the reforms over a long period, especially given the regime's encouragement of democratization and grass-roots political activity. Unless the state or the economy can generate some positive material benefits for the workers, the Kremlin is likely to confront many more of the kinds of strikes staged by miners in Siberia and Ukraine. Gorbachev has recognized this problem, telling the Central Committee in January 1988 that "just two or three years will decide where restructuring is going."[57]

Political Justice or Market Justice?

Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership face multiple dilemmas in the next two or three years. With democratization, *perestroyka,* and *glasnost',* they have unleashed social forces that will not be easy to control. Perhaps the most important problem is in managing, or satisfying, popular expectations. Since 1985, Gorbachev has been pledging "radical reform" and even "revolutionary" changes in the Soviet Union. The reforms he promotes are meant to move the Soviet Union to a higher plane of development. For most Soviet citizens, however, little has changed; indeed, in many cases, the situation has worsened.

The basic problem for the Gorbachev leadership, then, becomes one of shifting popular expectations of justice from the political system to the marketplace, and then in getting the market to work. In a discussion of perceptions of justice in the United States, Robert Lane has argued that Americans prefer "market justice" to "political justice"; "they prefer the market's criteria of earned deserts to the polity's criteria of equality and need, and believe that market procedures are more fair than political procedures."[58] If Gorbachev is going to succeed in the Soviet Union, it would seem that he would need to nudge the Soviet population, or a good part of it, toward such a preference for market justice.

In the process, the Soviet state will reduce its commitment to satisfying the norms of social justice, by cutting back on its distributive role. This will put it in a dangerous position. The population as a whole has become increasingly dissatisfied with the political system, and with the heretofore meager results of economic *perestroyka*. Groups that profited from the old arrangements—unskilled workers, bureaucrats, and collective-farm workers—are especially unhappy with the government. Meanwhile, the regime is also under fire from groups—skilled workers, the creative intelligentsia, some high-level managers, and industrious farmers—that want more radical reforms in respect to property and politics. Hence, it is in danger of losing all of its constituencies, and therefore its legitimacy.

Under Gorbachev's reforms, "justice" is increasingly to be achieved through hard work and commitment to quality. The burden will be more on the individual. This, of course, begins to sound like the free enterprise system that both Gorbachev and most Soviet citizens profess not to want. The Gorbachev leadership remains committed to socialism, and the population remains somewhat egalitarian and supportive of the welfare state. This constitutes, then, the central dilemma facing the Soviet Union: how to create a more efficient society without sacrificing too much of the commitment to social justice. The ideology of communism, the achievements of the Soviet state, and the legitimacy of the regime have been based in large measure on the commitment to justice. The future of the regime, however, depends on making the country more efficient, in terms of satisfying the material needs of its population and being competitive in the world market.

[57]M. Gorbachev, "Democratization Is the Essence of Restructuring and the Essence of Socialism," *Pravda,* Jan. 13, 1988, trans. in *CDSP,* Feb. 10, 1988, p. 4.

[58]Lane, loc. cit., p. 387.

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Hungary's New Political Elites: Adaptation and Change, 1989–90

Rudolf L. Tőkés

In March and April 1990, for the first time in 45 years, Hungary held free elections. In these elections, Hungarians voted out of power the communist government and 90 percent of the communist-dominated legislature. Three parties—the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), the Independent Smallholders' Party (ISP), and the Christian Democratic People's Party (CDPP)—formed the coalition government that took office on May 25, 1990. The parliamentary opposition consists of the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD), the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP), the Federation of Young Democrats (FYD), and a small group of independent delegates. According to Hungary's revised constitution, popular sovereignty resides in the country's democratically-elected National Assembly. For this reason, the 386 members of the Hungarian legislature may be seen as an important component of that country's "new" political elite.

Another part of Hungary's universe of political elites consists of the decision-makers and executives who staff the highest levels of government.[1] Since late May 1990, several ministries and top government agencies have been reorganized, and the ruling coalition has made several hundred "political" appointments. But the ruling coalition has only begun to move representatives of the "new" elite into central governmental institutions. Thus, the distribution of power within the government among the new, old, and holdover elites has not radically changed.

This article will analyze the demographic and sociopolitical background of Hungary's new political elite in the legislature and in the government. It will then focus on the place of the new parliamentary elites within the broader universe of Hungarian elites during the country's transition from post-communism to democracy.[2] Because the transition is still in process, there are substantial constraints on the scope and depth of inquiry one can make into the dynamics of Hungary's elite politics. Hence, this article is intended to be an interim report rather than a finished product.

From Authoritarianism to Democracy

The precise beginning of Hungary's political trans-

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[1]In addition to the political elite in parliament and the government, the Hungarian elite also embraces old and "holdover" elites at the center and a cluster of approximately 30,000 elected officials in local government. The members of the old elite include the extra-parliamentary political parties and electoral alliances under the leadership of still active political and social notables of the old regime; corporatist interest groups, such as the old/new Trade Union Federation and the successor organizations to the Young Communist League; the formal and informal "political action committees" of the old agricultural and heavy industry lobbies; amorphous clusters of third-echelon elites formally associated with the police, army, and Workers' Guard; scattered fundamentalist Marxist-Leninist intelligentsia groups; and leaders of major religious denominations who had gotten along (some say, too well) with the old regime.

Holdover elites include reappointed sub-cabinet and ministerial-level executives; top civil service appointees in the local and regional governments; leaders and top members of corporatist entities, such as the Academy of Sciences, the universities, and the associations of creative intellectuals and technocrats; executives, program managers, and senior editors in the media; military officers, field grade and above; the judiciary; professional associations in law, medicine, and engineering; and managers of industrial enterprises, state farms, and agricultural cooperatives who were appointed or dubiously elected.

Of course, these categories overlap to some extent. Ultimately, what distinguishes the old from the holdover elites is the degree of their personal commitment to systemic change. Absolute proof of this commitment is unobtainable.

[2]Rudolf L. Tőkés, "From Post-Communism to Democracy: Politics, Parties, and the Elections of 1990 in Hungary," *Interne Studien* (Bonn), No. 18, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1990.

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Former HSWP First Secretary János Kádár at a reception held on his 75th birthday on May 25, 1987.

—L. Weber from Eastfoto.

formation from an authoritarian to a democratic polity is difficult to establish. One can make a case for the 1956 revolution, the inauguration of János Kádár's policy of "he who is not against us is with us" in the early 1960's, the launching of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 1968, the onset of the country's economic collapse in the late 1970's, the holding of the first multi-candidate parliamentary elections in 1985, the ouster of János Kádár and his close associates from the Politburo of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) in May 1988, the emergence of independent political parties in the winter of 1988–89, the HSWP's consent to the establishment of a pluralistic political system in February 1989, the party's surrender of its *nomenklatura* authority in May 1989, or the HSWP's demise in October 1989. Each may be seen as a milestone in the protracted decline of the profoundly illegitimate political regime that had been imposed on the country by the Soviet Union in 1947–48.

Geopolitical factors played a decisive role in the shaping of Hungarian politics and elite behavior in the last 40 years. Until the mid-1980's, the regime's policies, the political incumbents' ideologies, and Hungary's institutional arrangements were hostage to the political, ideological, economic, and military preferences of the Soviet Union. In addition, a number of external events—the Prague Spring of 1968, the collapse of the Polish regime in the early 1980's, the ripple effects of political succession crises in the USSR between 1982 and 1985, and, above all, Mikhail Gorbachev's reform policies—have had a decisive effect on Hungarian domestic politics.

How decisive is a matter of conjecture. Although the Hungarian regime had been "semi-sovereign" in foreign policy since 1985, direct Soviet interference in Hungarian domestic affairs probably continued until mid-September 1988, when Yegor Ligachev was demoted from the de facto position of second secretary of the Soviet Communist party to secretary for agriculture. From then on, the old regime in Hungary had to face pressure from the domestic opposition on its own and salvage what it could from the political and economic wreckage of the Kádár regime.

Two kinds of scholarly literature might be helpful for a better understanding of the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe in general and in Hungary in particular. The first consists of academic studies of the dynamics of the "transition from authoritarianism to democracy" in Latin America and Southern Europe over the last 10 to 15 years. The second consists of the literature on political succession, elite politics, and dissent in communist states from 1953 to the late 1980's.

Of the voluminous literature on processes of transition to democracy, perhaps the best is *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, Lawrence Whitehead, and several collaborators.[3] This publication offers a series of penetrating case studies on the dynamics of transition in individual countries. Each national scenario has something to offer to the student of transitions in Eastern Europe.

However, the real analytical payoff for a deeper understanding of Hungary lies in O'Donnell and Schmitter's conceptualization of what one might call the "metaprocesses" of the transition to democracy. Their classification of transition outcomes into a "transfer," "surrender," or "overthrow" of the incumbents' power cleanly dovetails with choices between a "change in the system" and a "change of the system" in Eastern Europe. Moreover, O'Donnell and Schmitter's notion about a "second transition" toward the actual fulfillment

[3]Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

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of formal democratic rights gained during a "first transition" is highly suggestive and points to the open-ended nature of the democratization process both in Eastern Europe and in Latin America.

The O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead volume points to key similarities between transition politics in right-wing authoritarian and post-totalitarian communist polities. In both kinds of transitions, we find incumbent political elites who work to shape the politics of the transition period. The state bureaucracy, the military, the secret police, the business community (the industrial and agricultural policy lobbies in a mature communist regime), and actual and nascent opposition parties (dissident groups in a communist context) are active in both cases. Moreover, in both cases one can speak of the influence of pressures for democratization from abroad, particularly from the United States and Western Europe. In the case of Eastern Europe, "benign neglect" by, or gentle pressures from, the Soviet Union has been a factor in the last year or so.

However, three qualitative differences distinguish the transition politics of a "right-wing authoritarian" polity from that of a "communist," albeit "post-totalitarian," polity:

- Communist regimes' institutional and ideological penetration of society is much deeper than that of right-wing dictatorial regimes.
- Key economic, social, and cultural elites in communist regimes have much less legally guaranteed or de facto autonomy than their counterparts in right-wing dictatorships.
- Non-state actors (business and individuals) in communist regimes have little discretionary control over economic resources (liquid assets and property) and over the utilization of these resources for private purposes compared to their counterparts in right-wing dictatorships.

It is self-evident that not even in the darkest days of a rightist dictatorship are the citizens subjected, en masse, to compulsory political indoctrination under the threat of losing their jobs. And it is equally self-evident that in Latin America and Southern Europe, the Catholic Church, major industrialists and landowners, the military high command, and, to some degree, even certain corporatist entities (such as the universities) did enjoy a fair amount of immunity from state interference in their internal affairs. It is, however, the substantial autonomy of private property (occasional "populist" seizures of public utilities and key industrial plants notwithstanding) under right-wing authoritarian regimes and its legal protection from state interference that tend to undercut across-the-board comparisons between the group politics and elite behavior in right-wing authoritarian systems and in communist political systems.

The main analytical issue here is whether one might not consider the transition from authoritarianism to democracy as *part* of a transition from a "traditional market" type of system toward a more modern capitalist economy and appropriate political "superstructure." The flip side of this argument is to view communist revolutions and Marxist-Leninist regimes as symbols of drastic historical *discontinuity,* the movement out of which is seen not merely as a "transition," but as a *quantum leap* to the partial restoration of the pre-communist status quo.

Traditionally, with the exception of some apocalyptic scenarios that were dismissed as evidence of wishful thinking by émigrés and right-wing anti-communists, the study of communist elite politics and political succession has dealt with "within-system" change. The subject of inquiry has been the interplay of key political personalities acting, at best, on behalf of ad hoc coalitions of narrow elite constituencies within the ruling party. As party-designated managers of the state's material and human resources, the specialist elites lacked direct leverage to affect strategic decisions and major policy outcomes. In any case, the central issue in this literature is to identify the sources of political change *in* communist politics. As Valerie Bunce put it: "In the future, as in the past, succession should function as a way to 'tune' the system, rather than to undermine it."[4] Dissent in communist politics has been the subject of a large and still growing body of academic literature. Apart from descriptive accounts of the activities and ideas of dissident political actors, there have been two basic approaches to this phenomenon. The first might be called the "heroic-apologetic," which dealt with dissent in historical, moral, and philosophical terms.[5] The second type of literature tended to view dissidents as political actors, their organized activities as a new kind of interest group politics, and their ideas as policy inputs and alternative agendas for change in and of the system.[6] Neither type of literature on dissent gave enough credit to any communist leader for the kind of

[4]Valerie Bunce, *Do New Leaders Make a Diffference? Executive Succession and Public Policy Under Capitalism and Socialism,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 159. For a less systematic, but more up-to-date collection of studies on political succession in communist regimes, see Raymond C. Taras, Ed., *Leadership in Communist States,* Boston, Unwin & Hyman, 1989.

[5]The approach of Russian émigrés and that of Peter Reddaway seems to fit this characterization.

[6]Rudolf L. Tőkés, "Dissent: Politics for Change in the USSR," in Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tőkés, Eds., *Soviet Society and Politics in the 1970's,* New York, The Free Press, 1974, pp. 3–59; and Rudolf L. Tőkés, "Human Rights and Political Change in Eastern Europe," in Rudolf L. Tőkés, Ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe,* London, Macmillan, 1979, pp. 1–25.

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ideological and political flexibility that Gorbachev, Wojciech Jaruzelski, and Kádár's successors displayed in their dealings with their non-communist political opponents.

With these caveats in mind, it may be argued that the key to the reconstruction and better understanding of the Hungarian transition to democracy lies at the confluence of elite, leadership-succession, and dissident politics in communist states. Today's "new East European elites" include both the "players" and the "pawns" of yesterday's communist elite politics. However, in addition to the already known and extensively examined "old" pre-transition actors, much of the new Hungarian, and arguably the new East European, elite is made up of hitherto politically passive and non-persecuted middle-class professionals and intellectuals.

Elite Formation in Hungary

With few exceptions, today's Hungarian elites were either born or came of age, received their formal education, and had their careers under communist auspices. They were participants in, as well as willing or reluctant objects of, an epic effort to build a new political system, to promote economic modernization, and to create a new socialist society.

The communist party's priorities were informed by the primacy of politics in that they sought to realize two incompatible objectives: implementation of a Marxist-Leninist agenda of system-building and social transformation and, at the same time, preserving the party's monopoly of power. At issue, to use Alfred Meyer's phrase, is the subsequent evolution of the regime's initial "primitive accumulation of legitimacy," which the party could not sustain beyond the early mobilization phase of its development. The gratification of popular desires for consumer goods, better housing, and improved quality of life under "existing socialism" called for remedial steps. The moment the regime, however hesitantly, embarked in the late 1960's and early 1970's on the path of economic reforms, the party unwittingly compromised the integrity of its ideology, upon which its political power rested. A new kind of legitimacy was needed, but this legitimacy could not be accommodated within the confines of the regime's Marxist-Leninist institutional structure.

It is unclear whether either Mátyás Rákosi or Kádár were seriously committed to creating a "new socialist man" in Hungary. Yet, there is ample evidence that the regime assiduously promoted, well into the 1980's, its commitment to the shaping of a developed society managed by cadres with preferred socio-economic backgrounds and demonstrated loyalty to the ruling party. The regime's 40-year record of *kontraszelekcio* (policies of personnel selection rewarding political loyalty at the expense of expertise) and the penalizing of merit were the principal motivations behind the middle-class intelligentsia's involvement in politics and its leadership role in hastening the demise of the Kádár regime. The regime's anti-intelligentsia biases took many forms, ranging from job discrimination and systematic underpayment of white-collar work to restricted access to top *nomenklatura* positions for educated members of society. Skills and expertise, though badly needed for the realization of the party's drive to modernize the country, were recognized, if at all, through a complex system of rewards based on clientelism, nepotism, and co-optation.

Education and social mobility: winners and losers. The educational level of Hungarian society was quite low at the time of the communist takeover. For example, in 1949, 69.7 percent of the 15–29 age group had less than eight grades of formal education. Over its 40-year history, the communist regime's educational record has indeed been quite impressive. In 1980, of the 15–29 age-group, 37.9 percent had completed at least eight grades; 30.7 percent, vocational high school; 29.5 percent, academic high school, and 9.8 percent, university or college. In fact, of the total population under 30 in 1981, 46.1 percent were enrolled as full-time students in educational institutions ranging from kindergarten through university.[7]

From the very beginning, the Hungarian party sought to restructure the society in line with the regime's developmental goals and political-ideological objectives. The massive promotions to executive and managerial positions of 60,000 blue-collar workers in 1948 and of another 210,000 workers by the early 1980's were important steps in the long process of creating a new ruling elite that was to be both "red" and "expert."[8]

The initial losers in the process of large-scale, politically-directed social change between 1949 and 1954 were the more than 300,000 families of entrepreneurs, small businessmen, farmers, and middle-class professionals who were deprived of their property, jobs, and often their homes.[9] In dispensing this kind of "social justice," the regime deliberately handicapped the life

[7] *Magyarország 1985. Statisztikai Évkönyv* (Hungary 1985. Statistical Yearbook), Budapest, KSH, 1985, p. 16.

[8] Tamás Kolosi, *Struktura és Egyenlőtlenség* (Structure and Inequality), Budapest, Kossuth, 1983, p. 125.

[9] Antal Orkeny, "Historical Perspectives on Social Mobility," *Valóság* (Budapest), April 1989, p. 24.

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prospects of at least 750,000 middle-class Hungarians, alienating them politically for decades to come. Nevertheless, numerous middle-class professionals and white-collar employees, particularly the technical and the scientific intelligentsia, managed to weather the Stalinist period with their jobs and social status intact.

Social mobility under Kádár: opportunities and constraints. The 1956 revolution was a major political-economic watershed that compelled the regime to attempt to gain some legitimacy in the eyes of the Hungarian people. Attempts to improve the economic lot of the people figured prominently in regime efforts to bolster its legitimacy. Toward this end, the party sought to develop a highly skilled labor force for industry, agriculture, science, education, trade, commerce, and public administration. The regime attempted to resolve the dilemma of whether to seek modernization or political stability by granting access to specialized higher education according to a never fully specified mix of criteria based on class background and talent.

The Educational Reform Law of 1961 established a three-tier system of secondary education and two main tracks of higher education. At the age of 14 and upon the completion of the eighth grade, a student could continue at: (1) an academic high school; (2) a vocational—trade or commercial—high school; (3) an industrial or agricultural vocational secondary school; or (4) stay at home and start working at the age of 16.

Data relating student secondary school enrollment to the father's occupation and educational background show that notwithstanding the massive promotion of blue-collar cadres into white-collar positions, each social class continued to reproduce itself from generation to generation. Thus, 71.2 percent of students attending an academic high school came from families in which the father had a university education. Approximately 67 percent of students attending an industrial or vocational secondary school came from families whose fathers were unskilled workers, and 57 percent came from families whose fathers were semiskilled workers. Moreover, the data also show that of the students who dropped out of Hungarian academic high schools—27.8 percent of the total (1961–62), 14.5 percent (1974–75), and 11.1 percent (1980–81)—as well as of the 20.8 percent, 16.7 percent, and 17.8 percent who left vocational trade or commercial schools in these same years, most were children of working-class background.[10] A 1969 study on the academic achievement of grade-school children shows a full one-point difference on a scale of 5 to 1 between the grade-point average of children from white-collar families (4.2) and the grade-point average of children from unskilled manual worker families (3.2).[11]

Limits on status and income expectations. By the late 1970's, 30 years of communist rule had been unable to overcome inherited disadvantages and to meet the "mobility expectations" of the very social strata (the urban and rural manual workers) in whose name the party ruled. Data developed by Rudolph Andorka and cited by Tamás Kolosi show that children (whether male or female) whose fathers were executives or other white-collar workers had a greater chance of attaining white-collar positions than did the children of skilled, semiskilled, or unskilled workers.[12] The data point to a persistent gap between the top and the bottom layers of the society with respect to opportunities for upward mobility.

The regime's failure to satisfy its core constituency's status expectations coincided with its failure to satisfy the income expectations of white-collar workers and university graduates, particularly those of the under-30 generation of young intellectuals. Income discrimination against white-collar employees and university graduates took two forms.[13] The first was the policy of ideologically-motivated income leveling, which kept the monthly incomes of "managers and other experts" (the latter category consisted of university and college graduates) and those of the skilled workers at a nearly identical level. The second was a policy of income discrimination based on age and educational background. In a country where the salary of a medical school graduate took seven years to catch up with the wages of a semiskilled worker of his age group, there could be no societal consensus in support of the regime's economic policies. The irony of these policies was that they victimized members of the occupational category on which the regime's economic and political stability depended. In 1977, the salaries of 14 percent of the "upper industrial managers" were lower than the average salary nationwide. The corresponding figure was 66 percent for those in "middle managerial" positions.[14]

Attitudes toward the regime's income policies are

[10]Márta Szénai, "Youth in the Mirror of Education," in *Ifjuság és Társadalom. Tanulmányok* (Youth and Society. Studies), Budapest, KSH, 1982, p. 24.

[11]Ibid., p. 96.

[12]Kolosi, *Struktura és Egyenlötlenség*, p. 153.

[13]Mária Rédei, et al., "Young People's Incomes and Housing," in Zoltán Békés, Ed., *A Magyar Ifjuság a Nyolcvanes Években* (Hungarian Youth in the 1980's), Budapest, Kossuth, 1984, p. 155

[14]Kolosi, *Struktura és Egyenlötlenség*, pp. 137–38.

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Table 1: Perspectives on Income Differences According to the Respondents' Educational Background, 1974

(in percent)

Income differences *should be:*	Less than *8 years*	*8 years*	High *school*	*University*
Greater than at present	18	13	80	82
The same as at present	63	16	14	9
Less than at present	19	71	6	9
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: Róbert Angelusz and Judit Pataki, "Public Opinion on Income Differentials," *Rádió és Televizió Szemle* (Budapest), No. 4, 1975, p. 126.

shown in Table 1. The table shows the wide gap between the views of those with a high school and university education and those with eight years or less of schooling. Under these circumstances, the educated elites had three options to improve their economic conditions. They could enter the second economy by substantially increasing their working hours; they could try to change the regime's policies by agreeing to be co-opted and working for desirable changes from within; or, failing to obtain results by these methods, they could work to change the regime itself.

The new Hungarian middle class. The Hungarian regime's decision in 1968 to embark on the path of economic reforms was motivated by short-term needs for political stability and economic progress, as well as by long-term needs to ensure the survival of the system.[15] The opening of the second economy also helped provide new opportunities for additional income and served as a safety valve to accommodate middle-class demands for economic security and higher living standards. Between 1970 and 1980, the number of white-collar employees in the Hungarian labor force increased by 27 percent. By 1980, 8.1 percent of all wage earners were university or college graduates, as were 27.6 percent of all white-collar employees.[16] Because of the magnitude of the changes in the occupational structure and educational level of the wage-earning population, a new "critical social mass" came into being in the 1970's. This, for want of a better term, may be called the new post-totalitarian Hungarian middle class.

Most of these educated individuals of the new middle class are the sons and daughters of educated fathers who occupied white-collar positions. In terms of status, the traditional "privileged, less privileged, and underprivileged" hierarchical structure of Hungarian society was left largely intact. Status, however, conferred on non-party specialists neither commensurate income nor the capability to influence (inherently political) decisions affecting their jobs, occupational mobility, or their personal autonomy as professionals and citizens. Although less than one-third of the new graduates received their degree from elite (daytime university) programs,[17] all diploma holders felt entitled to top white-collar positions in the economy, as well as to an "intellectual" life style in their private lives. These were unrealistic aspirations in the last decade of the Kádár regime and eventually undermined its stability.

Given the intensity of frustrations over arrested social mobility and declining purchasing power, the large-scale exodus of educated people with marketable skills to the non-socialist market environment helped, at least for a time, relieve pressures on the regime for power-sharing with the new middle class. But another factor associated with the emergence of the second economy also tended to undermine the regime's social and political stability. The second economy's market-driven mechanisms limited access for those who did not have certain "convertible" skills. Whereas 64 percent of the "upper intelligentsia" and the upper and middle economic managers were able to participate in various moonlighting activities, two important clusters of educated elites were denied access to the second economy. The first were intellectuals in the humanities (teachers, free-lance professionals, journalists, etc.), many of whom turned up in 1988–89 as charter members of the new political parties. The second were members of the state bureaucracy, the party bureaucracy, the military, and the police, who had no legal opportunities to supplement their incomes.[18] Thus handicapped, these cadres sought to overcome the discrepancy between their political power and their purchasing power through bribe-taking, extortion, and nepotistic money-making schemes in the second economy.

The rise of a new entrepreneurial class was another unintended consequence of economic reforms. The new rich came from all segments of the society. Prominent among them were approximately 50,000 small craftsmen, the new rural "socialist entrepreneurs," retail merchants, lawyers, foreign traders, and assorted

[15]Rudolf L. Tőkés, "Hungarian Reform Imperatives," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1984, pp. 1–24.

[16]András Klinger, "Changes in the Structure of Classes and Strata," in Tibor Halay and Tamás Kolosi, Eds., *Társadalom, Szerkezet és Rétegződés* (Society, Structure and Differentiation), Budapest, Kossuth, 1982, p. 188.

[17]Tamás Kolosi, *Tagolt Társadalom* (Structured Society), Budapest, Gondolat, 1987, p. 315.

[18]Kolosi, *Struktura és Egyenlőtlenség*, p. 266.

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

Inventor and entrepreneur János Petrenkó (center) with his team in his private workshop.

—INTERFOTO MTI from Eastfoto.

entertainers and professional athletes.[19] Although they provided much-needed services and, as members of intra-enterprise work cooperatives, helped to overcome production shortfalls, these newly affluent people tended to destabilize the system in three ways. First, as conspicuous consumers of scarce goods, such as automobiles and new housing, they evoked the envy of the egalitarian majority of the society. Second, as apparent beneficiaries of otherwise unavailable official favors (most often won through bribes and informal deals with the authorities), they helped to demoralize further the state bureaucracy. Finally, by example of their evident success, they promoted private enterprise as a positive alternative to the bankrupt model of wage egalitarianism and central planning in Hungary.

Life styles, consumption, and elite realignment. The new Hungarian middle class was a heterogeneous entity. Its cohesion hinged, to a large extent, on the successful routinization of interaction between the *nomenklatura* elite and the rapidly growing cluster of well-educated, middle-class people who called themselves the "intelligentsia." Until the emergence of the new entrepreneurial elites in the late 1970's, these two elites—one "in" and one "out" of power—had been the principal players in Hungarian public life.

The two elites' level of material consumption differed in some important respects. Thus, 97.1 percent of the *nomenklatura* elite lived in high-quality housing, as did 86.3 percent of the intelligentsia. However, 35.2 percent of the *nomenklatura* elite owned a summer house, compared to 8.4 percent of the new middle class. 81.5 percent of the *nomenklatura* elite owned an automobile as against 49.1 percent of the middle class.[20]

[19]See Ivan Szelenyi, *Socialist Entrepreneurs*, Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.

[20]Ágnes Utassi, "Life Styles, Demand Levels, and the Hungarian Elite," in R. Andorka and T. Kolosi, Eds., *Stratification and Inequalities*, Budapest, Institute of Social Sciences, 1984, pp. 152ff.

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But comparisons of the two patterns of consumption are misleading in that they fail to account for the enormous differences in the power wielded by members of the two elites. By power one understands not only the top political elites' monopoly over the coercive resources of the state, but also their exclusive authority to allocate, by voluntaristic ideological criteria, the economic and cultural resources of the state.

The Hungarian regime's policies of resource allocation tended to favor urban and carefully targeted provincial investment projects. With the arrival of the provincial entrepreneurs and, more to the point, upon their rapid interpenetration with the regional political elites, the entrepreneurs began to demand discretionary central allocations plus greater local autonomy in the management of these resources. Thus, although Hungary's middle-class "green lobby" (state and cooperative farm executives, officials from the agro-industries and the Ministry of Agriculture, and members of the rural apparatus) was exceptionally strong by East European standards, it never managed to secure an adequate slice of the central investment pie for provincial infrastructural development, particularly funds earmarked for educational, cultural, and health facilities. The visible success of the new entrepreneurial elites and their interpenetration with regional political elites tended to exacerbate the middle-class intelligentsia's status insecurity and drove a new wedge between it and the political incumbents. Therefore, in terms of the NEM's impact on status and incomes, the regime unwittingly compromised chances for the orderly co-optation of the intelligentsia into the ruling elite.

Much of this intra-elite competitive interaction and the emergence of various interest groups making claims on the political incumbents may be seen as partial evidence for the birth of a new context for societal interaction and enhanced political self-awareness in Hungary. Political scientist Csaba Gombár called the outcome a politically differentiated (*tagolt*) society in which latent, but distinct, group interests could not find political expression or benefit from equitable interest adjudication by the powers that be.[21] Sociologist Elemér Hankiss called it the "second society"—the social analogue of the second, or unofficial, economy. The term denoted the process of social re-stratification taking place partly within and partly outside of Hungary's first, or "official," society.[22]

The second society amounts to, or approximates, civil society. Civil society, even in nascent form, posed a challenge to the legitimacy of the post-totalitarian political system.[23] The regime could either accommodate or resist the autonomist aspirations of the new Hungarian middle class. Had accommodation been the chosen strategy, it would have taken the form of controlled change of institutions and leadership sometime between 1978 and 1982.

Instead, in his last 10 years in power, Kádár opted for a policy of piecemeal concessions and protracted "house-to-house" rearguard action to postpone the day of reckoning with the new social forces (whose time eventually came in 1988) and to protect the old elite. We now turn to an analysis of that old elite—the *nomenklatura*.

The Rise and Fall of the Old Elite

Between 1948 and June 1988, a self-perpetuating oligarchy of 101 communist politicians ruled Hungary.[24] These people were members of the party's Politburo, Secretariat, and the short-lived Organizational Bureau, or "Orgburo." These leaders shaped cadre policies and exercised hands-on control over all key personnel decisions. These critically important and vigorously exercised leadership prerogatives helped define the commanding heights of political, economic, and ideological power, and the authority of each office-holder in the chain of command; and set policies for the recruitment, co-optation, and general circulation of top elites in Hungary.

Leadership: from professional revolutionaries to co-opted experts. The Hungarian sociologist István Szakadát proposed the following typology of the 101 top communist leaders.[25]

- professional revolutionary, Muscovite;
- professional revolutionary, native;
- underground or resistance veteran;
- forty-fiver (as in 1945);
- social democrat;
- career *apparatchik*;
- co-opted expert.

The terms denote the nature of these actors' formative

[21]Csaba Gombár, *Boritekolt Politika* (On Politics), Budapest, Pénzügyi Kutató RT, 1989, p. 12.

[22]Elemér Hankiss, *Kelet-Európai Alternatívák* (East European Alternatives), Budapest, KJK, 1989, pp. 117–43.

[23]See Attila Ágh, *A Századvég Gyermekei* (Children of the Fin de Siècle), Budapest, KJK, 1990, pp. 137–83.

[24]András Nyirő, et al, Eds., *Segédkönyv a Politikai Bizottság Tanulmányozására* (Handbook for the Study of the Politburo), Budapest, Interart, 1989.

[25]István Szakadát, "Career Types in the Leading Organs of the HCP," unpublished manuscript, 1989.

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political experiences, and their order indicates the rough chronological sequence in which each type came to power.

Since 1945, the Hungarian party has been led by a Muscovite (Mátyás Rákosi, 1945–56), a native (János Kádár, 1956–88), a career *apparatchik* (Károly Grósz, 1988–90), a social democrat (Rezső Nyers, leader of the HSP, 1989–90), and a career *apparatchik*, (Gyula Thürmer, leader of the HSWP, December 1989–1990). Except for the last two, each "first," or "general" secretary played a decisive role in selecting his close associates and defining general cadre policies.

Under Rákosi, professional revolutionaries dominated the Politburo and the Secretariat. When the "natives" were purged in 1949–50, selected underground veterans and forty-fivers were brought into the leadership. Under Kádár, the natives made a comeback—as did the social democrats, some forty-fivers and, for a time, even some Muscovites. In the early 1970's, career *apparatchik*s made their appearance, but the Kádár-led Politburo gerontocracy kept them in the wings until 1987. Once in the Politburo, it took less than a year for the younger career *apparatchik*s and the co-opted experts to oust the "mummies"—the professional revolutionaries, forty-fivers, and remaining underground veterans—at the Third Party Conference in May 1988.

Each of these leadership types entailed idiosyncratic preferences with respect to cadre policies. But they all preferred recruiting politically reliable and, at best, marginally qualified subordinates at all levels of the party hierarchy.[26] Those with the best record of loyalty to the top were rewarded with extremely long job tenure. For reasons of their own, neither Rákosi, who was a university graduate, nor Kádár, who completed eight grades, recruited highly educated cadres for key leadership positions. Indeed, of the 101 top cadres, about 50 percent had a formal education of 10 grades or less.[27]

Although the educational level of the very top party elite sharply improved in the 1970's, it is well to keep in mind that, as the sociologist András Nyirő put it, "between 1956 and 1985 Hungary's economy was run by a mechanic (Jenő Fock), a sixth-grade dropout (Sándor Gáspár), a typesetter (Rezső Nyers), a butcher (Károly Németh), and a bricklayer (Ferenc Havasi)." They were, at one time or another (Gáspár for 24 years), all members of the Kádár Politburo.[28]

However, the glacial progression of elite turnover at the top and the visible leadership positions occupied by "mechanics" and "bricklayers" tended to obscure the emergence and growing influence of co-opted young economic, media, and cultural experts. Miklós Németh, Károly Grósz, and Imre Pozsgay entered the Central Committee apparatus in 1970–72. The transformation of these conformist young *apparatchik*s into behind-the-scenes power brokers was a complex process and is a matter that requires the further analysis of Kádár's personnel decisions over his last 15 years at the helm.[29]

Nomenklatura: quantitative dimensions. Recently published secret party documents shed new light on the hierarchy and spheres of decision-making authority in HSWP cadre matters.[30] Between early 1957 and May 1989, the Politburo issued 13 secret directives on the management of the *nomenklatura* system. Personnel decisions were made, in descending order, by the Central Committee, the Politburo, the Secretariat, the seven functional departments of the Secretariat, the executive committees of the 19 county party organizations and those of five cities with county status, and the party committees of large enterprises, smaller towns, villages, and the local party organizations. The *nomenklatura* system had control over approximately 460,000 positions, or one-ninth of all jobs in Hungary.

In the late 1960's, the local party organizations had jurisdiction over 360,000 jobs, while the middle-level party committees controlled an additional 90,000 "mid-range" positions. The majority of personnel decisions made at the local and middle levels affected mainly non-party people, most of whom were unaware of the existence of the *nomenklatura* system.

Personnel decisions made at the party center affected the 5,000–7,500 positions in the party; central and regional government administration; mass organizations; scientific, cultural, and educational institutions; and the media.[31] The ministries of defense, internal affairs, and foreign affairs were managed directly, under the Politburo's supervision, by the responsible line secretaries of the Central Committee. The latter body had, by way of "election," "appointment" and "advisory opinion," jurisdiction over the top 200 *nomenklatura* positions. The Politburo made relatively few (about 50) direct appointments, but submitted advisory opinions on

[26]See Ágnes Ságvári, *Mert Nem Hallgathatok* (I Cannot Remain Silent), Budapest, Magyar Hirlap Könyvek, 1989; and Emil Kimmel, *Végjátek a Fehér Házban* (Endgame in the White House), Budapest, Téka, 1990.

[27]András Nyirő, "Why Were Cadres with University Diplomas of No Use to the Old Regime?" unpublished manuscript, 1990.

[28]Ibid., p. 11.

[29]Rudolf L. Tőkés, interviews with Imre Pozsgay, June and August 1989.

[30]Tamás Korányi, "Cadre Ladder," *Világ* (Budapest), Feb. 1, 1990, p. 31.

[31]Calculated from "Nomenklatura List of the Central Committee. Approved by the Politburo on June 1, 1971," ibid., pp. 32–35.

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approximately 800 positions in more than 20 job categories. As a collective body, the Secretariat was authorized to make about 1,500 appointments and the individual secretaries rendered advisory opinions on another 1,000 positions. Finally, the seven functional Central Committee departments were empowered to issue advisory opinions on the filling of more than 1,000 additional positions.

The Hungarian nomenklatura system: assets and liabilities. The HSWP was a mass, rather than a cadre party. With a 1987 membership of 860,000, or 13 percent of Hungary's adult population, the HSWP as a whole was more of a "rearguard" than a "vanguard." Hence, to lead effectively, indeed to lead at all, the party was compelled to rely on the *nomenklatura* to manage and help legitimate the political system. In operational terms, the sole raison d'être of the *nomenklatura* system was the preservation of the party's influence over the strategic and functional elites of the society.

From the incumbents' perspective, the system was necessary to regulate and enhance elite cohesion through the institutionalization of patterns of hierarchical dependency and inequality of power. Rank was determined by one's designated place in the decision-making hierarchy, and by access to the political center and to differentiated rewards of prestige and material benefits.[32] Inequality was also gauged by the degree of personal immunity from police and judicial authority. According to the 1971 Politburo *nomenklatura* directives, "all matters arising from the discharge of official responsibilities" by members of the party apparatus were "to be adjudicated by the Politburo." Exemption from the legal consequences of violations of civil and criminal laws (ranging from homicide to traffic violations) of the party *apparatchiks* was, on a case-by-case basis, also extended to *nomenklatura* notables outside the party apparatus. Access to one of the five restricted telephone networks, appointments to expert advisory bodies attached to the HSWP Central Committee or to county party committees, and preferential access to high-quality housing were also tangible evidence of one's standing in the hierarchy.

Interaction between the party apparatus and the *nomenklatura* specialized elites was governed by very complex situational dynamics. Hungarian political economist Mária Csanádi's study of the Hungarian "party-state interlocking directorate" presents data on the impenetrable maze of power relationships within the ruling hierarchy.[33] The rigidity of the centralized command structure and vertical information flows was attenuated by informal "feedback loops" and ad hoc bargaining relationships among actors at different levels of the elite hierarchy. Improvised efforts at interest reconciliation among the elites seemed to work up to a point and helped the system to stay afloat.

However, because the entire decision-making system was but an aggregate of constantly changing and inherently unstable bargaining relationships, none of the participants had a clear sense of their precise decision-making authority at any given time. The result was role ambiguity and the tendency for making excessively cautious use of one's nominal administrative powers. Underutilized managerial prerogatives led to sub-optimal performance both on the individual and on the systemic level.

When mediocre performance becomes a pervasive characteristic of the system, *nomenklatura,* both as a command structure and as an integrative device to foster elite cohesion, loses its underlying rationale. In addition, fear of a recurrence of the events of 1956—the source of the apparatus's and the specialized elites' mutual interest in the cohesion of the system—diminished considerably by the early 1980's. Desire to avoid the outcomes that occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Poland in 1980–81 reduced Kádár's options for crisis-management to that of "escaping forward" by means of token reforms and grudging accommodation of elite pressures for change.

Two kinds of party and specialist elite strategies for economic and political reform eventually emerged from the combination of the regime's defensive posture and the country's mounting economic difficulties. The younger members of the party apparatus no longer viewed the ability of the regime simply to "muddle through" as sufficient proof of the party's adequacy as a system manager. Therefore, they began developing scenarios for the peaceful transformation of the party from that of a hands-on facilitator of desired policy outcomes to that of an indirect "hegemonic" overseer of needed changes. Hungary's faltering reform process also inspired the non-party intelligentsia to develop another, more radical agenda. Many of them, particularly the economists, the sociologists, and a few emboldened technocrats, chose to "go public"—most often with pol-

[32]The organizational principles of the system were spelled out in a 72-page booklet, *Útmutató a Központi Pártszervek Hatáskörébe Tartozok és Eegyes Tömegszervezeti Funkciókat Betöltők Személyi Adatainak Egységes Besorolásahoz, Összesitéséhez és Gépi Feldolgozásához* (Guide for the Systematization and Machine Readability of Personal Information on Individuals Who Belong to the Central Party Organs' *Nomenklatura* Authority), Budapest, 1978.

[33]Mária Csanádi, "Party-State Interlocking Directorate: Economic and Political Decision Making in Hungary," unpublished paper, March 1989.

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icy proposals which they had submitted to the senior party apparatus, but which had been rejected at the top.

Well before Gorbachev came to power in Moscow, a native brand of *glasnost'*—reform proposals appearing in samizdat and elite journals—emerged in Hungary. This discussion of policy options quickly helped politicize and recruit two elite constituencies that were previously silent and unrepresented—the young intellectuals (mainly university students) and the intelligentsia living and working in provincial cities, small towns, and villages. The shared sense of powerlessness, alienation from the local power elites, and growing self-awareness of both groups motivated their involvement in politics. Neither the existing *nomenklatura* system nor the spurious structure of interest aggregation and interest articulation discussed above could accommodate these constituencies' demands for political participation and substantive involvement in decisions affecting their future.

Cadre politics: reds or experts. The most puzzling aspect of the process of transition in 1988–90 was the virtual absence of overt, or much covert, resistance by the party apparatus. After all, it was the party's Praetorian Guard that had the most to lose from the regime's collapse. Clearly, things must have changed since 1957, when the *apparatchik*s were busy rounding up and hanging suspected "counterrevolutionaries," or even since the early 1970's, when they put the economic reforms "on hold" for several years. In 1989, the *apparatchik*s abandoned, en masse, the sinking ship of the party-state.

The key to an explanation of the apparatus's transformation from militant orthodoxy to a pragmatic acceptance of economic and political reforms seems to lie in the Kádár leadership's schizophrenic response in the mid-1970's to the early signs of Hungary's economic difficulties. At this time, the Politburo began to hand over gradually all but its formal decision-making powers to the party's financial and economic experts and, through them, to the state bureaucracy. From the early 1980's on, the Politburo became a hostage to the state's financial, planning, and agro-industrial bureaucracies. Thus, it was the party's lukewarmly pro-reform bankers and reform economists who, as government officials, made strategic decisions affecting investments, foreign indebtedness, and living standards.

To counter the experts' growing influence, the Politburo accelerated the co-optation of blue-collar workers into key positions in an effort to immunize the party apparatus against the ideological disease spread by "the intellectuals." Cadre recruitment policies favoring quickly retrained manual laborers were desperate and politically self-defeating measures to preserve party control of the commanding heights of power in Hungary. Moreover, the deliberate downgrading of expertise in favor of orthodox ideological criteria violated the regime's stated cadre policy, which called for a "balanced mix" of formal education, personality attributes, and political reliability.

Until recently, documentary evidence on HSWP cadre policies, particularly on the demographic breakdown, socio-economic background, educational qualifications, and territorial distribution of the party apparatus, was impossible to obtain. However, with the help of empirical data unearthed by Professor Ferenc Gazsó of the Budapest University for Economics and the Social Sciences (formerly Karl Marx University) and his associates on the top 6,000 officials in the party and state bureaucracies in the 1980's, one can provide at least a partial explanation for the Hungarian party elite's paradoxical behavior during the transition period.[34]

The preliminary findings of this study may be summarized in the form of six propositions:

- With respect to social background, there were important differences between the party apparatus and the "specialist intelligentsia." About 86 percent of the apparatus came from blue-collar industrial-agricultural backgrounds, as opposed to 39 percent of the national sample of the (party and non-party) intelligentsia.
- The party preferred to recruit offspring of workers and peasants into the cadre elite. This recruitment policy remained in force until 1989.
- As a consequence of recruitment policies favoring workers and peasants, an "educational deficit" was a shared characteristic of the apparatus. To overcome educational disadvantages, more than one-half of the apparatus enrolled in evening and correspondence programs at universities and colleges. The rest either attended party-sponsored ideological training programs or remained content with their elementary or high school educational credentials.
- The apparatus was chronically deficient in the professional skills that are necessary for the effective supervision of the state's administrative, economic, and cultural bureaucracies. Moreover, as shown in Table 2, the distribution of specialized professional skills within the apparatus failed, by a wide margin, to match those of the non-party specialists working under the ap-

[34]Ferenc Gazsó, "Certain Sociological Characteristics of the Cadre Bureaucracy," unpublished manuscript, 1990. For an abbreviated version, see Ferenc Gazsó, "The Upper 6,000," *Népszabadság* (Budapest) July 7, 1990. See also Mihály Bihari, "The Cadre Bureaucracy," *Népszabadság*, July 7, 1990.

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Table 2: The Hungarian Party Cadre Elite and the Hungarian Intelligentsia, According to Social Background, 1980

(in percent)

Social background	Cadre elite (*n* = 5,600 +/-)	Intelligentsia (*n* = natl. rep. sample)
Intellectual	5	32
Mid-level white collar	6	28
Worker	63	30
Agricultural manual	23	9
Small tradesman, small merchant	2	1
Other	1	—
TOTAL	100	100

SOURCE: Ferenc Gazsó, "Certain Sociological Characteristics of the Cadre Bureaucracy," unpublished manuscript, 1990, p. 9.

paratus's direct or indirect political oversight.

- The uneven distribution of higher educational credentials, scientific degrees, foreign-language skills, and professional job experience among members of the central, Budapest municipal, and county apparatuses weakened the party's control of the economy and government administration at the local and the regional levels. With respect to "convertible skills," i.e., the transferability of one's educational and job credentials to positions outside the apparatus, an extremely high percentage of the apparatus had no "marketable" skills, and hence could depend only on the party for their livelihood. However, many took the "middle-management" option by "parachuting" into the non-party sector. The obvious consequences were the creation of new obstacles to the career advancement of non-party professionals and the swelling of the ranks of unqualified managers in Hungarian industry and agriculture.
- The upper state bureaucrats and the party apparatus disagreed over the prospects for economic and political reforms and the possibility of systemic change. The most important factors explaining these disagreements were the professional qualifications and convertibility of skills possessed by the former, which had the ability to adapt to and benefit from even the most radical changes, including the move from one-party rule to a multiparty system. The apparatus's choices were more limited, although many of its members did enter mid-level management in 1989–90.

Professor Gazsó's data also indicate that the *nomenklatura* in the state sector underwent drastic changes in the 1980's. Whereas in the preceding decade, the turnover of top state personnel (ministers, deputy ministers, secretaries of state, heads and deputy heads of main departments) was 9.3 percent, the turnover at this level was 22 percent between 1980 and 1984 and an astonishing 53 percent between 1984 and 1988. One could say, to quote Gazsó, that the specialist intelligentsia "occupied a sinking ship."[35] They certainly did, but mainly because they were allowed to do so by the aging, unskilled, and psychologically paralyzed party apparatus.

With the formal abandonment of the party's *nomenklatura* authority on May 8, 1989, the HSWP Central Committee terminated the party apparatus's rule in Hungary. As a consequence, the *nomenklatura* elite disintegrated into its component units. Each of these had a stake in the outcome of Hungary's transition to democracy, but it was mainly the top government bureaucrats under Prime Minister Miklós Németh and the party's reform wing led by Imre Pozsgay who had the opportunity and the requisite skills to survive the process and adapt to a new political environment. The managerial elite—itself a heterogeneous cluster of old-line industrial and agricultural executives and aggressive free market entrepreneurs—withdrew from the political arena to await the outcome of the transition process.

The split in the HSWP that was begun by its "Reform Circles" beginning in late 1988 succeeded in putting an end to the party apparatus by the middle of 1989. In October 1989, the survivors joined the new Hungarian Socialist Party, and others retired from public life into well-deserved oblivion. By process of elimination, two politically viable elites remained in Hungary in the summer and fall of 1989. With some oversimplification, these may be called the reform intelligentsia "in" power and the reform intelligentsia "not yet in" power.

The New Hungarian Political Elites

In 1985, Hungarian voters chose a new parliament in the first multi-candidate elections since the late 1940's. Instituting electoral competition was a regime effort to counteract political passivity and to infuse the moribund National Assembly with the new blood of politically alert elites from the lower levels of the *nomenklatura*. The elections had also been planned as an exercise in the controlled mobilization of the voting public, as well as an orderly process of co-opting politically underrepresented elites into the central *nomenklatura*.

The party was particularly interested in securing the nomination and the election of young professionals,

[35]Gazsó, "Certain Sociological Characteristics," p. 22.

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women, and well-regarded non-party members. It assumed that by sending a large contingent of managers into the National Assembly it could build up the image of that body as an "expert" policy advisory group to the regime. To secure the desired results, the regime put up candidates with nearly identical backgrounds with respect to age, sex, occupation, and social status in 104 of the 352 voting districts.[36] Elsewhere, the officially endorsed nominees had been selected by the county party organizations from among the regional *nomenklatura* elites.

Contrary to the party's expectations, the pre-election nominating meetings yielded 280 spontaneously nominated candidates in 165 electoral districts.[37] Of these insurgents, 20 won seats in the parliament.[38] Most of the independent candidacies were successful in those districts where the regime insisted on "look-alike" candidates (especially manual workers and women) or where the "favorite sons" of small communities competed with one another without regard to the county apparatus's preferences.

In the elections, voters tended to favor middle-aged males who were university- or college-educated managers and professionals,[39] and regional *nomenklatura* elites—party members and non-members alike.[40] In retrospect, it is clear that as elected parliamentary deputies, the managerial elite—the party's designated political choice to satisfy popular expectations for more effective representation of local interests in the legislature—failed to deliver on the regime's campaign pledge of prosperity and economic reforms. Thus, by 1986–87, the regime had no choice but to come to terms with the reform intelligentsia "not yet in" power—the only politically untarnished elite with the capacity to attract popular support.

By the end of 1988, the reform intelligentsia "not yet in" power could be divided into two categories. One consisted of nationally prominent, but politically powerless, members of the Budapest intelligentsia. These included well-known writers, academic intellectuals, and non-conformist technocrats. This group perceived itself as the country's morally uncompromised "natural leader." As the opportunity arose, it organized itself into civic pressure groups and political parties. The second cluster of politically eligible and mobilizable elites consisted of traditional local and regional non-political authority figures, such as leading intellectuals, physicians, lawyers, teachers, successful entrepreneurs, and other notables. These community leaders were widely perceived as authentic spokesmen for the interests of towns and villages against the regime's local political machines. From early 1989 on, they were the first to establish and lead the local branches of the top half dozen newly formed democratic parties in Hungary.

Political transition: "transplacement" or a conspiracy of the intellectuals? The elections of March-April 1990 marked the end of an arduous process of a negotiated transfer of power from the old elites to 386 freely elected members of the Hungarian parliament. The reconstruction of this process and the evaluation of its results must begin by sorting out whether what transpired in Hungary ought to be characterized as "transformation," "replacement," or "transplacement." These terms are Samuel P. Huntington's and refer to three kinds of transition outcomes in Latin America, Southern Europe, East Asia, and Eastern Europe.[41]

"Transformation" denotes democratization at the initiative of "reformers in government"; "replacement" is the collapse of the authoritarian regime and its supplanting by the opposition; and, finally, "transplacement" denotes a change of regime that is the "joint product of government and opposition groups." All three of Huntington's categories shed some light on Hungary's transition, but none can fully account for it. The first several initiatives for radical "transformation" came from the democratic opposition and the non-party intelligentsia, not from the "reformers in government."[42] Moreover, as will be shown below, although the original objective of the National Roundtable negotiations held in summer 1989 was the transplacement of the regime, eight months later this deal was rejected by the electorate, which overthrew (or "replaced") the old regime by a resounding margin at the ballot box.

What is at issue here is not the label that we might attach to the results of the Hungarian transition but the way in which the deputies of Hungary's six parliamentary parties might interpret and act upon: (1) their respective "pacts" and informal understandings with one another and with the old regime's reform elites; and (2) their perception of the nature of their respective elector-

[36]István Kukorelli, *Igy Választottunk* (This Is How We Voted), Budapest, Department of Political Science, ELTE, 1988, p. 104.

[37]Ibid., p. 51.

[38]Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Hungarian Situation Report* (Munich), Aug. 7, 1985, p. 27.

[39]Of the 767 parliamentary candidates, 424 were either top or middle-level managers. Hungarian samizdat, 1985.

[40]István Kukorelli, *Az Országgyülési Képviselők Jogállása* (The Legal Status of the Parliamentary Delegates), Budapest, KJK, 1989, p. 215.

[41]Samuel P. Huntington, "Democratization and Security in Eastern Europe," in Peter Volten, Ed., *Uncertain Futures: Eastern Europe and Democracy*, New York, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1990, p. 41.

[42]See Zoltán Biró, István Csurka, and Lajos Für, Eds., "Hungary's Chances," (a transcript of the Lakitelek conference of Sept. 27, 1987), samizdat, 1988; János Kis, et al, "Social Contract," *Beszélő* (samizdat), June 1987; and László Antal, et al, Eds., *Fordulat és Reform, 1986* (Turnabout and Reform, 1986), samizdat, 1987.

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al mandate from the voters who brought them to power in May 1990.

Although the full details have yet to emerge, we know that well before the summer of 1989, leaders of the HSWP and the major opposition parties participated in a series of semi-clandestine meetings and conferences about ideologies, reform options, and methods of interaction with pro-reform politicians of the old regime. These early negotiations yielded neither agreement nor a joint action program.[43]

Two factors account for the lack of unity in the opposition camp. First the old regime attempted to manipulate the opposition, and chose the populist intellectuals over the urban radicals as its preferred negotiating partners in 1987–89. The incompatibility of the reform programs advanced by the populists, the radicals, and the reform communists was the second and, by all accounts, the decisive reason for the development of an adversarial, though businesslike, relationship among the three main political actors during the transition process. Although no "pacts" had been signed prior to the convening of the Opposition Roundtable in March 1989,[44] there was enough distrust of each other's motives to resort to meticulously structured negotiations within the roundtable as the means to resolve differences and ratify eventual agreements. But because of the participants' shared educational backgrounds and comparable status, much of the interaction within the opposition groups and parties was an incestuous affair, in which personalities and clashing egos often overshadowed the issues under discussion.

Confusion came to an end (or was shelved for the time being) when the opposition forces were transformed from movements to political parties in the spring of 1989,[45] and these parties entered into talks with the regime in the National Roundtable, which met from June to September. The National Roundtable included the parties and groups adhering to the Opposition Roundtable, the HSWP, and the so-called "third side," which was made up of the Patriotic People's Front, the National Council of Trade Unions, and other transmission belts of the HSWP. The National Roundtable had two objectives: determining the principles and rules that would govern the transition to pluralist democracy, and discussing the means necessary to overcome Hungary's social and economic crises.

Skilled negotiators and lawyers from the HDF and the AFD—rather than populist-nationalist and urban-radical ideologues—were the principal negotiators with the old regime in the National Roundtable. The medical historian József Antall, the constitutional lawyer Péter Tölgyessy, and Imre Kónya, then of the Independent Lawyers' Forum, brought with them expertise, pragmatic flexibility, and solid negotiating skills. These people, together with their colleagues from the other opposition parties, were responsible for much of what the National Roundtable accomplished in the summer of 1989.

But it was clear then and is obvious now that the opposition professionals' superb negotiating skills notwithstanding, the positive outcome of the National Roundtable discussions had been the reform communists' "gift" to the new political elite. Imre Pozsgay, the principal HSWP negotiator, accommodated—at times well beyond his brief—all opposition demands that were consonant with the HSWP reform faction's political survival and with the peaceful transformation of the system. In addition, it had been the reform communists who in June 1989 made it possible for the pending legislative agenda of the increasingly pro-reform parliament to be put on hold and, as a package of negotiable items, to be transferred to the jurisdiction of the National Roundtable. The opposition negotiators, who represented the potentially powerful middle-class constituencies of Hungary, were thus given full partnership, and even veto power, over a vast number of transition issues. Finally, Prime Minister Miklós Németh and his "cabinet of experts" not only kept the country afloat, but in the critical days of October 1989 completed, by legislative fiat, the unfinished work of the National Roundtable. Credit for outlawing party organizations in the workplace, compelling the HSWP to account for its assets, disbanding the Workers' Guard, and renaming the state from a people's republic to the Republic of Hungary belongs to the Németh government.

Neither the opposition nor the reform communists were, however, willing to take responsibility for decisions on economic and social welfare issues. Therefore, the deliberations over efforts to resolve the country's socio-economic crisis ended in a stalemate. By this time, the nominal political adversaries had a shared interest in preventing the trade unions from making political capital from the roundtable's apparent lack of

[43]János Kenedi, "On People, Ideas, and Politics," *Valósag*, March 1990, pp. 53–69, and April 1990, pp. 33–51. See also Henrik Havas, "What Happened in Lakitelek?" *Ötlet* (Budapest), May 24, 1990, pp. 26–27.

[44]The Opposition Roundtable consisted of the AFD, the HDF, the Social Democratic Party, the Hungarian People's Party, the ISP, the FYD, the Endre Bacsy-Zsilinszky Society, and the League of Independent Trade Unions.

[45]The transformation from movements to political parties took place in a somewhat different manner in each political party. The difference in the two phases may be explained by referring to organization (loosely structured *vs.* vertically integrated from top to bottom), leadership (consensual-informal *vs.* formal with elected leaders), and programs (vague *vs.* programmatic-specific). However, the principal difference between the two phases lies in these organizations' semi-legitimate status before February 1989 and their status after February 1989 as officially-recognized contenders for political power.

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concern for the economic well-being of those who went unrepresented at these negotiations. Their decision to deny the trade unions the right to form a political party for the forthcoming elections left the man on the street without effective representation in the new parliament.

Certainly, the accusation that the informal understandings and recorded agreements of the National Roundtable were a conspiracy of the intellectuals at the expense of the "silent majority" is unfounded. On the other hand, to call three months of negotiations of an all-intellectual plenary group, two middle-level committees, 12 working groups, and a total of more than 1,000 experts anything less than a collusion of the Hungarian reform elites would endow this process with a kind of pluralistic legitimacy that it, in fact, did not have. Indeed, the transformation scenario that was set into motion by the National Roundtable was weighted in favor of political parties of the reform intelligentsia and the communist party's reformist heirs.[46]

In the next six months, political parties made up of non-elites—the rump HSWP, the Social Democratic Party, the People's Party, the constituent parties of the radical right Christian Democratic Union, and the "counter-culture" Party of the Hungarian October—fell by the wayside. The electoral law requiring parties to obtain 4 percent of the nationwide vote for party lists in order to secure party representation in parliament (see below), although meant to enhance Hungary's political stability, in fact worked to exclude 50-odd non-elite parties from the legislature. The law left 12 percent of those who did vote and 35 percent of those who were eligible to vote but did not without legislative representation. In other words, the old and new elites' "pacts" and "deals" worked well enough, but the kind of representative system they wrought was of questionable legitimacy.

Members of Parliament: the people's choice? The Hungarian elections, unlike the June 1990 elections in Poland, were not constrained by quotas on the numbers of freely contested seats. Therefore, the outcome of the Hungarian elections may be seen as a reasonably accurate expression of the will of the politically active electorate.

According to Hungary's electoral law, the parliament was to have 386 members chosen in a two-part secret ballot. The first part of the ballot was to elect 176 deputies from individual electoral districts. Parties and individuals could nominate candidates for these seats. If no candidate won a majority in a given district, a runoff election was held to determine a winner.

The second part of the ballot was to result in the selection of a total of 210 delegates from county and national lists of the various parties. Voters were to choose a party as such from one of a number of county-level party lists, from which 152 delegates were to be selected. Parties could also enter slates for a national list of candidates, from which another 58 deputies were to be named according to a complex formula based on the results of the vote for county-level lists. The eventual outcome, determined by shuffling and reshuffling of fragmentary votes between the two lists, yielded 120 delegates from the county lists and 90 from the national list.

The selection of candidates from individual constituencies took two rounds to complete. In the first round—on March 25—only five (among them the independent Miklós Németh and HSP-member Mátyás Szűrös) of the 1,600-odd candidates in 176 electoral districts received the 50 percent (plus one) of the vote required for a seat in the new parliament. The second round of voting on April 8 completed the process with the election of 171 candidates.[47]

As I have discussed elsewhere,[48] the outcome of the March-April 1990 elections must be seen as the expression of two kinds of political judgments by the Hungarian voters. One was a vote of "no confidence" in the old regime and, as such, a protest vote against the communist party and its heirs. Another was handed down on April 8 as a "vote of confidence" in individual candidates, most of whom were members of one of the six parties that managed to secure the required 4-percent threshold for party representation in parliament.

The procedures governing the electoral system had important consequences not only for the respective voting strength of the individual parties but for the legitimacy of the Hungarian party system as well. Votes cast for a county-level party list on March 25 were also counted as votes for the party list at the national level. Names appeared on these ballots according to the importance ascribed by the national party leadership to ensuring their membership in the National Assembly. The more prominent the party member at either the county or national level, the higher his or her name appeared on the county or national list. But the voters did not know and could not know whose candidacy benefited from the vote they cast for a party list. Thus, the citizens' "protest vote" not only threw the communists out

[46]On the Roundtable process, see András Bozóki, "History of the Opposition Roundtable," *Beszélő* (Budapest), Mar. 3, 10, 15, and 24, 1990. See also Karoly Vigh, "From the Opposition Roundtable to the National Roundtable," in Sándor Kurtán, et al, Eds., *Magyarország Politikai Evkönyve* (Hungarian Political Yearbook), Budapest, Aula, 1990, pp. 231–36.

[47]The electoral results are in *Magyar Kozlony* (Budapest) May 13, 1990, pp. 1013–92.

[48]Tőkés, "From Post-Communism . . . ."

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János Kis, chairman of the Alliance of Free Democrats, gestures during a press briefing held in party headquarters on the results of the election on March 26, 1990. Next to him are party leaders Péter Tölgyessy (left) and Iván Pető.

—Sz. Hámor from Eastfoto.

of power but amounted to a "constructive vote of confidence" in unknown parliamentary candidates competing for 210 seats. These election procedures, as the Hungarian public has already realized, beg the question of the personal accountability of more than one-half of the voters' freely but indirectly elected representatives. (This is one reason why the votes of individual delegates are rarely reported in the Hungarian media.)

Members of parliament: composition and qualifications. The National Assembly is now made up of members of three political generations. To the first belong those aged 55 to 70, whose formative political experiences were shaped by World War II, the Soviet occupation, a three-year interlude (1945–47) of political pluralism, and the ensuing Stalinist repression. Most of the Smallholders, many Christian Democrats, and a handful of the HDF and AFD leaders fall into this age cohort. A middle generation, aged 40 to 55, makes up the overwhelming majority of the parliament. Although some 45-year-olds claim to have been influenced by the Stalinist years and the 1956 revolution, more plausible formative experiences would include the events of the Kádár regime's "middle years" between 1960 and 1980. The HDF, the AFD, and the HSP are particularly strongly represented among members of the parliament's middle-aged contingent. The youngest group, which came of age between 1975 and 1989, may be called "Kádár's children." The FYD and several members of the AFD are the young generation in the Hungarian legislature today.

Due to the large-scale influx of older politicians from the "historic" ISP and CCDP, the deputies' average age is about the same as, or even somewhat older than, that of their immediate predecessors in the parliament. For at least two reasons, age is a politically salient issue in parliament. First, in several one-on-one second-round contests between HDF and AFD candidates, the older candidate from the HDF won in most cases. Indeed, the two-year difference in the average age of HDF and

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Table 3: The Hungarian Parliament: Distribution of Membership by Parties and Occupational Background, May 1990

(in percent)

	Parties (number of deputies)							
Occupation	HDF (164)	AFD (93)	ISP (43)	HSP (33)	FYD (21)	CDPP (21)	Ind. (10)	Total deputies (386)
Misc. professional	35.4	31.2	54.5	21.2	27.3	23.8	22.2	33.9
Scholar/educator	30.5	29.0	9.1	15.2	59.1	14.3	22.2	26.9
Lawyer	10.4	19.4	9.1	—	13.6	28.6	—	12.4
Business/Management	4.9	7.5	15.9	6.1	—	23.8	22.2	8.0
Physician	14.6	6.5	—	3.0	—	—	—	8.0
Prof. politician	0.6	1.1	4.5	51.5	—	4.8	22.2	6.2
Clergy	1.8	4.3	2.3	—	—	—	11.1	2.3
Blue-collar worker	1.2	1.1	4.5	3.0	—	4.8	—	2.3
Military	0.6	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.3

SOURCE: Data derived from Péter Somfai, et al. Eds., *Szabadon Választott. Parlamenti Almanach, 1990* (Freely Elected. Parliamentary Almanac, 1990), Budapest: IPKV, 1990; *Heti Világgazdaság* (Budapest), "Voks '90" (Special Election Issue), March 1990; and Hungarian press reports on individual candidates, January–April 1990. For his valuable assistance in the development of a data base on the parliament, I am indebted to Tamás Fellegi, Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut.

AFD delegates may explain the Forum's landslide victory in the individual districts (it won 114 out of 176). Second, there are differences in average age between the 210 delegates elected on party lists (46.5 years) and the 176 delegates who won their seats in individual districts (43 years). The placing of older party executives, cultural notables, women, and party hacks, who were less competitive politically, on the national and county lists added two or three years to the average age of the deputies.

Closely linked to age is the politically sensitive matter of the delegates' previous membership in the communist party. In the absence of published information on this subject, to provide an estimate one must rely on biographical interviews and common sense. The following data suggest that at least one-third of the middle generation were members of the HSWP. About 300,000 of the HSWP's total 1986 membership of 850,000 were identified as university graduates or "intellectuals." It is highly probable that most of them were upwardly mobile white-collar professionals; therefore, there is a strong statistical probability that at least 35 percent of the delegates were, at one time or another, members of the old ruling party.

In any case, given the negotiated nature of the political transition, previous HSWP membership, in and of itself, is not a serious political liability in Hungary today. However, the widespread lack of candor on this matter is evidence of the continued political sensitivity of the new elites' ambiguous and still unexamined ties to the old regime. By contrast, chances are that the Christian Democrats, most of the Smallholders, and the Young Democrats had never been members of the communist party. The Christian Democrat and Smallholder delegates were, as a rule, politically marginalized provincial intellectuals always at odds with the local power structures. The Young Democrats were too young to have been asked to join the party. However, the Young Democrats, just as virtually everyone else under 55, were forced to join the Communist youth organization in secondary school.

The small number of women delegates (28, or 7.3 percent of the total) compares unfavorably with that of the female contingents of the 1980–85 and the 1985–90 legislative sessions, when their respective numbers were 106 (27 percent) and 80 (21 percent). It is also a telling indication of the Hungarian voters' negative disposition toward women in politics that of the women who were elected to parliament, only one-fifth won their seats in individual districts.

Although no member of parliament has less than a high school education, the level of educational credentials differs significantly among the caucuses of the six parties and the independents. Given that substantial educational credentials and appropriate professional status are important requisites of electability, the low score of the Smallholders on this scale (10 of their 43 deputies had only a high school education), combined with their top position in the "miscellaneous professional" category (see Table 3), hints at the possibility of inflated claims for professional status. The educational credentials of the HSP caucus may also be inflated. Almost 85 percent of HSP deputies claimed a college or university education. However, if we assume that many

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of the HSP-members' "college" credentials are based on nothing more than evening school degrees and diplomas earned in party agit-prop schools, then we have several "professionals" with very modest educational credentials. Apart from the lawyers and elderly professionals with university degrees earned 40 years ago, the Christian Democrats' professional qualifications also leave something to be desired. By contrast, the Young Democrats are a party in which solid educational credentials and high professional competence fully coincide. Although its membership is small, in terms of intellectual quality and political skills, the FYD is a "major" party and, in terms of legislative skills, is in the same league with the two largest parties.[49]

The foregoing discussion of the ISP, CDPP, HSP, and FYD delegates' educational background and professional qualifications sought to identify statistical patterns from which one might hypothesize the existence of certain national middle-class norms and expectations for political leadership that might have contributed to these parties' electoral performance. Explanations might be found in such variables as age, sex, religion, educational background, occupational prestige, and party affiliation. All these, in a negative and positive sense, had a bearing on these parties' showing at the polls.

The Smallholders were widely perceived as a single-issue party with a primary constituency of small farmers and agricultural workers. The Christian Democrats were seen as a predominantly rural Catholic party. The HSP's diffuse support came from lower-middle-class voters, the rural apparatus, younger professionals, and from those who could not bring themselves to vote either for either a Christian-national or a radical anti-communist liberal party. The Young Democrats benefited from votes of the very young and the very old. In none of these cases did the social and demographic characteristics of those who voted for these parties match the demographic attributes, education, social prestige, and electoral platform of these parties' candidates.

By contrast, upon examination of the HDF and the AFD delegates' demographic, educational, professional, and status attributes it is apparent that the candidates and programs of both parties responded very well to the expectations and long-suppressed demands of the new Hungarian middle class for vigorous and competent representation of its interests. A pre-election Gallup survey of the electorate's voting preferences for individual candidates revealed that 25.2 percent of the "well-to-do" voters intended to support the HDF candidate, while 26.9 percent of the same cluster favored the AFD's local standard-bearer. With a margin of about two and one-half points in favor of the Forum in the "middle-income" group, and with the same margin—in favor of the AFD—in the "poor" category, the proximity of the two parties' voter support held steady throughout Hungary.[50] Both parties fielded attractive candidates in individual districts, yet the HDF captured more than three times as many seats there as the AFD. When faced with the choice in the second round between two equally appealing HDF and AFD intellectuals, the voters supported the candidate who ran on what they believed to be a less radical and more "constructive" platform. However, the election's outcome does not in any way alter the social and demographic similarities between the candidates and delegates of the HDF and the AFD. Thus, it was the Hungarian middle class, with its higher than average rates of voter turnout, that made it possible for middle-class intellectuals and professionals to take over the country's helm from the old regime's intellectually bankrupt and discredited *nomenklatura*.

Constraints on the Transition

"Spring housecleaning" and "radical change" were prominent campaign slogans of at least five of the six parties that are in the Hungarian parliament today. Yet, according to press reports and the latest US government directory of top office holders in Hungary, only 100 of the top 700 old *nomenklatura* positions have changed hands since the government of József Antall took office in late May 1990.[51] A mid-July summary of personnel changes in the government indicated that of the newly appointed 71 sub-cabinet level secretaries of state, 29 had served for a total of 300 years under the Németh government and its predecessors.[52] Since mid-summer 1990, several hundred national- and regional-level executive positions have been filled with new appointees. Given the number of top *nomenklatura* positions (estimates range from 5,000 to 7,500), what has happened in Hungary thus far looks more like a light dusting than a thorough housecleaning.

[49]Péter Somfai, et al, Eds., *Szabadon Választott. Parlamenti Almanach 1990* (Freely Elected. Parliamentary Almanac, 1990), Budapest, IPKV, 1990; *Heti Világgazdaság* (Budapest), "Voks '90" (Special Election Issue), March 1990; and Hungarian press reports on individual candidates, January–April 1990.

[50]Survey by Gallup-Budapest, February-March 1990.

[51]Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of Hungarian Officials*, July 1990.

[52]Endre Babus, "300 Years of Time Served," *Heti Világgazdaság*, July 14, 1990.

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József Antall, chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Hungarian acronym—MDF), flashes the V-sign for victory as he announces his party's triumph in the national elections during a press conference at the Forum's headquarters in Budapest on April 8, 1990.

—G. Szebellédy from Eastfoto.

The new Hungarian political elites' apparent hesitation to effect thoroughgoing personnel changes is a manifestation of systemic and situational constraints on the new government's policy options. By systemic constraints I mean the staggering economic burden and the legacy of public distrust in political authorities that the new government and parliament inherited from the previous regime. By situational constraints, I am referring to several specifically Hungarian conditions that tend to inhibit the new government's ability to deliver in full on its campaign promises. In what follows, I will propose seven systemic and country-specific factors, which, when taken together, either minimize the need for further changes or will tend to make certain desirable changes very difficult to effect.

- As shown in Table 4, the government's internal regeneration had already been proceeding for at least a decade. It was initiated as early as 1980, when increasing numbers of university-trained specialists began occupying important positions in the bureaucracy. In 1985, the regime not only offered a token freedom of choice to the Hungarian voters, but deliberately disposed of many scores of conservative *apparatchiks* by having them run against and be soundly defeated by the younger and better qualified favorite sons of several communities. The HSWP conference of May 1988 led to the replacement of one-third of the Kádárist Central Committee, and speeded up the early retirement of many scores of party *apparatchiks*. A year later, the reform communists began isolating, and in October 1989, they totally eliminated and pensioned off the entire party apparatus. From early February 1990 on, the lame-duck parliament held a series of hearings that called all sub-cabinet level office-holders since 1980 to account for their homes and possessions. Although the hearings were a farce, they nevertheless were part of a broader effort to eliminate old elites that had already been taking place for years.
- Since the mid-1980's, communist reform elites have been involved in frequent consultations with the non-party elites and, since early 1989, with the leaders of opposition parties as well. These consultations yielded tactical alliances that unseated Károly Grósz and

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Table 4: The Hungarian Party Cadre Elite and the Top State Bureaucracy: Professional Qualifications and Specialized Skills

(in percent)

Qualifications and specialized skills	Party cadres		State bureaucrats	
	1981	1989	1981	1989
University or college degree	44.2	57.1	77.5	92.8
University, or "little doctorate"	5.4	7.8	19.1	26.5
Scientific degree	2.7	4.7	14.6	18.9
Knowledge of foreign languages	15.4	19.2	53.7	69.4
Professional experience	22.3	27.8	39.4	55.5
Has "convertible" skills	17.6	28.5	49.6	71.4

SOURCE: Ferenc Gazsó, "Certain Sociological Characteristics of the Cadre Bureaucracy," unpublished manuscript, 1990, p. 20.

discredited the political authority of the party apparatus. The National Roundtable and particularly the Németh government's routinized interaction with the opposition parties helped foster negotiations as the method of choice for crisis prevention and for the resolution of conflicts between the outgoing government and the ascendant opposition parties. An intended by-product of this interaction was a tacit understanding concerning the avoidance of post-transition retaliation against former party members. With a choice between *leszámolás* (showdown) and *elszámolás* (accounting), all responsible political actors rejected the former in favor of the latter.

• As noted above, well before the new government took office, thousands of mid- and upper-level party *apparatchiks* left the regime via lateral transfer to white-collar positions in industry, agriculture, the service sector, or local government. In many cases, the lack of "transferable skills" was no obstacle as long as the refugee from the apparatus could read, write, and answer the telephone. In any case, generous severance payments (the HSWP and its legal successor, the HSP, were said to have spent close to a billion forints for this purpose in 1989) plus six months' salary eased the cadres' pains of transition to the non-party sector.

• From late 1989 on, a number of Western firms and many individual investors sought to acquire part or full ownership of many marginally profitable or currently unprofitable enterprises. In all such cases, the incumbent management, rather than the workers or the government, were the foreign investors' "natural partners." Western banks were similarly keen on obtaining the services, inside information, and network of contacts that top officials of the Ministry of Finance and those of the state's other economic agencies offered in return for high managerial positions in all kinds of joint ventures. No one had to be dismissed from the Ministry of Finance when the new government took over because most of the top experts had already left for the private sector.

• During the waning years of the Kádár regime, many white-collar, corporative, and "guild" types of groups acquired a fair amount of autonomy. The writers', the artists', and the journalists' unions, the Academy of Sciences, the universities and colleges, and the media have used this autonomy to resist outside pressures for change, whether these pressures came from the post-communist regime or from the Antall government. The print media, which had served the old regime so long and well and which are still staffed by many enemies of democracy, defend themselves under the flag of a free press. Similarly untouchable are the old/new Trade Union Federation, the "red barons" business associations (the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Entrepreneurs, etc.), the state farms, and the old-line agricultural cooperatives' associations. Also untouchable are some of these groups' ill-gotten cash and real-estate assets.

• A surplus of white-collar office workers and semi-professionals has been a chronic problem in Hungarian enterprises. Yet, no government would dare contemplate layoffs for whatever reason, because as the incumbents to these positions see it, white-collar positions are not jobs but inviolable entitlements. Therefore, it is politically impossible to remove any but top managerial personnel from an office or an institution. When politically-appointed faculty members are threatened with dismissal, the universities (naturally) plead administrative interference with academic freedom and resist needed changes. Unlike the manufacturing and service industries, where the government hopes that the "invisible hand" of the market will weed out the

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incompetents, there will be no housecleaning among white-collar employees in other areas in the foreseeable future.

- A careful reading of the transcript of deliberations in the new parliament and a review of government statements on administrative reorganization, constitutional changes, and privatization indicate a sense of disorientation and uncertainty among the new political elites in the government and the legislature. Parties of the government coalition are beginning to realize the vagueness and essentially conditional nature of their electoral mandate. Not even the prudent and statesmanlike HDF-AFD agreement of early May can withstand the pressure of unmet and unrealistic public expectations for a rapid economic turnaround. The trade unions and the media have savaged the government and the legislature in words and print for failing to address the concerns of blue-collar workers and farmers. Personnel changes in the trade unions and media could bring forth further attacks from these quarters, and therefore might have to be put off for a year or two.

The most realistic way out of the post-transition quagmire for the new political elites might be through a reexamination of their frayed, though still correct, ties with those members and corporative organizations of the old elite who have a shared interest in the prevention of chaos and in the preservation of the carefully negotiated modus vivendi. Elemér Hankiss foresaw this contingency and called it a post-transformation "grand alliance" among the old and new party elites, the "expert" top state bureaucracy, and the new managerial class from the public and the private sector.[53] To make this scenario work, both elites need to agree on a new social contract with the non-elites. There is no time to waste, because as far as the average Hungarian is concerned, there ought to be more to democracy than the recapturing of intelligentsia and elite autonomy from the communist state.

Further democratization raises other issues. The present government coalition came to power on the strength of votes from a little more than one-fourth of the total electorate. To turn the government and the parliament into effective institutions for the promotion of change, the party system must become more open to the interests of the politically unrepresented 40 percent of the Hungarian people. As a first step, the parties must put their houses in order. The gap between the parties' parliamentary caucuses and the political movements that put the delegates into the parliament is growing and threatens to undermine the parties' organizational cohesion and political will. The parliamentary parties also seem to have lost touch with their local organizations. The mushrooming of new platforms, single-issue groups, and regional caucuses may be the healthy signs of intra-party pluralism, but they are also signs of political fragmentation. To stem these problems the parties must tighten their ranks and at the same time open up to the non-elites. This strategy will help broaden the parties' popular base at the local level.

The elections for local governments held in two rounds on September 30 and October 14, 1990, gave Hungarian voters their first opportunity to make a political judgment on the new regime's performance since the March-April national elections. The outcome went against the government coalition, yielded agreeable surprises for the AFD and FYD, and brought a political windfall to the old and holdover elites in the rural areas. Eighty-four percent of the newly-elected village mayors were "independents," of whom 80 percent had been incumbents. In most cities (including Budapest), the Free Democrats and the Young Democrats took over the municipal governments, while the candidates from the HDF, ISP, and CDPP lost in most elections for slots in the municipal councils.

The local election results have produced a new set of checks and balances and thus have helped to stabilize Hungarian politics. Parties in the parliamentary opposition have suddenly found themselves responsible for governing several financially hard-pressed and essentially ungovernable cities. The holdover elites in the villages are now faced with the intractable problems of rural Hungary's backward infrastructure. To survive politically, the new and holdover elites must cooperate with the center-right government now in power in Budapest.

The six parliamentary parties' ideological postures are inspired far more by the new elites' rejection of the past than by a coherent vision of the future. The May 1990 HDF-AFD pact in support of a series of constitutional measures concerning the transition to democracy has pushed these parties' ideological purists to the sidelines. They have been fighting back through the media, and their personal example has encouraged extremist tendencies among the rank and file. In July and August 1990, the parties' ideological polarization took a turn for the worse. Venomous debates on religious education in schools, abortion, privatization, anti-Semitism, and the control of the media, and clashing assessments of the prewar Horthy regime have shattered the new parties' fragile post-election consensus on national priorities. Intellectuals in politics tend to be a conten-

[53]Elemér Hankiss, "The 'Grand Coalition' or the Conversion of Power," *Valóság*, February 1989, pp. 15ff.

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tious lot, but in Hungary today they are playing with fire.

"Democracy is here, now deliver the goods" is what the Hungarian public is telling the intellectuals in power today. The authors of yesterday's economic blueprints are finding that it is one thing to prescribe the bitter pill of structural unemployment, but it is another to persuade hundreds of thousands of unskilled and semi-skilled workers to swallow it. The authors of yesterday's sparkling samizdat treatises on the human condition are discovering that people would rather read comic books than reflect on Hegel. Yesterday's political saviors are fast becoming today's party hacks in the public eye. The "Great October Taxi Strike," as a Budapest wit dubbed the nationwide strike of cab and truck drivers to protest a sharp rise in gasoline prices, was a blunt reminder of the fragility of the popular consensus behind the painful but essential measures needed for economic readjustment. The government and the opposition alike discovered that the non-elites and the old Trade Union Federation can no longer be ignored and must be accepted as necessary, albeit unwelcome, partners in future decisions affecting Hungary's economy and the concerns of the man on the street.

Although social discontent characterizes Hungary today, a regime on the model of Romania's National Salvation Front or the reign of social fascist demagogues to contain the restless masses is not on the horizon in Hungary. The intelligentsia's rhetoric of "more of the same" is not a substitute for courageous political action. A "grand" HDF-AFD coalition might be the answer, but the price—the withering of party pluralism—may not be worth it. Prognosis: cloudy weather with frequent thunderstorms.

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Books

Marxist Disaster and Cultural Survival in Ethiopia

Paul B. Henze

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JOHN CLARKE. *Resettlement and Rehabilitation: Ethiopia's Campaign against Famine.* London, Harney and Jones, Ltd., n.d.

JASON W. CLAY and BONNIE HOLCOMB. *Politics and the Ethiopian Famine, 1984–85.* Cambridge, MA, Cultural Survival, 1986.

THE EFFORT of Marxist-Leninist leaders to force their societies into an ideologically prescribed mold has proven a bankrupt policy, even if the likes of Fidel Castro or Kim Il-song keep trying. So, too, at least until very recently, did Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia. The efforts of the military junta (the Derg) that pushed Haile Selassie off his throne in 1974 and sought to turn Ethiopia into a replica of the Soviet Union plunged the country into an even deeper crisis than the one now afflicting the USSR itself. Only on March 5, 1990, with the northern heartlands of Ethiopia under insurgent control and the capital itself increasingly threatened, did President Mengistu admit failure:

[S]ituations can no longer be predicted as they used to be. Very fundamental changes are now taking place in the world. The beliefs and outlooks as regards social development held formerly are being changed . . . . Today's world is no longer what it was when we charted out the direction of progress 15 years ago.[1]

The damage Marxism-Leninism has done to Ethiopia can be categorized under three headings. The most basic of these is that it has brought the Ethiopian state, one of

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*The books reviewed are listed in alphabetical order. In the case of Ethiopian names this relates to the first name given, which is the proper name of the given authors.

[1]Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-AFR*), Mar. 12, 1990, p. 10.

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JASON W. CLAY, SANDRA STEINGRABER, and PETER NIGGLI. *The Spoils of Famine: Ethiopian Famine Policy and Peasant Agriculture*. Cambridge, MA, Cultural Survival, 1988.

JOHN M. COHEN. *Integrated Rural Development: The Ethiopian Experiment and the Debate*. Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987.

DAWIT WOLDE GIORGIS. *Red Tears: War, Famine, and Revolution in Ethiopia*. Trenton, NJ, Red Sea Press, 1989.

DESSALEGN RAHMATO. *Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia*. Trenton, NJ, Red Sea Press, 1985

DONALD DONHAM and WENDY JAMES, Eds. *The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in History and Social Anthropology*. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988.

THOMAS E. DOWNING, KANGETHE W. GITU, and CRISPIN M. KAMAU, Eds. *Coping with Drought in Kenya: National and Local Strategies*. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1989.

HAGGAI ERLICH. *Ethiopia and the Challenge of Independence*. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1986.

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the world's most ancient, into greater jeopardy than at any time since the 16th century. This is monstrously ironic, for Mengistu's junta took power under the slogan *"Ityopya Tikdem!"* ("Ethiopia First!") implying that the imperial regime had not given sufficient priority to protecting the country's unity and territorial integrity. In 1974, Ethiopia suffered from only one rebellion: that in Eritrea, which had been supported from abroad for more than a decade. And prospects for a negotiated settlement were favorable.[2] Nevertheless, Derg radicals, led by Mengistu, preferred to prove their prowess by using arms to subdue the Eritreans. Steadily, over the next three years, Mengistu increased the intensity of military operations in this attractive and potentially highly productive province. And, steadily, Derg forces lost ground. Meanwhile, a dozen other insurgencies developed in other parts of the north and in the western and eastern parts of the country. Despite armed forces numbering close to 400,000 (compared to Haile Selassie's 45,000), the Addis Ababa government is everywhere on the defensive. War has become a way of life in much of the country, with many of the insurgent movements also opposing one another and having at their disposal large quantities of Soviet-bloc arms seized from the government forces.

Second, there is famine, which has become chronic in Ethiopia. The world first became aware of the extent of the problem toward the end of 1984, when journalists and television reporters overcame Derg attempts to suppress knowledge of it. A massive relief effort, spearheaded by the United States, continued into 1986, surmounting Mengistu's obstructionism and saving millions of people from starvation. When famine threatened again two years later, another international campaign averted its worst effects.

By the end of 1989, famine loomed again. The elaborate infrastructure that Western governments and private relief organizations have maintained in Ethiopia succeeded in averting widespread starvation and mass movements of people as of late 1990, in spite of civil war in the northern half of the country.

Famine is not merely the result of military operations, however. Indeed, it reflects the way in which Marxism-Leninism has undermined Ethiopia's society and economy. Although development specialists continue to regard the country as a potential breadbasket, Ethiopia fell to the very bottom in World Bank rankings during the 1980's.

Before the 1974 Derg takeover, Ethiopia's economy was growing at a rate of 4–6 percent a year. Average annual growth during the subsequent 15 years barely exceeded 1 percent, while population has continued to grow 3 percent annually. The country now has 52 million people, and will have 68 million by the year 2000. Between 1979 and 1987, annual per capita food production fell from 194.7 to 125.3 kilograms, having dipped to an all-time low of 109 kilograms in 1985.[3] Reforms that are more far-reaching than those announced by Mengistu last March will be needed if the

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[2]Insurgency in Eritrea had been supported during the 1960's and early 1970's by the Soviet Union, Cuba, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and other pro-Soviet Arab states, and also, until late 1971, by Beijing in competition with Moscow. As part of the process of establishing relations with the United States, China's leaders shifted to support of Haile Selassie and terminated all assistance to the Eritreans. Meanwhile, Sudan, through which Moscow was sending arms to Eritrea, changed its orientation after Ja'far Muhammad Numayri narrowly escaped ouster in a communist-instigated coup in July 1971. In return for help in settling his southern rebellion, Numayri promised Haile Selassie to restrict Eritrean insurgent use of Sudanese territory. The result was a marked decline in the intensity of insurgent operations in Eritrea during 1972 and 1973 and an increase of tensions among insurgent factions.

[3]See the paper of Befekadu Deguefe, "Profile of the Ethiopian Economy," Addis Ababa University, June 1988.

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HAGGAI ERLICH. *The Struggle over Eritrea, 1962–1978.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution, 1983.

JOHN W. HARBESON. *The Ethiopian Transformation: The Quest for the Post-Imperial State.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1988.

JORDAN GEBRE-MEDHIN. *Peasants and Nationalism in Eritrea: A Critique of Ethiopian Studies.* Trenton, NJ, Red Sea Press, 1989.

ROBERT D. KAPLAN. *Surrender or Starve: The Wars Behind the Famine.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1988.

EDMOND J. KELLER. *Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic.* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1988.

DAVID A. KORN. *Ethiopia, the United States, and the Soviet Union.* London, Croom Helm, 1986; distributed in the United States by Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale.

HANS WILHELM LOCKOT. *The Mission, the Life, Reign, and Character of Haile Selassie I.* London, Hurst, 1989.

JAMES McCANN. *From Poverty to Famine in Northeast Ethiopia: A Rural History, 1900–1935.* Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987.

HAROLD MARCUS. *Haile Selassie I: The Formative Years, 1892–1936.* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1987.

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country is to begin its recovery.[4]

HOW DID things deteriorate to such an extent? How could a leadership group addicted to such counterproductive policies maintain its hold on power? How could a country with so much history, so many able people, and so much international sympathy and support in the past fall into such disarray?

One fallacious argument that continues to crop up in journalistic and academic writing on the region is that superpower competition in the Horn is the root cause not only of Ethiopia's problems, but of the equally serious condition of its neighbors, Sudan and Somalia.[5] This fallacy does not stand up to honest examination of elementary facts, as I have argued elsewhere.[6]

Perhaps the best-documented work on superpower competition in the horn, David Korn's *Ethiopia, the United States, and the Soviet Union,* demonstrates just how determined Mengistu Haile Mariam was to place himself under Moscow's wing even though many officials in Moscow were less than enthusiastic about embracing him and would have preferred dealing with an ideologically more sophisticated civilian. The book, a combination of scholarly examination and personal memoir by a man who was chargé d'affaires of the American Embassy in Addis Ababa during the critical years 1982–85, analyzes Mengistu, discusses the process of formation of the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE),[7] and describes the first months of the massive famine relief operations in Ethiopia on the basis of close daily observations—and in the last case, direct personal involvement.[8]

Another memoir, *Red Tears,* written by Dawit Wolde Giorgis, who served the Derg in many important positions, offers a detailed account of the author's disillusionment with Marxist militarism. From 1983 until his defection in 1986, Dawit was chief of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, the governmental organization overseeing all famine relief and refugee support operations in Ethiopia. His account of the struggle he and his staff put up in 1984 to try to force Mengistu to recognize the seriousness of the threat leaves no doubt that Mengistu and his

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[4]In a paper presented to the 10th International Ethiopian Studies Conference in Paris in August 1988, "Ethiopia's Economic Prospects for the 1990's," (subsequently published as N-2857-USDP, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, February 1989), I projected key indicators and concluded that Ethiopia could not avoid repeated famine during the 1990's. Attacked by Soviet participants as derogatory and challenged by Ethiopian regime media as unfounded, these projections have proved to be relatively conservative.

[5]See, e.g., Stephen Green, "Superpowers Must Team to Save the Horn of Africa," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Mar. 30, 1990.

[6]See my "History and the Horn," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1983, pp. 66–75; a paper I delivered at a conference sponsored by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in Cairo in May 1990, subsequently published as a RAND paper, *The United States and the Horn of Africa: History and Current Challenge,* N-3198-RC, Santa Monica, CA, The RAND Corporation, October 1990; and my forthcoming book, *The Horn of Africa—From War to Peace,* New York, St. Martin's, 1991.

[7]This party, though slow to be formed, was of the classic Marxist-Leninist vanguard type. It was launched with expensive pageantry in September 1984, just as news of the Great Famine was breaking. Never more than an agglomeration of soldiers, bureaucrats, and opportunists, the WPE had a remarkably brief and troublesome life. Mengistu announced its transformation into something called the Democratic Unity Party of Ethiopia (DUPE) on March 5, 1990, but as of November 1990, Ethiopian government officials were still being identified as WPE functionaries. The successor party, perhaps on Soviet advice, was envisioned as encompassing the full spectrum of political opinions in the country but appears to have been stillborn.

[8]I have reviewed Korn's outstanding book more extensively in *The Journal of Northeast African Studies* (East Lansing, MI), Vol. 9, No. 2, 1987.

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JOHN MARKAKIS. *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa.* New York, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

MESFIN WOLDE MARIAM. *Rural Vulnerability to Famine in Ethiopia, 1958–1977.* New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House (in conjunction with Addis Ababa University), 1984.

MULATU WUBNEH and YOHANNES ABATE. *Ethiopia: Transition and Development in the Horn of Africa.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1988.

SIEGFRIED PAUSEWANG. *Peasants, Land, and Society: A Social History of Land Reform in Ethiopia.* Munich/Cologne, Weltforum, 1983.

(ETHIOPIAN) RELIEF AND REHABILITATION COMMISSION. *The Challenges of Drought: Ethiopia's Decade of Struggle in Relief and Rehabilitation.* Addis Ababa, 1985 (produced and distributed by H&L Communications Ltd., London).

TESFATSION MEDHANIE. *Eritrea: Dynamics of a National Question.* Amsterdam, B. R. Gruener, 1986.

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clique chose to let famine develop in hope of dealing a blow to communities sympathetic to insurgent groups.

When Mengistu could no longer avoid admitting the seriousness of the famine, he shifted tactics to capitalize on it by mounting two major campaigns designed to speed up the process of collectivizing agriculture and consolidating control over the rural population: resettlement and "villagization." Dawit recounts how several hundred thousand famine victims were transported to inhospitable sites in the thinly populated western border regions of the country and forced to eke out a living on huge, poorly organized state farms. At the same time, Mengistu began the process of uprooting the peasants in the central Ethiopian provinces and regrouping them into huge camp-style villages, which facilitated regime control of people, livestock, and produce; in effect, these measures turned the country's farmers into serfs.

BEYOND these "insider" accounts of revolutionary Ethiopia, there are a number of recent comprehensive studies by scholars with long familiarity with the country.[9] Viewed from the vantage point of late 1990, these authors seem to have given the Ethiopian revolutionary regime too much benefit of the doubt and to have overestimated its staying power. (All were written, of course, before the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union underscored the inherent lack of viability of all Marxist-Leninist systems.)

Mulatu Wubneh and Yohannes Abate's *Ethiopia: Transition and Development in the Horn* goes furthest in this regard. Harshly critical of the imperial regime, these two Ethiopian authors credit the Provisional Military Advisory Commission (PMAC—i.e., the Derg) with "major achievements in land reform (rural and urban), education, and bureaucratic reorganization" and claim that the PMAC "was successful in conferring some power on the masses through peasant and urban dwellers' associations" (p.193). Although the study appears based on data up through 1983, i.e., before the shortcomings of the Marxist-Leninist regime were apparent, such a reading is ironic in light of Mengistu's own admissions in March 1990.

John W. Harbeson, Edmond J. Keller, and Christopher Clapham each treat the Ethiopian revolution with more perspective, analyzing it against the processes of political, social, and economic change that were deliberately fostered by Haile Selassie. The imperial system advanced modernization and development. However, despite encouraging education and technical training and giving young technocrats ample opportunity to apply their talents, the paternalistic old emperor failed to create a leadership structure capable of guiding the country through the inevitable transition that the country faced after his passing.

Thus, when the old regime fell apart in 1974 due to an unusual combination of domestic and international pressures, power fell into the hands of a group of second- and third-level military men with little understanding of the nature of government and leadership. The country's misfortune was compounded during the next two years as Mengistu—the most energetic, brutal, and stubborn member of the Derg—consolidated his control over the junta.

In his *Ethiopian Transformation: The Quest for the Post-Imperial State,* Harbeson argues that the Ethiopian state lasted for centuries and survived intact through the initial decades of the modernization process because it was flexibly constituted and its leaders were able to adapt to changing circumstances. Modernization and development required centralization, but Haile Selassie tempered centraliza-

[9] I omit from discussion here Peter Schwab's *Ethiopia: Politics, Economics, and Society,* Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1985, a book whose multiple shortcomings I reviewed in *The Journal of Northeast African Studies,* Vol. 9, No. 2, 1987.

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tion with respect for the principle of autonomy, applied not only geographically but in respect to the society and the economy as well. By contrast, Mengistu—in the name of unity—tried to force the whole vast and varied country into a dogmatic, rigid Marxist-Leninist system.

Keller's analysis parallels Harbeson's in most respects, despite an inclination to regard what he calls Afro-Marxism as permanently established in Ethiopia. For example, he concludes that "a new society is being created based on a variant of state socialism and the principles of Marxism-Leninism" (p. 27). Keller's final chapter, entitled "Feudalism Is Dead! Long Live Dependence!" demonstrates that Mengistu made the country far more dependent on external forces—Soviet military support and Western economic assistance and famine relief—than it had ever been before in its history.

In the excellent work *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia,* Christopher Clapham, a veteran observer of Ethiopia,[10] notes that Marxist-Leninist categories are useless in explaining the 1974 revolution, which was the result of conditions that were peculiar to Ethiopia.

The dogmatic embrace of Marxism-Leninism by Mengistu and his close associates was in no sense accidental, however. It was a conscious effort to cloak the exercise of raw power with an ideological mantle in the expectation of drawing the Soviet Union into enthusiastic support of the revolutionary regime. This proved to be more difficult than Mengistu at first assumed, and when the support finally materialized, the Soviet embrace proved to be unidimensional—like Soviet power itself, long on the military aspect, deficient economically, and downright counterproductive socially.

In Clapham's book, as in Jacques Bureau's less analytical but entertaining *Ethiopie: un Drame imperial et rouge* (Ethiopia: A Drama Both Imperial and Red), there is much about continuity. Ethiopia's encounter with Mengistu's "garrison socialism"—as many leftist critics have termed his Marxist-Leninist rule—did not change the country's unique basic character. In a sense, Mengistu has come to terms with this character by behaving much like emperors of old. His speech on May Day 1990, in which he characterized himself as the spiritual heir of Emperor Tewodros, who committed suicide when besieged by the British at Magdala in 1868, led some Ethiopians to conclude that he might be contemplating the same dénouement for himself.

One of Clapham's major theses is that the Derg's effectiveness rested on a strong state structure, which it was, initially, able to strengthen. It also capitalized on a well-developed sense of nationalism, from which Mengistu profited even as his power began to crumble, and which undoubtedly delayed his fall.

Clapham has long challenged the shallow notion that the Ethiopian state is merely an Amhara conspiracy against the rest of the ethnic groups of the country (a major theme of Robert Kaplan's *Surrender or Starve* and several other books on the Eritrean conflict cited below). He stresses the deep sense of common identity that has characterized Ethiopians since medieval times.[11] He regards most of the regional insurgencies that have emerged since 1974 as motivated by a rejection of centralism, resentment at exclusion from national politics, and frustration over the regime's economic policies.[12]

SCHOLARS in Ethiopia have been inhibited about publishing much of their ongoing historical and socio-anthropological research on the varied peoples who inhabit their country (it is remarkable what a blighting effect Marxism has on this kind of scholarship!). However, studies by Western scholars based on field research carried out before the 1974 revolution or immediately following it continued to appear during the 1980's.

Some of these works treat the smaller peoples of the southwestern part of the country.[13] Many critics of the imperial regime thought these groups most recently incorporated into Ethiopia by conquest would want to opt out of the Ethiopi-

[10]His *Haile Selassie's Government* (London, Longmans, and New York, Praeger, 1969) remains a classic that provides essential background for understanding what has happened in Ethiopia during the past two decades. His new work also benefits from several months of residence, travel, and teaching in Ethiopia during the years 1984–87.

[11]Thus reflecting, confirming, and updating the analysis in Donald Levine's *Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1974.

[12]Clapham has continued his examination of this important problem in the "Postscript" to the paperback edition of his book (1990) and in two recent articles: "The Structure of Regional Conflict in Northern Ethiopia," *The Cambridge Anthropologist* (Cambridge, UK), Vol. 13, No. 2, 1989; and "The Political Economy of Conflict in the Horn of Africa," *Survival* (London), September/October 1990, pp. 403–19.

[13]They include: Werner J. Lange, *History of the Southern Gonga,* Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1982; M. Lionel Bender, Ed., *Peoples and Cultures of the Ethio-Sudan Borderlands,* East Lansing, MI, African Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1981; Charles W. McClellan, *State Transformation and National Integration: Gedeo and the Ethiopian Empire, 1895–1935,* East Lansing, African Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1988; Donald L. Donham, *Work and Power in Maale, Ethiopia,* Ames, IA, Iowa State University Press, 1985; and Ulrich Braukamper, *Geschichte der Hadiya Sud-Athiopiens* (A History of the Hadiya of Southern Ethiopia), Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1980.

By contrast, not a single original work by a Soviet scholar dealing with social anthropology or the political dynamics of any Ethiopian region or ethnic group has appeared in the last 15 years. Soviet scholars have done no field work in Ethiopia. G. V. Tsypkin's *Efiopia: ot razdroblennosti k politicheskoy tsentralizatsii*

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an state. But the most serious resistance to the Marxist-Leninist centralizing government has actually come from the old northern heartland populated by the leading peoples of historic Ethiopia, the Amhara and the Tigreans. (The people of highland Eritrea who dominate the Eritrean insurgent movement are historically and culturally Tigreans.)

Why have the southern and southwestern peoples remained loyal to Addis Ababa? There is no simple answer, but *The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia,* a collection of studies edited by Donald Donham and Wendy James, sheds valuable light on this important question. Nine coherent and stimulating essays deal with the Oromo of Wollega,[14] Maale, Gedeo, Dassanetch, Mursi, Kwegu, Gumuz, Maji, and with the interactions between Ethiopia and southern Sudan. Trade in salt, ivory, coffee, and slaves drew the Amhara, the assimilated Shoan Oromo, the Gurage, and the Tigreans into these regions both for military conquest and commercial ventures. But simple models of colonial conquest, exploitation, and subjugation of local peoples do not explain this process. The evolution of mutually beneficial political and economic relationships determined the orientation of these peoples and regions toward the dynamic Ethiopian state as it expanded its administrative structure and began the process of economic modernization in the 20th century.

Three of the books under review deal with northern Ethiopia with comparative objectivity. Each is different in character. One, the Israeli scholar Haggai Erlich's *Ethiopia and the Challenge of Independence,* is a collection of essays centered on the history of Tigre and Eritrea since the 1870's. Jonathan Baker's *Rural-Urban Dichotomy in the Developing World: A Case Study from Northern Ethiopia* is an extremely detailed socio-economic survey of two towns in northern Gondar province. Although the fieldwork on which this book is based was carried out before the revolution, the data and insights it provides are relevant for understanding reactions of the population of the northern heartland to the turmoil unleashed by Mengistu's military socialism and, what is more important, for laying the groundwork for post-Mengistu recovery and a more constructive future. James McCann's *From Poverty to Famine in Northeast Ethiopia* deals in depth with the rural economy and society of Wollo during the first third of the 20th century.

Erlich's book penetrates the myths of Eritrean independence perpetrated by contemporary insurgents. For some 3,000 years before Italy established its Red Sea colony in 1890, Eritrea was a frontier area through which South Arabian civilization and three major religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—entered Ethiopia. From the time of the Axumite Empire (500 BC–800 AD), the Ethiopian state controlled the Red Sea coast when it was strong and contested it with Arabs, Turks, and Egyptians when it was weak.

Intent upon securing the country's northern frontier while countering British, French, and Italian colonial advances in the west, south, and east, the Shoan emperor Menelik II conceded Eritrea to Italy after his great victory at Adowa in 1896. Tigreans, who felt just as entitled to rule Ethiopia as Shoans, considered cession of Eritrea a betrayal, and all Ethiopians continued to regard Eritrea as part of the country. So, too, did Italy, but from a reverse point of view: it regarded Eritrea as a base from which it would eventually take possession of all of Ethiopia. Thus, Italy and disgruntled Tigreans found a common interest in the 1920's and 1930's. Erlich's book sheds light on this history from the Egyptian incursions of the 1870's through the machinations of the Italians before their 1935 invasion, to the post-liberation arrangements for federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia. His work is essential for understanding the intensity and success of the Tigrean Popular Liberation Front (TPLF) in resisting the Derg (see below).

Baker's book is based on a 1983 doctoral dissertation resulting from the work of a University of London research group that 20 years ago spent a year and a half studying the towns of Debarek and Adi Arkai in an Amhara-Tigre border region in northern Gondar province (then called Begemder). Replete with tables, diagrams, and maps, it is a meticulous examination of how producers, consumers, and traders interact on the local plane; how central government policies and distant economic forces affect rural-urban relationships; how

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(vtoraya polovina 19–nachalo 20 v.) (Ethiopia: From Fragmentation to Political Centralization [Second Half of the 19th–Beginning of the 20th Century]), Moscow, Nauka, 1980, and *Efiopia v antikolonial'nykh voynakh* (Ethiopia in the Anti-Colonial Wars), Moscow, Nauka, 1988, stood as lone efforts at serious treatment of modern history until appearance of G. V. Tsypkin and V. S. Yag'ya, *Istoriya Efiopii v novoye i noveysheye vremya* (The Recent and Latest History of Ethiopia), Moscow, Nauka, 1989. In spite of the appearance of having been revised as it was written, the latter book is an embarrassing effort to depict Ethiopia's disastrous experience with "socialism" in favorable light. It will have to be disavowed as *glasnost'* and *perestroyka* force a reevaluation of the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship.

A May 1990 Soviet emigrant to Israel, Michael L. Volpe, though never able to visit Ethiopia, became a specialist in translation and analysis of Amharic fiction. His small volume *Literatura Efiopii* (The Literature of Ethiopia) was published by Akademiya Nauk in Moscow in 1981. Volpe published an "Annotated Bibliography of Ethiopian Literature in Russian," in the Italian Ethiopanist journal *Rassegna di Studi Etiopici,* Vol. 32, 1990.

[14]Given the paucity of scholarship on the Oromo of Wollega, who have been characterized by remarkable cultural vigor as well as a strong commitment to modern Ethiopia, the chapter "Nekemte and Addis Ababa: The Dilemmas of Provincial Rule," by Italian scholar Alessandro Triulzi, is particularly valuable.

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local markets work and mesh into regional and national markets; and how ethnic and religious differences play out among individuals in their day-to-day affairs.

Mengistu and his junta failed to appreciate the socio-economic dynamism that existed in the lively trading towns of this and most other parts of Ethiopia during the mid-20th century. Under the Derg, government and party bureaucrats became the dominant element in such towns, and the most creative and productive people shifted their energies to the underground economy while the national economy as a whole stagnated.

The grimmest photographs of victims from the famines of 1973–74 and the Great Famine of 1984–86 came from Wollo. Mengistu capitalized on this circumstance to haul hundreds of thousands of famine victims from the province to allegedly more fertile resettlement sites in the southwest. However, there were doubtless other motives. From the beginning, the deeply traditional Amhara Christians of Wollo had little enthusiasm for the Derg. Although they were slow to form a united insurgent movement (see below), they engaged in some of the first anti-Derg actions in the country.[15] Why has the thickly populated agricultural region of Wollo, which might have been expected to benefit from the Derg's abolition of "feudalism," been so hostile to "people's government" in Addis Ababa? If the Derg is merely the continuation of a pattern of alleged Amhara dominance that has persisted for a full century, why has Ethiopia's Amhara core been so alienated?

McCann's book provides unique insight into these issues (it includes an epilogue that extends his analysis well beyond the cutoff date of 1935 in the title, into the post-1974 period). The author supplements his rich historical source material with extensive interviews in 1982 with migrants from Wollo who had settled in Addis Ababa and Nazreth and with 1985 fieldwork among peasants in northern Shoa, a very similar region located directly south of Wollo.

McCann demonstrates how individual peasant households in Wollo strove to cope with the impact upon them of forces over which they have had very little control. Like Mesfin Wolde Mariam, he stresses the primacy of external political and economic influences rather than climate to explain the famine. The Wollo peasantry has been impoverished less by drought than by the indirect and direct effects of governmental action—and inaction. In the imperial era, Haile Selassie's eldest son, Crown Prince Asfa Wossen, as titular governor, visited his domain only occasionally. Most of the local aristocracy moved to the capital but retained title to their lands and drew revenue from them without investing in rural development. The local population grew but remained locked into traditional patterns of farming. Ironically, the agricultural policies of the Derg—based on the preconceptions of Marxist urban intellectuals—amounted to a new version of the old pattern of exploitation and neglect. So Wollo remained one of the most environmentally degraded and marginally productive regions of the country.

THERE is no dearth of literature on the Eritrean issue, as books on this subject continue to appear at the rate of several a year. The majority of these works fall into two categories: (1) polemics by separatists and (2) journalists' accounts of the guerrilla war. Let me discuss a few exceptions to this general rule.

Dawit Wolde Giorgis's *Red Tears*, already mentioned, provides unique insights. The author's career included service in Eritrea as a young officer in the early 1960's as well as almost four years (1979–83) as senior representative of the Derg in Asmara—in effect, governor of Eritrea. In the chapter "The Northern Region and Ethiopia's Internal Conflicts" (pp. 69–120), Dawit concedes that the imperial government never took the federative arrangement seriously and failed to understand the nature of the challenge (or opportunities) Eritrea represented. He then proceeds to chronicle the Derg's own disastrous attempts to cope with the Eritrean insurgency. Not only did Mengistu's determination to bring Eritrea to heel by force fail, but it created a violent environment in which the Marxists of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) were able to outmaneuver and destroy rival insurgent factions to gain the dominance they finally achieved at the end of the 1970's.

Much the same ground is covered, in greater detail, in Haggai Erlich's *Struggle over Eritrea*. While sympathetic to the Eritrean people and alert to their grievances, he refuses to idealize their rebellion. He demonstrates the complex origins of the rebellion, the many different strains that have fed into it (including substantial communist and radical-Arab support), and the ferocity of factional infighting among insurgents—reflecting the geographic and ethnic divisions of the province itself. There were times when fratricidal violence between rebel factions and subfactions took more lives than fighting against Ethiopian government forces.

The fifth chapter of John Markakis's *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa* provides additional detail on early infighting among Eritrean factions. For example, he describes a little-known "coterie of radicals who regarded themselves as Marxists" who organized an "Eritrean

[15]The actions centered in the traditional Amhara highland subprovinces of Wag, Lasta, and Saynt. In the early 1980's, the Derg lost control of Lalibela with its famous rock churches and its potential for tourist revenue.

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Democratic Working People's Party" as early as 1968 and tried to infiltrate the then dominant Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and establish an independent "socialist Eritrea." Soviet involvement in this effort cannot be precluded,[16] but it is my hypothesis that around 1970, Moscow shifted its efforts to supporting a single, more disciplined and controllable Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, the EPLF.[17]

We know far too little about the political relationship between Moscow and the EPLF in the last two decades. Did anything remain of it after the Somali invasion of 1977 forced the Soviets to rescue and fully embrace Mengistu? The hopes of Soviet ideologues that Marxism-Leninism could eventually bring the EPLF and the Derg together undermined Soviet credibility with both sides: the EPLF outgrew its need for Soviet support, whereas the Derg became totally dependent upon it.

Turning now to journalistic and émigré accounts of the Eritrean struggle, we have Robert Kaplan's *Surrender or Starve: The Wars behind the Famine,* the latest and one of the best-written journalistic celebrations of the EPLF's struggle.[18] There can be no quarrel with his descriptions of the misery Mengistu's armies have inflicted on Eritrea and the dedication with which the guerrilla fighters have persevered, but his history blatantly embraces and embroiders EPLF myths that seek to legitimize Eritrea's separate status. It was not Eritreans who resisted Egyptian attempts to dominate the region in the 1870's and 1880's, as Kaplan contends, for the territory did not then even exist as a political entity. Rather, it was Ethiopian Emperor Yohannes IV and his general, Ras Alula, who resisted both Egyptian and Italian incursions into an area Ethiopian rulers had regarded as their patrimony from ancient times.

Nor is "Amhara colonialism" the basic problem in Eritrea, as Kaplan argues. Indeed, Eritrean highlanders, beneficiaries of modern education established by 19th-century Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant missionaries,[19] flocked southward to take advantage of opportunities to participate in government, the professions, and the commercial activity of Ethiopia during the 1950's and 1960's and can still be found all over Ethiopia in significant positions. Eritrean intellectuals were originally strongly oriented toward the Ethiopian state, but alienation from that state, which began during the late imperial period, accelerated rapidly after the Derg's brutal attempts to subdue Eritrea by force.

The result has been the development of a large community of energetic Eritrean businessmen, professionals, and intellectuals abroad. Most Eritreans in American universities became strong supporters of the EPLF. Unlike most other Ethiopians in exile, they are prolific writers. Unfortunately, most write political polemics and history that is difficult to take seriously as scholarship.

For example, the most curious book on Eritrea to appear in recent years is *Eritrea: Dynamics of a National Question,* by Tesfatsion Medhanie. Purportedly an "objective" analysis of the Eritrean problem by a concerned Eritrean living in Connecticut, it appears to reflect repeated Soviet attempts during the 1980's to bring the Derg and some part of the Eritrean insurgents together. Although manufactured in the United States, the book bears the imprint of an obscure Dutch publishing house and is replete with citations from the periodicals of the Soviet Union and other communist countries, as well as from the works of Lenin and Stalin. Moscow is invariably the good guy fostering peace and progress for Eritrea, and Washington is falsely painted as the prime supplier of arms and inspiration to the EPLF. The Soviet Embassy in Addis Ababa was distributing Tesfatsion Medhanie's book in 1987, to the annoyance of many officials of the Ethiopian regime.

Similarly, although Jordan Gebre Medhin declares that "the Eritrean case opens rich avenues for the social sciences" (p. 196), his *Peasants and Nationalism in Eritrea* does not answer most of the questions an unbiased social scientist might ask about patterns of existence in rural Eritrea, or the attitudes of Eritrean peasants and pastoralists toward either the narrower, or broader, world around them. It idealizes relations among Eritrean ethnic and religious groups and attributes most tensions among them to outside influences. Its Marxist class analysis must be embarrassing to an EPLF leadership now seeking to persuade Western governments and publics

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[16]It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that this group, which—like the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Movement (EPRM) that appeared among Ethiopian students in Europe and America about the same time—had a classic communist structure and used clandestine methods, may have had some degree of Soviet inspiration. This early Eritrean Marxist group disappeared and may have been absorbed into the EPLF, which enjoyed Soviet favor until 1977.

[17]See Paul B. Henze, "Getting a Grip on the Horn," in Walter Z. Laqueur, Ed., *The Pattern of Soviet Conduct in the Third World,* New York, Praeger, 1983.

[18]Other recent ones include James Firebrace, *Never Kneel Down,* Trenton, NJ, Red Sea Press, 1985; and Lionel Cliffe and Basil Davison, Eds., *The Long Struggle of Eritrea,* Nottingham, Spokesman, 1988.

[19]Eritrean Muslims, traditional in attitudes, were slow to take advantage of opportunities to gain a modern education. Children of families that had converted to Evangelical Christianity, on the other hand, were often the first to benefit from educational opportunities. Though the Eritrean Protestant community represents only a small proportion of the population, young men of Protestant origin are prominent in the current leadership of the EPLF.

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that it has abandoned Marxism. Like Bereket Habte-Selassie's *Eritrea and the United Nations and Other Essays,* Jordan's book is for the most part a series of arguments with history, rather than an effort to elucidate it or apply its lessons in realistic fashion to the future.

Marxism in various manifestations has deprived Eritrea, still potentially one of the most attractive and promising parts of Africa, of more than two decades of progress and reduced the life of its inhabitants to a raw struggle for survival. The Soviet Union, which for a decade encouraged rebellion in Eritrea and then reversed course and supported Mengistu in his genocidal efforts to suppress it, is unlikely to have the means, even if it had the heart, to try to exercise influence in Eritrea in the foreseeable future. If Mengistu was unable to bend Eritrea to his will with US$12 billion dollars worth of Soviet military support, no future Addis Ababa government is going to be able to dictate to Eritreans their future.

Whether autonomous or independent, Eritrea's future rests with the Eritreans themselves. They must overcome their differences and work out the bases for an open economy, an open society, and a democratic political system. Nothing in Eritrea's past—ancient or modern—justifies an assumption that this will be easy.

Eritreans need to think objectively about their future relationship with Ethiopia as well. They cannot alter their geography. There are good arguments not only for retaining a link, but for Eritreans to consider playing a major role in the post-Mengistu Ethiopian state. Instead of trying to entice outside powers to back narrow partisan interests, Eritreans would better spend their time thinking about how to harness their talents for development and how to make themselves attractive for investors who can provide the means to build on the infrastructure that still exists in the province.

OTHER insurgencies—in Tigre, and among the Afar, the Oromo, or the Somalis of the Ogaden—tend to receive much less attention than the publicity-conscious EPLF. John Markakis's book, while excessively preoccupied with class conflict, helps broaden our knowledge of the early phases of some of the area's other dissident movements. Markakis's extensive discussion of the Southern Sudanese rebellion is outside the scope of this essay, but his chapter on the Somali unification struggle is not, for it deals more with Ethiopia and Kenya than with Somalia itself.

Markakis provides valuable information on personalities and tactics in the 1960's, when Soviet arms shipments enabled Somalia to support a serious insurgency in the Ogaden and the province of Bale. Haile Selassie's government managed to bring this rebellion under control by a combination of astute military and political measures.[20]

Markakis also traces in detail the more comprehensive plans of Siad Barre, the Somali chief of staff who seized power in October 1969, to absorb the Somali-inhabited regions of Ethiopia. In the 1970's, Mogadishu inspired the formation of two guerrilla movements—the Western Somali Liberation Front and the Somali Abo Liberation Front. However, these two competing fronts lacked an independent capacity to challenge Ethiopia, and it is doubtful that Siad would have been tempted to mount his assault, which began as a series of guerrilla operations in 1976 and turned into full-fledged military invasion in 1977, if (1) Mengistu had not gotten most of his armed forces bogged down in Eritrea; (2) internal political disarray in Ethiopia had not encouraged Siad to believe that the country might be falling apart; and, last but not least, (3) the Soviets had not poured arms into Somalia in unprecedented quantities during the three years following the signing of a Friendship Treaty in July 1974.

Markakis for the most part ignores the larger context of Siad's attack on Ethiopia and does not even raise the issue of Soviet foreknowledge and/or encouragement of the 1977 invasion. This remains one of the most important unanswered questions about the recent history of the Horn of Africa. Perhaps *glasnost'* in Moscow will shed some light on this matter.

Whatever factors contributed to the decision to invade, Markakis is correct in assessing Siad's invasion as "a foolhardy venture" and also in observing that "defeat was never accepted and the regime in Mogadishu continued to assert it was 'morally bound to assist its brethren in Western Somalia' " (p. 231). This resulted in an internal crisis in Somalia, which is now as beset by internal dissidence and insurgency as Mengistu's Ethiopia. The Issaq of northern Somalia and at least two southern Somali groups have allied themselves with Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Ogaden remains an unhappy region, where little development has taken place for two decades. However, Somali dissidence and potential insurgency are no longer major problems for Ethiopia.

The Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and perhaps the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) represent more serious ethnic problems for the future Ethiopian state, if, indeed, Ethiopia survives the damage Mengistu has inflicted on

[20]Markakis draws upon a doctoral dissertation by Gebru Tareke, "Rural Protest in Ethiopia, 1941–70, a Study of Three Rebellions," Syracuse University, 1977, which reportedly has been accepted for publication by Cambridge University Press.

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it. Because they constitute the single largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, the Oromo are a potential threat to the country's integrity. However, so far, this large ethnic group lacks a sense of cohesion. It is widely dispersed territorially and includes groups of differing religions and styles of life.

The Tigreans, by contrast, have become an even greater threat to Mengistu than the Eritreans, for the TPLF has abandoned all notion of separatism and advocates a unified, democratic Ethiopia with participation of all ethnic groups on an equal basis. This may be idealistic, but the TPLF succeeded several years ago in establishing the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM) in the core Amhara areas of Gondar, Wollo, Gojjam, and northern Shoa and in bringing the TPLF and EPDM together in the joint Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1989. The TPLF took control of the entire province of Tigre when Mengistu's forces abandoned the capital, Makelle, in the spring of 1989, after government forces were defeated at Enda Selassie. Forces of the TPLF/EPDM/EPRDF moved steadily southward in late 1989 and early 1990, isolating the important provincial cities of Gondar, Bahr Dar, and Dessie. By the summer of 1990, they were within striking distance of Addis Ababa. The TPLF is the first Ethiopian insurgent movement to achieve such widespread success.

JUST AS the Eritrean independence movement has established a myth to legitimate its program, so the Derg has used Marxist-Leninist ideology in an attempt to stop history in its tracks and establish a new myth about the country's recent past. For example, the Derg initially succeeded in making the deposed Haile Selassie into an "un-person," denounced for covering up the 1973–74 famine and allegedly depositing several times the country's annual gross national product in foreign bank accounts.[21]

Interest in history runs deep in Ethiopia, however, and the country possesses a comparatively large contingent of trained historians who remained at work at Addis Ababa University after 1974 and have produced important research. Most of this work has been published, if at all, only as articles in local journals, or in the *Proceedings* of the biennial International Ethiopian Studies Conferences.[22]

Feeling the need to bolster its legitimacy as the defender of the country's territorial integrity, the Derg commissioned several works on the borders with Somalia, on Eritrea, and on the waters of the Nile. During the latter part of the 1980's, Western scholars were invited to conferences commemorating the 100th anniversaries of the Battle of Dogali (the site inland from Massawa where the Italians were defeated by Ras Alula in 1887), of the founding of Addis Ababa, and of the Battle of Metemma (where Emperor Yohannes IV died fighting the Sudanese Mahdists in 1889). Symposium volumes from each of these conferences have been published under official auspices.

As Mengistu's shortcomings as a leader became more apparent, Ethiopians began to reexamine the country's experience under his imperial predecessor. During visits to Ethiopia in the late 1980's, I heard people at many levels of society reflecting on Haile Selassie's positive qualities: his devotion to the concept of collective security; his skill in balancing the country's international relationships without becoming dependent on any single power; his ability to maintain internal peace by using both carrot and stick in dealing with opponents and dissidents.

No one in Ethiopia ever seems to have taken seriously the tales that the emperor had deposited vast fortunes abroad, and no foreign bank accounts ever came to light, as Hans Wilhelm Lockot confirms in *The Mission, the Life, Reign, and Character of Haile Selassie I.* Lockot, a Baltic German by birth, spent 24 years in Ethiopia as director of research in the National Library before leaving in 1975. His brief book is fascinating; it is also frustrating because he has chosen to protect some of his sources on the emperor's private and official life by citing no sources at all. It would be particularly valuable to have more complete descriptions of the dark foreign forces that Lockot maintains systematically undermined imperial authority and the effectiveness of the government immediately before and during the 1974 revolution. The book is no mere glorification of the late emperor. Lockot describes, but never fully analyzes or explains, Haile Selassie's inability to get a grip on the situation as his government began to come apart in 1974.

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[21]A prime example of this effort was Ryszard Kapuscinski's tasteless book reviling Haile Selassie. Written in Polish and copyrighted in translation in 1978, *The Emperor: Downfall of an Autocrat* attracted no attention until Harcourt Brace Jovanovich brought out an American edition with considerable publicity in 1983. It was then translated into several European languages and widely praised by reviewers who knew nothing of Ethiopia. It was even turned into a London stage plan. When the play opened, historian Richard Pankhurst was moved to expose the book as a malicious invention in a letter to the *Times Literary Supplement* (London), April 17, 1987. The volume was never distributed in Ethiopia or translated into Amharic, for its fraudulence would have been immediately apparent to Ethiopians.

[22]These were held in Chicago in 1978, in Tel Aviv and Monte Carlo (separately) in 1980, in Lund (Sweden) in 1982, in Addis Ababa in 1984, in Moscow in 1986, and in Paris in 1988. Voluminous *Proceedings* of all but the Tel Aviv and Paris conferences have been published. The next such gathering is scheduled for Addis Ababa in April 1991.

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Haile Selassie I: the Formative Years, 1892–1936, the first of three volumes on the last reigning descendant of the Solomonic line by Harold Marcus, dean of American historians specializing in Ethiopia, whets the appetite for the next two volumes. Marcus demonstrates that Haile Selassie was no accident of history and even less a man who had greatness thrust upon him. He shaped history, thrived on challenge and adversity, was a master of intrigue and calculation, but always remained a deeply civilized man, combining the best qualities of the unique civilization that produced him and those of modern Western civilization, which he admired.

ALTHOUGH the Derg exploited the imperial regime's inept handling of the famine of 1973–74 to discredit Haile Selassie's government both at home and abroad, that famine and the government's mishandling of it were dwarfed by the Great Famine of 1984–86. I have already mentioned the authoritative treatments of the Great Famine by Korn and Dawit. Unfortunately, many of the early works on this event were hastily written, if dramatic descriptions of the impact of famine on regions, villages, and individuals, and exhibited a great deal of political confusion. Some writers echoed Derg accusations against Western governments and relief agencies that they were slow to respond to the famine threat. Other works, including those by self-sacrificing people who worked for weeks and months in famine relief operations, understood very little about Ethiopian rural life and social circumstances and, consequently, include unreliable information and judgments. (Subsequent famines in Ethiopia have generated very few eye-witness accounts, probably because the market was satiated by accounts of the Great Famine.)

Systematic efforts by the Derg and the Soviets to blame the Great Famine on drought and environmental degradation have all too often been automatically repeated by other writers, who with a bit of reflection and deeper research, could have given appropriate emphasis to the political and administrative dimensions of the issue. An example of Addis Ababa's efforts is *The Challenges of Drought: Ethiopia's Decade of Struggle in Relief and Rehabilitation.* Expensively produced and richly illustrated with color plates, this Derg initiative makes embarrassing reading beside Dawit's *Red Tears.* Ironically, it has a long introduction signed by Dawit himself, and the volume was distributed just as he defected.

Most of the book deals with the 1973–74 famine and smaller-scale problems of relief and rehabilitation in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Sections dealing with the famine of 1984 and its aftermath are misleading. A map labeled "Drought-Affected Areas, Mid-1985" (p. 111) depicts as "severely affected" lowland desert areas in the Ogaden and along the Red Sea coast that always receive minimal rainfall and have very few inhabitants and almost no agriculture. A photograph of "Comrade Mengistu with drought victims in Wollo" (p. 170) is blatantly hypocritical in light of Dawit's description of the difficulties he had persuading Mengistu to undertake such visits at all, and the leader's obvious lack of interest in famine victims. John Clarke's *Resettlement and Rehabilitation: Ethiopia's Campaign against Famine,* also published and distributed at regime initiative, is likewise a propaganda tract, which, like the preceding work, falsely presents resettlement as a humanitarian enterprise.[23]

Four books are essential for understanding the famine problem in Ethiopia in historical, geographical, and political perspective. The first is Mesfin Wolde Mariam's *Rural Vulnerability to Famine,* which is based on this energetic Ethiopian geographer's extensive on-the-ground research in famine-prone regions. Mesfin demonstrates that even under circumstances where government and other external agencies take no action at all, there is no preordained and automatic relationship between drought and famine. He argues that timely assistance to peasants to enable them to maximize age-old strategies for coping with natural disaster can minimize famine and, if combined with effectively managed but not necessarily expensive programs, can eliminate it entirely.

These conclusions are reinforced and substantiated in the thick volume, *Coping with Drought in Kenya,* edited by Thomas E. Downing, Kangethe W. Gitu, and Crispin M. Kamau. This book offers 25 studies of measures that alleviated the effects of drought and forestalled famine in Kenya during the 1980's. Most scholars specializing in Ethiopia, let alone journalists, Western government officials, and the world at large, remain largely ignorant of the fact that Kenya was in the mid-1980's struck by a drought far more serious than anything Ethiopia suffered, but experienced no famine at all. Timely recognition of the threat and well-organized governmental action (including grain imports, which the Kenyan government initially financed out of its own resources) averted starvation, disease, mass population movements,

[23]In April 1988, a high-level Ethiopian government committee completed a devastating critique of the entire resettlement process. It was presented to Mengistu and other officials but has never been officially released. I cite portions of it in *Ethiopia in Early 1989: Deepening Crisis,* P-7574, Santa Monica CA, The RAND Corporation, November 1989, pp. 27–28, and am preparing a detailed study of resettlement, based in part upon this report.

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death of livestock, and disruption of normal life. As a result, recovery of agricultural production was rapid when the next year's rains came. Kenya's performance, which drew little attentions in the world press,[24] reinforces all the indictments of the performance of Ethiopia's Marxist regime.

So, too, do the two well-documented studies by Cultural Survival. In *Politics and the Ethiopian Famine,* Jason Clay and his collaborators collected an enormous quantity of information and hard data through interviews with refugees and relief workers; they examined official documents, press releases, journalists' reports, books, and published studies. The work deals with the famine and refugee movements and the initial phase of the resettlement campaign. *The Spoils of Famine* examines the operation of resettlement sites up through 1987 and the villagization campaign.[25]

The latter book—on the basis of official documents and statements of officials, as well as examination of the procedures they followed—demonstrates that the villagization campaign was conceived as a "great leap forward" toward collectivization of the Ethiopian peasantry. Although some lower-level officials may have been sincere in claiming that villagization sought to (1) make it easier for the government to provide elementary amenities to the peasantry and (2) enable the peasants to increase agricultural output, the priority goals were clearly Stalinist—the assertion of control over potentially hostile rural populations and the extraction of produce from the countryside.

In contrast to resettlement, where mortality is reported to have exceeded 30 percent at sites such as Pawe in Gojjam, few people lost their lives as a result of villagization. The effect of the latter process was more long-range and insidious. Villagization threatened to undermine the entire structure of rural life in Ethiopia and turn a self-reliant peasantry into a rural proletariat, as occurred in the Soviet Union. However, the villages were already dissolving in many parts of the country before Mengistu's March 5, 1990, admission that his agricultural policies were a failure, and the Ethiopian countryside has recently been reported to be in turmoil as peasants abandon the hated villages and reclaim their original land.

IRONICALLY, the Great Famine offered Mengistu and his clique a convenient and face-saving opportunity to reverse failed economic policies that had contributed to the famine. This came in the form of a 126-page report in English entitled "Considerations of the Economic Policy of Ethiopia for the Next Few Years," a proposal for partial economic reform drafted by a team of advisers from the Soviet State Planning Commission (GOSPLAN) in Addis Ababa and presented to the Ethiopian government in September 1985. Though not intended for public circulation, it was in subsequent months informally passed by Ethiopian officials sympathetic with many of its recommendations to foreign diplomats and representatives of international development agencies in Addis Ababa.[26]

Drafted before Mikhail Gorbachev's philosophy of *perestroyka* had been widely propagated, the report did not acknowledge the failings of communism in the Soviet Union or the negative effects of Soviet-supported policies on Third World client states. The advisers attributed the famine and poor performance of the Ethiopian economy to an unusual combination of natural circumstances and bureaucratic red tape and recommended tighter discipline and short-term adjustments in economic policies.

Mengistu ignored the report, which for all its shortcomings might have inaugurated a process of reform, and retreated more stubbornly into Stalinism. An unrealistic 10-Year Plan remained the basis of official economic policy. Villagization was accelerated. The state's grip on the economy was tightened, and the more productive parts of the economy increasingly went underground.

Mengistu's non-response to the GOSPLAN advisers' report illustrates the kind of relationship he apparently desired—and usually succeeded in maintaining—with the Soviets: obsequious aping of classic, simplistic communist dogma combined with refusal to accept specific Soviet advice if it went against his own dictatorial inclinations. It is, of course, possible that Mengistu was encouraged in his stubbornness by contrary advice from conservative Soviet dogmatists. So little yet has come to light of the actual day-to-day nature of Mengistu's relations with his Soviet mentors and advisers that the question cannot now be resolved.

In works written as early as the beginning of the 1980's, there are

[24] I called attention to Kenya's performance in "The Example of Kenya," *Encounter* (London), July-August 1986, pp. 26–27. The subject was treated more extensively in John Cohen and D. B. Lewis, "The Role of Government in Combatting Food Shortages: Lessons from Kenya, 1984–85," in Michael Glantz, Ed., *Drought and Hunger in Africa,* New York, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

[25] The judgments and conclusions of this Cultural Survival study match and expand upon my own observations of resettlement sites and new villages during travels in Ethiopia in 1987, 1988, and 1989, as reported in *Ethiopia: Contrasts and Contradictions,* P-7389, Santa Monica, CA, The RAND Corporation, October 1987, and in *Ethiopia in Early 1989* (see fn. 23).

[26] See my *Ethiopia: Crisis of a Marxist Economy, Analysis and Text of a Soviet Report,* R-3677-USDP, Santa Monica, CA, The RAND Corporation, April 1989.

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indications of Soviet displeasure with Ethiopia's rush to collectivize agriculture. A few Soviet participants in the November 1984 International Ethiopian Studies Conference in Addis Ababa cautioned against excessive speed in "building socialism." Finally, in early 1989, a highly critical article appeared in the journal *Narody Afriki i Azii,* "The National-Democratic Revolution in the Light of New Political Thinking (with Ethiopia as an Example)." Its author, a hitherto unknown graduate student, Galina Krylova, was reported by Soviet diplomats in Addis Ababa to be merely a voice for several high officials disgusted with the Soviet involvement in Ethiopia and with the failures of Soviet development dogma in the Third World in general.[27]

Meanwhile, impressive and realistic research on agriculture being conducted at the Institute of Development Studies at Addis Ababa University throughout the 1980's was coming to similar conclusions regarding Ethiopian policies. The work *Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia,* written by one of the principal researchers of this institute, Dessalegn Rahmato, is a good example.

Dessalegn's study rests on fieldwork carried out in 1980–81 in four different *woredas* (counties) in Sidamo, Kaffa, Gojjam, and Wollega provinces to determine how the 1975 land reform was working out in practice. The author familiarized himself with Marxist doctrine on agriculture, noted its limitations and deficiencies, and cited Marx to underscore the need to approach reform realistically. He cautioned against collectivization and elimination of private property and drew on Lenin to argue that "a program of agrarian socialism which would involve, in effect, the expropriation of the peasant would be counter-productive." Villagization was precisely such a program.

Dogmatic Ethiopian Marxist-Leninists did not want to hear such conclusions. Though parts of this book were written while Dessalegn was on fellowships in Sweden and England, he returned to Ethiopia and continued his research. Until the end of the 1980's, Mengistu and WPE functionaries willfully ignored his work and that of most of his colleagues at the Institute of Development Studies.

They likewise ignored excellent studies by foreign specialists, as exemplified by Siegfried Pausewang's *Peasants, Land, and Society* and John Cohen's *Integrated Rural Development.* Both authors brought extensive experience in the pre-revolutionary Ethiopian countryside to their post-revolutionary surveys. Pausewang's book is rich in examples of the practical problems facing rural Ethiopia: the complex relations among different ethnic groups, the influence of history, the importance of social relationships (which vary from one region to another), and the sharp differences in physical circumstances among different areas, which argues for selectivity and refinement in any land-reform scheme applied to the country as a whole.

Pausewang's volume concludes with three case studies of contrasting areas in northern Shoa, northern Sidamo, and western Wollega. He found that the ultimate result of the regime's approach to land reform in each instance was not to give the individual peasant more control over his fate, but to increase his dependency and limit his options for pursuing his individual economic interests. The former land-owning class was replaced by a state bureaucracy that imposed delivery quotas and thereby exploited the peasant more intensively than the dispossessed nobility ever had.

Peasant associations, which were set up in 1975, allegedly to represent the peasants in dealing with the authorities, quickly became instruments of state coercion and control. It is little wonder that as the EPRDF forces advanced into the central Ethiopian highlands in 1989–90 and proclaimed freedom for the rural population to decide questions of land tenure and marketing as they pleased, new villages quickly dissolved, and officials of peasant associations and WPE bureaucrats who did not flee often suffered severe retribution.

Cohen's *Integrated Rural Development* recounts an exciting experience with a sad ending: the story of the largest single foreign-supported agricultural project in Ethiopia: the Swedish International Development Agency's (SIDA) Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) in the province of Arussi. In the 1960's, the Swedes chose the Chilalo subprovince of this Oromo-inhabited plateau region of rolling plains and extraordinarily fertile soil for a comprehensive development effort that aimed at rapid modernization of techniques and dramatic increases in productivity while at the same time preserving private ownership and providing efficient marketing mechanisms to reward producers. The project involved a broad range of extension services, experimental research, and new educational arrangements. In a relatively short time, a peaceful rural revolution was effected.

Following service with the US Peace Corps in Kenya, Cohen did doctoral research on CADU in the early 1970's. He is realistic in describing CADU and the difficulties that arose over land tenure, land prices and rents, and eviction of tenant farmers. Nevertheless, by

[27]See my *Glasnost about Building Socialism in Ethiopia: Analysis of a Critical Soviet Article,* N-3022-USDP, Santa Monica, CA, The RAND Corporation, April 1990.

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the eve of the revolution, "it was clear that CADU had converted Chilalo into the richest wheat growing area in Ethiopia and project participants into some of the country's better off peasants" (p. 135).

The story of CADU after the 1974 revolution is depressing. The project was expanded beyond its capacity for effectiveness, first to cover the entire province of Arussi and then the northern section of the province of Bale as well. It was encumbered with a mushrooming bureaucratic superstructure and rapidly politicized. To WPE enthusiasts, and doubtless to some of their Soviet advisers, Arussi's rolling wheatlands looked like Ukraine or Kazakhstan—ideal territory for giant cooperatives and state farms. SIDA continued its support for the expanded project into the 1980's, but by then, both Swedish advisers and the Swedish parliament became increasingly critical of Ethiopia's discrimination against individual farmers.

The regime chose Arussi for priority villagization in 1985, and peasants were coerced into forming huge grid-style settlements with 500 or more houses—obviously in anticipation of full collectivization. The Swedes terminated their support for the project in 1986. In spite of restrictions imposed by the Marxist bureaucracy, Arussi was still producing a major portion of Ethiopia's surplus grain at that time.[28] Cohen, then (and still) an agricultural adviser to the government of Kenya, returned to Ethiopia with a Swedish team in 1986 to study villagization in Arussi and Bale and had the opportunity to view firsthand the results of the collapse.[29]

IT WILL take Ethiopia a long time to recover from the devastating impact of Marxism-Leninism on peasant life. Yet, the damage may be less profound than that wrought in the Soviet Union by the same disease. First, the exposure was briefer, and Derg control of the countryside was never complete. Second, the Derg found it necessary to be equivocal about religion because of its enormous role in rural life and because it is a source of cultural identity for the Ethiopian urban population as well.

Soon after taking power, the Derg tilted toward Islam by declaring all Islamic holidays equivalent in status to Christian ones and taking other steps to modify alleged discrimination against Muslims by the imperial regime.[30] In keeping with classic Marxist anti-religious attitudes (not to mention pragmatic considerations), the regime confiscated the extensive landholdings of the Orthodox Church and its monasteries in 1975, when all rural land was nationalized. Otherwise, however, the regime treated the church gingerly and took few provocative measures against it.

The clergy was never enthusiastic about the Derg but refrained from displaying hostility toward regime policies and pursued their religious mission with renewed vigor and dedication.[31] By the end of the 1970's, manifestations of religious devotion had became a major form of passive resistance to the regime's Marxism-Leninism. Orthodox and Islamic faithful contributed generously and provided materials and labor for repair of their respective places of worship and the construction of new churches and mosques in Addis Ababa and the provinces. Both Christian and Islamic religious festivals have attracted hundreds of thousands of pilgrims and underscore the continued significance of both religions in Ethiopian culture and daily life.

Christianity is a fundamental element in Ethiopian art, but there is also a long tradition of popular art depicting historic figures, battles, ceremonies, hunting expeditions, and aspects of daily life. The Derg's attempts to exploit popular art for political purposes never advanced beyond crude "socialist realism" in the form of garish posters and bill-

[28]On an officially sponsored tour through Arussi in December 1984, when the massive international relief effort to alleviate the Great Famine was under way, I visited state and collective farms where mountains of grain were being threshed and bagged. None was allocated for famine relief. It was destined for a nearby malt factory recently opened to ensure the beer supply of the armed forces and urban population.

[29]See John M. Cohen and Nils-Ivar Isaksson, *Villagization in the Arsi Region of Ethiopia*, Uppsala, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, 1987. ("Arsi" is the new spelling of "Arussi" favored by the Mengistu regime.)

[30]The Derg's efforts to enlist Muslim support to counter the traditional positive orientation of the country's Christian majority toward the monarchy were not very convincing (the Derg had only one Muslim officer among its approximately 120 members). Late efforts by the regime to foster hostility between the Islamic minority (estimated at 20 to 35 percent of the population) and Ethiopia's Christians had little success. While resisting Muslim invaders, Ethiopia's Christians have been historically quite tolerant—e.g., the Axumite emperor gave refuge to the Prophet Muhammed and his followers. See Maxime Rodinson, *Mohammed*, Penguin, 1971, pp. 113–16; and Sergew Hable Selassie, *Ancient and Medieval Ethiopian History to 1270*, Addis Ababa, HSIU Press, 1972, pp. 181ff.

The sweeping rural land reform of early 1975 represented a much more logical and coherent approach to building a popular base for the revolution, although the peasant constituency soon dissipated once the Derg ideologues began to move toward collectivization and to set delivery quotas for produce at lower-than-market prices.

[31]The Derg singled out the leadership of the Evangelical Lutheran Mekane Yesus Church, especially popular among the Oromo of Wollega, as potentially subversive, and the leader of this church, the Rev. Gudina Tumsa, disappeared. Dawit Wolde Giorgis describes his murder on p. 125 of *Red Tears* and comments on Derg attitudes toward religion. The Mekane Yesus Church per se was not, however, severely suppressed and, like the Orthodox Church, gained in strength and influence during the 1980's.

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boards glorifying villagization, industrial construction, and literacy programs—paintings filled with red hammer-and-sickle flags and rainbows in the national colors—red, yellow, and green. All over the country, in squares and along roadsides, portraits of the Communist Trinity—Marx, Engels, and Lenin—were put up. These were often so grotesque that it was impossible to escape the impression that the painters intended them as caricatures. As Mengistu's cult of personality gained momentum, his portraits were added.

Serious art has, however, continued to flourish in Ethiopia, and gradually the Derg has accepted such work as expressions of patriotism. The work of three contemporary painters—Zerihun Yetmgeta, Girmay Hiwet, and Worku Goshu—was displayed in a major exhibition in Zürich in 1989.[32] British historian Richard Pankhurst and the Polish-Canadian doyen of the study of Ethiopian religious painting, Stanislas Chojnacki, convened the First International Ethiopian Art Conference at the Warburg Institute in London in October 1986.[33]

Of revolutionary Ethiopia's many political anomalies, none perhaps is more curious than the transformation of Haile Selassie's most favored artist, the extraordinarily productive Afewerk Tekle, into the prime favorite of the revolutionary regime and its communist benefactors. Afewerk had visited the Soviet Union and Bulgaria before the revolution and went again early in 1976. He opened an exhibition of his painting in Moscow in 1980 and was decorated as a "Worker for Peace and Friendship"; he was feted by Bulgaria in 1981, elected a member of the Soviet Academy of Arts in 1984, and made an honorary citizen of Frunze, Kirgizia, in 1986. Meanwhile he had painted a series of canvases in gaudy colors celebrating "The Victory of Ethiopia Through Work, Struggle, and Productivity," which is the closest thing to "developed socialist realism" produced in Ethiopia under the Derg. In 1987, a lavishly illustrated volume on Afewerk in Amharic and English appeared in Addis Ababa.[34] It pictured Afewerk with numerous world leaders, conspicuously omitting Haile Selassie. However, Aferwerk is known to have become a strong critic of Mengistu's policies and style of rule by the end of the 1980's.

If art flourished in many forms in Mengistu's Ethiopia, literature suffered a deadly blight. Abiy Gobegan, the country's most popular novelist, who had rushed home from a fellowship at the University of Iowa in May 1974 declaring, "All that change and no blood! I must be part of it!" died of depression a few years later, having written nothing more. Baalu Girma, whose satirical novel *Oromai* enjoyed brief acclaim and was then suppressed, is believed to have been killed in prison. Revolutionary Ethiopia has produced no *samizdat,* no Aleksander Solzhenitsyn—unless previously hidden manuscripts subsequently emerge. On the other hand, there has been none of the banal glorification of socialism that has masqueraded as literature under other Marxist-Leninist regimes.

ALL these books from the 1980's show the deep attraction and sympathy felt toward the Ethiopia by large numbers of people in the Western world—in contrast to the attitude in the Soviet Union. More important, these books demonstrate the vitality of Ethiopian life and culture and attest to the deep historical roots of Ethiopian statehood. This explains in large part why Ethiopia became an embarrassment for Marxism-Leninism. In a multiethnic country far more ancient than the Russian Empire itself, Marxism-Leninism proved to be an utter failure as a formula for modernizing society and creating a better life for the population. The books on the Eritrean and other ethnic resistance movements within the country, in turn, show the disruptive effect Marxism-Leninism has had (just as in the Soviet Union) on ethnic relationships.

Has the country been injured beyond repair? Have ethnic tensions been so exacerbated that the diverse peoples of Ethiopia cannot be drawn back together? Can Ethiopia survive as a state? As of late 1990, the answer to these questions must remain open.

[32]The richly illustrated 200-page catalog for this exhibition—Elisabeth Biasio's *The Hidden Reality,* Ethnological Museum of the University of Zurich, 1989—ranks as a major publication in the field of African art.

Of equally high quality and with authoritative text is the catalog published for the exhibit of Ethiopian popular art drawn from private collections throughout Europe and mounted at the Ethnographic Museum in Munich in 1985. See Girma Fisseha and Walter Raunig, *Mensch und Geschichte in Aethiopiens Volksmalerei* (Man and History in Ethiopian Popular Art), Innsbruck, Pinguin, 1985.

[33]This meeting assembled specialists from Ethiopia, the United States, and several European countries to present papers on topics ranging from early medieval to modern Ethiopian art. The USSR was not represented, but Poland, which has maintained an independent tradition of Ethiopian studies, was. The *Proceedings* were published in a generously illustrated volume by Pindar Press, London, 1989. The Second International Ethiopian Art Conference took place in Nieborów, Poland, in September 1990.

[34]Richard Pankhurst, *Afewerk Tekle, Short Biography and Selected Works,* Artistic Printers, Addis Ababa, 1987.

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Chinese Nationality Policy and "The Tibetan Question"

Donald R. DeGlopper

THOMAS HEBERER. *China and Its National Minorities: Autonomy or Assimilation?* Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1989.

Tsepon W. D. SHAKABPA. *Tibet: A Political History*. New York, Potala Publications, 1984.

A. TOM GRUNFELD. *The Making of Modern Tibet*. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1987.

MICHAEL C. VAN WALT VAN PRAAG. *The Status of Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects in International Law*. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1987.

MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN. *A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State*. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1989.

IN THE last decade of the 20th century, ethnicity and religion appear to be supplanting ideology and the modernizing state as dynamic political forces. From Canada to Germany to Yemen, state structures are giving way to resurgent nationalism, revitalized religions, and new multinational groupings and associations. In the communist world, 1990 has seen movement toward fundamental political change not only in Moscow but also in such torpid backwaters as Tirana and Ulaanbaatar. The alleged triumph of the state over society is thus called into question.

China, as is often the case, is not in step. Its aging leaders are attempting to reassert the complete authority of the Communist party and the state over the burgeoning civil society that manifested itself in Beijing and in over 200 provincial cities in the spring of 1989.[1] That the only city formally under martial law in 1989 and early 1990 other than Beijing was Lhasa indicates, however, that ethnicity and religion are dramatic forces even in China. Looking at China from the perspective of nationalities and nationality policy affords a fresh perspective on Chinese politics and on the politics of ethnicity in communist states.

The books considered here treat China's minority nationalities in general and detail the case of the best-known "minority region" —Tibet. Thomas Heberer's *China and Its National Minorities* provides a survey of China's minority policies and their rationale in the 1980's, and focuses on the effects of economic reforms on minority areas. Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa's *Tibet: A Political History* draws on Tibetan sources to support the claim that Tibet was an independent and fully sovereign country before its occupation by the Chinese People's Liberation Army in 1950. A. Tom Grunfeld's *The Making of Modern Tibet* uses a wide range of English-language sources to support Chinese claims that Tibet has been an integral part of China for centuries. In *The Status of Tibet,* Michael van Walt van Praag examines that land from the perspective of international law; after reviewing Tibetan history since the ninth century, he con-

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[1]The figure of 200 cities comes from Liu Binyan, the well-known Chinese investigative reporter now resident in the United States.

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cludes that Tibet was an independent state in 1950 and that China's only legal claim to Tibet would have to be based on right of conquest. Melvyn Goldstein's 800-page *A History of Modern Tibet* is based largely on interviews with members of Tibet's former political elite and provides a detailed and nuanced account of Tibet's internal politics between 1912 and 1950 and their relevance for Tibet's relations with China, British India, the Republic of India, and the United States.

THE People's Republic of China (PRC) is officially a multiethnic state, although one nationality, called the Han, comprises 92 percent of the population. Fifty-five minority nationalities constitute the remaining 8 percent of the population, numbering over 91 million people. These 55 minority "nationalities" are recognized by the central government and hence are entitled both to mandated representation in the regional and national people's congresses—which are theoretically the sources of state authority and legitimacy—and to the right to live in special "autonomous" regional administrations, which comprise at least half the territory of the PRC, including most of the country's frontier regions. A number of these ethnic groups, such as Mongols, Kirgiz, or Yao, live on both sides of China's border.

To a large extent the present distribution of ethnic groups in China reflects ecological factors.[2] The Han have traditionally practiced intensive grain agriculture on relatively flat land. Peoples inhabiting areas not suitable for Han-style agriculture and the civilization it supported have remained ethnically distinct. They live on steppes, desert oases, or steep mountains, supporting themselves by pastoralism, shifting cultivation, or other special adaptations to their environment.

This theory, which traces ethnic distinctions to unchanging factors of topography and climate, suggests that the sharpest ethnic boundaries will be found where subsistence most differs from the lowland grain farming that defines Han identity. This is, indeed, the case. The antagonism between the Han and the steppe pastoralists is deep and long-standing. (One way that it is expressed is in the refusal of the normally omnivorous Han to consume the dairy products—yogurt, cheeses, butter—that sustain the pastoralists.) The prospects of assimilation of these existing ethnic groups to the Han are very poor. Their assimilation would probably require redefinition of Han identity, a process rendered unlikely by Han political dominance and Han disdain for minority cultures. China's ethnic minorities are thus culturally marginal and likely to remain so.

Furthermore, many of China's ethnic groups are politically marginal in that they have no history of continuous incorporation in a Chinese state or of voluntary adhesion to such a state. Indeed, many have a history of conflict with and opposition to Han states. A glance at a historical atlas will demonstrate that the boundaries of the Chinese state have varied considerably over the past two millennia, and that there is nothing "natural" or "necessary" about the anxiously-defended boundaries of the present People's Republic of China. Much of the western half of the present Chinese state has in the recent past belonged to Mongolian, Turkic, and Tibetan polities.

The minority nationalities, to the extent that they are linked to boundary definition and boundary maintenance, have a political significance greater than their numbers alone would dictate. The boundaries involved are both territorial and sociopolitical. Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, China's leaders have attempted to win the loyalty or at least the acquiescence of the minority peoples. Minority policy has included at various points in China's post-revolutionary history a combination of formal political and legal equality, active efforts to incorporate minorities into the national political and economic system, the establishment of special ethnic administrative regions where minority languages may be used and national policies modified to suit local conditions, and the provision of subsidized benefits in public health, education, and economic development. The effectiveness of such policies has been limited by the failure of Han administrators to actually implement them, and by minority recognition of the paternalism implicit in even the most enlightened policy statement.

However, China's policies toward minority nationalities have never reflected a single coherent vision, and have always contained tensions if not downright contradictions. The degree of autonomy accorded local administrations, the definition of "autonomy," the powers of minority administrative cadres, the distinction between worthy ethnic customs and traditions and unworthy exploitation and superstition, and the extent to which national policies and political campaigns are to be applied in minority regions have all been the objects of bitter political struggle and frequent reversals of policy. In general, shifts in minority policies have followed shifts in the Chinese Communist Party's orientation, with radical, left-

[2]This point is made by Wolfram Eberhard, *China's Minorities: Yesterday and Today*, Belmont, CA, Wadsworth, 1982, and by Owen Lattimore in such works as *The Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1962, and *Studies in Frontier History*, London, Oxford University Press, 1962.

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ist periods such as the Great Leap Forward (1958–59) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) marked by efforts to eradicate ethnic distinctions and impose Han standards and practices on the minority peoples.[3] Such periods saw the imprisonment or execution of minority leaders and religious elites, the destruction of temples and museums, and attempts at forced assimilation of all ethnic groups.

Unlike the Soviet Union, the PRC is not a federative state. It is unitary and politically centralized, and the largest unit, the state, takes precedence over all subsidiary units. Indeed, there are exactly 56 "nationalities" in China (including the Han) because the central government defines and recognizes precisely that number. At any time, the state may increase or decrease the number in much the same spirit as it alters provincial boundaries. The government considers everyone born within the present boundaries of the country to be a citizen. Being Tibetan or Miao is thus like being a resident of Beijing or Hunan; it is a secondary, regional identity.

In practical terms, though, it has been necessary for the Chinese government to come to terms with the ways that Tibetans, Yao, Yi, Mongols, and so on differ from the peasants of, say, Hunan. The Chinese Communists differed from their Nationalist predecessors in their willingness to give limited political recognition to ethnic distinctiveness. The Communists adapted both traditional dynastic techniques for managing "barbarians" and modern Soviet practices to establish special "autonomous" regions for minority populations. Such autonomy carries no implications of diminished authority for the central government in Beijing; its reference is to provincial and local-level administration.

Within an ethnically distinctive autonomous unit, the minority language may be used in administration and in primary schools (but not in secondary schools); efforts are made to recruit minority members as administrative cadres; and national and provincial policies on such matters as family planning or family-based operation of farms or herds may be adapted to local conditions. Minority administrative units, which are generally among the poorest and least developed economically, have been granted tax exemptions and special subsidies for public health, education, and road construction. However, representatives of such nationalities as Tibetans claim that much of the central government's subsidy is used to support Han administrators.[4]

The apparatus of minority autonomous regions and statutory minority representation in various levels of people's congresses refers, it should be noted, to state rather than party structures. In China, as in other countries with Leninist systems, the Communist party makes policy and monopolizes power, while the state implements policy and provides largely symbolic expressions of popular participation. There is no evidence that minority nationalities are accorded any special positions within the party. Moreover, there is much that suggests that minority cadres have not only had second-class status in the party but also been among the first to be accused of disloyalty in every radical campaign to restore ideological purity.

Heberer's book summarizes the effects of the Cultural Revolution on China's minorities. During this period, China's leaders denied that China was a multiethnic country, and sought to eradicate the distinctiveness of the minorities. As a result, most autonomous regions were abolished, along with the subsidies and special preferences for minorities. The economic policies adopted during the period—such as the suppression of markets and the demand that every administrative unit become self-sufficient in grain by adopting Han-style cereal monoculture—were enforced in minority regions, and, predictably, produced famine. Forests were cut so that grain could be planted on steep hillsides, and herders were forced to plow up pastures. A typical demand of the period was: "They should live in houses instead of tents, wear normal clothes instead of costumes, and pigtails instead of turbans."[5] Newspapers and radio broadcasts in minority languages were terminated, and only Chinese could be used in public meetings. Such schools as remained open were permitted to use only Chinese. Even after the courts and the legal system began to be restored in the 1970's, members of minority nationalities continued to be denied their 1950's-era right to use their own language in judicial proceedings (Heberer, pp. 23–29).

China began to reverse these policies after 1978. Heberer notes that the 1982 State Constitution and the 1984 Law on Minority Regions Autonomy formally granted minorities more rights than they had ever enjoyed before. According to the law, leading officials of autonomous regions were required to be members of the minority nationality, and such regions were to have wide, if loosely defined, rights to adapt na-

[3]See June T. Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1976.

[4]See, for example, Tsetun Wangchuk, "Letter to the Editor," *The New York Times*, Oct. 27, 1990.

[5]*Minzu Yanjiu* (Beijing), No. 6, 1980, cited by Heberer, pp. 25–26.

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tional policies to local circumstances, and to control local education and economic planning, albeit within the context of national plans and policies. But as Heberer is careful to point out, the continuing dominance of party over state structures and the absence of any judicial mechanisms for appealing administrative decisions or enforcing theoretical rights of autonomous regions weakens the law considerably.

According to census estimates, China's minority population is growing at a faster rate than the Han population: minorities increased from 5.8 percent of the total population in 1964 to 8 percent in 1987.[6] Until recently, minority nationalities have been exempted from the one-child policy that has been imposed, with varying degrees of firmness and success, on the Han. From the middle of the 1980's, there have, however, been reports of attempts to encourage minority populations to limit births voluntarily, but the continued differential enforcement of the national birth control policy remains one of the major and most visible distinctions between the Han and China's minorities.

Minorities are growing more numerous and comparatively less prosperous, a combination with the potential for generating political problems. China's economic reforms of the 1980's benefited minority regions as well as the Han heartland, but the natural advantages of coastal and lowland China have meant that the already existing gap in living standards between those areas and the minority regions has increased.

There have been attempts to develop the resources and the local economies of minority regions, but these have also introduced new problems by bringing minority populations into closer relations with the state and with the Han. Han migration to minority regions and the alienation of minority lands, which had been occurring for centuries on an individual and ad-hoc basis, became a state-sponsored program after the Chinese Revolution. Between 1953 and 1970, an estimated 12.75 million Han migrated, not always voluntarily, to the Northwest, particularly to the provinces of Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Ningxia. For the most part, they have not been welcomed by the local populations. On the few occasions when minority representatives have been able to speak out at people's congresses and have their remarks published, they have called for bans on Han immigration and more control over land and resources (Heberer, pp. 96–97).

To the extent that minorities perceive immigration into autonomous regions as state-sponsored, their resistance can be generalized to the state and their perception of themselves as distinct groups opposed to the Han-dominated state enhanced. Indeed, on the basis of studies of ethnicity in other countries, it is likely that one consequence of the attempts at forced assimilation will be a new definition of ethnicity and ethnic identity by China's minority groups. Far from fading away or being "amalgamated" (*ronghe*) into a common Chinese and socialist identity, China's minorities are differentiating themselves ever more sharply from the Han even as (and because) the minorities are becoming more closely integrated with China's economy and political system.

THE minority nationality best known to the world outside China is the Tibetans. Although their status and treatment probably differs little from that of China's 54 other minority nationalities, their history of armed resistance to Han rule combined with their vocal exile community has won them much more recognition by the world at large. Although Kazakhs, Uighurs, Mongols, and other peoples share Tibetans' imposed status as Chinese citizens,[7] they attract only a tiny fraction of the world attention that is directed toward Tibet. Chinese authorities are aware of the existence of a "Tibetan Question" and are very sensitive to any discussions of Tibet or the Tibetans. Indeed, all journalism and scholarship on the topic is produced and read, whether in China, India, or the West, in a climate of contention and partisanship.

The reasons underlying the controversy over Tibet are complex, and at present, the Tibetan and the Chinese perspectives are simply irreconcilable. The Tibetans and their foreign interpreters describe Tibet as an ancient and distinct country conquered by the Chinese in 1951 and subsequently subjected to determined efforts to eradicate its civilization and perhaps its people as well. The Chinese and their foreign friends write of a place that has been part of China for centuries and that, like every place in China, suffered from the mistaken policies of the Great Leap Forward (1958–60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), but that is now making great progress in response to the Chinese leadership's correct policies. Works produced by both sides are marked by special pleading, selective quotation, question-begging, outright fabrication, and anachronisms. They are, for the most part, also marked by a narrow field of vision. Typically, they con-

[6] *China Daily* (Beijing), June 22, 1990, p. 4

[7] The special place of Tibet in the Western imagination is discussed in Peter Bishop's *The Myth of Shangri-la: Tibet, Travel Writing and the Western Creation of Sacred Landscape*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1989.

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centrate totally on Tibet or on Sino-Tibetan relations, rather than on the larger geographic or political contexts that shaped events in Tibet.

The highly contentious nature of the field is liable to confuse many readers of these books and cause them to make up their minds on such essentially non-intellectual grounds as sympathy for the underdog or a *realpolitik* disinclination to question Beijing's pretensions to authority over Tibet. Both reactions, although understandable, should be avoided. The way out of the morass of mutually contradictory claims is to widen the geographic and historical focus and pay more attention to the Central Asian context and to the history of China's relations with other states in that part of the world.

THE volume by Shakabpa (Tsepon is a title, like Ambassador or Judge) is devoted to the argument that "Tibet's historical and political development demonstrates that it was a sovereign country, which enjoyed the right to negotiate treaties, and to have direct relations with her neighbors" (p. 323). The author, an official in the Dalai Lama's government in the 1940's and 1950's and a sometime foreign emissary, attributes Tibet's inability to defend itself from Communist invasion to the world's ignorance of the historical evidence for Tibet's independence, which was the result of a joint conspiracy between British India and Manchu China to isolate Tibet, and to republican India's desire to make friends with Communist China at the expense of Tibet (p. 324).

Written in Tibetan and based on Tibetan sources, Shakabpa's work was originally translated into English and published by Yale University Press in 1967. It is valuable for the serious student who already knows a good deal about Asian history, but the many Tibetan names and its distinctly parochial perspective limit its usefulness to the non-specialist reader. For example, the great Dzungar Mongol leader Galdan (r. 1671–97), who attempted to reunite the Mongol tribes and fought several wars with China's Qing dynasty in the 1680's and 1690's, is referred to by his religious title of Dalai Khungteji and identified only as "a Mongol who had retired to Tibet to devote himself to religion" and "was asked by the Dalai Lama to visit Mongolia to bring about the reaffirmation of unity" (p. 121).

The books by Michael C. van Walt van Praag and Tom Grunfeld should be read together. Each argues the opposite side of the case for Tibetan independence. Although neither uses Tibetan or Chinese sources, both compensate by ranging widely in English-language materials published in Europe, North America, India, and China.

Van Walt van Praag, an international lawyer, has essentially written a brief on behalf of Tibet, arguing that it has for centuries met the criteria for statehood recognized in international law: control of territory, maintenance of its own armed forces and currency, and the contracting of agreements with foreign powers, which recognized its independence and sovereignty. His conclusions differ little from Shakabpa's, but his book is much easier for the average Westerner to read. He also feels less need to blame outsiders for the suffering that Tibet has endured.

After a reprise of Tibetan history van Walt van Praag focuses on the culturally distinctive (*sui generis* in his terms) personal relationship between successive Tibetan spiritual rulers and Mongol and Manchu emperors. The relationship, called *cho-yon,* was that existing between a Buddhist priest and a secular ruler, in which the spiritual leader proffered prayers and religious instruction in return for protection and support. Although couched in personalistic and ritual terms, the relationship, which like so much in Tibetan culture was adapted from an Indian source, was clearly a political one. Van Walt van Praag is at pains to argue that the relation was not, however, one of subordination or dependence, but one of mutual support between religious and secular leadership.

This archaic, Buddhist, and Central Asian religious-political bond is, typically, today interpreted by Tibetans and Chinese in opposite ways. In the Chinese view, Tibet was incorporated into China in the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) and has been Chinese ever since. According to Tibetans, only a fundamentally religious and personalistic bond existed between Buddhist religious leaders and secular Mongol and Manchu khans, some of whom were, coincidentally, also rulers of China. Tibet was not, they argue, ever incorporated into the administration of any Chinese state, and *cho-yon* ceased with the fall of the last Manchu emperor in 1911 (Van Walt van Praag, pp. 134ff). Neither van Walt Van Praag nor Grunfeld discusses the applicability of an archaic and culturally alien political concept to the contemporary and Western notion of state sovereignty. Grunfeld, taking the Chinese side, simply notes that Mongols and Tibetans "forged a unique 'priest-patron' relationship, the meaning of which is debated to this day" (p. 36).

Tibet may be described as a society that has specialized in religion since the 13th century. Most of its creative effort has been focused on the elaboration and development of a foreign-derived metaphysical system and the maintenance of its distinctive monastic-based social structure, which provided a measure of political and social integra-

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tion for its population, which is scattered over the climatically forbidding Tibetan Plateau.

Tibetan Buddhism is a missionary religion, and one of the most significant events in Tibetan history was the conversion, in the 1580's, of the Mongols to the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism, headed by the Dalai Lama. The ensuing relationship led to greater and more direct Mongol involvement in Tibetan politics and leadership struggles, as well as a role for the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan holy men in Mongol politics and leadership struggles. In the long run, it also involved Tibet—a peripheral place if ever there was one—in the major political and military struggles of Inner Asia. In their roles as court chaplains and spiritual advisers to the main military challengers to China's Ming (1362–1644) and early Qing (1644–1911) dynasties, Tibetan holy men and the Dalai Lamas attracted the attention of China's Manchu emperors. The end result was an 18th-century Qing effort to control Tibet. Manchu armies were dispatched to southern Tibet in 1720, 1728, 1750, and 1791. These four brief occupations provide the historical foundation for China's current claim to Tibet.

In retrospect, converting the Mongols may not have been such "A Good Thing" as it seemed at the time.[8] In 1788, Tibet became involved in a serious border war with the Gurkha rulers of Nepal, and in 1791, the Dalai Lama appealed to China's emperor for help. In a stunning display of mid-Qing military prowess, a 13,000-man army arrived in southern Tibet in the spring of 1792, joined the Tibetan forces, and marched to within a few kilometers of Kathmandu. The Nepalese were forced to make peace with Tibet, and to acknowledge the Qianlong emperor (1736–96) as their overlord. Since he had an army in Lhasa, the emperor seized the opportunity to incorporate Tibet more fully into his domains. He decreed that all major decisions made by the Dalai Lama and his council had to be ratified by the *ambans*—Manchu commissioners that had been stationed in Lhasa since 1722; that the emperor had to approve the choice of a new Dalai Lama; and that the *ambans* should control Tibet's foreign relations and foreign commerce.

However, with the threat from Nepal ended, the emperor's army soon departed, and with it went most imperial influence over Tibetan affairs. Thus, until the next Chinese army arrived in Lhasa in 1910 and established a Chinese garrison, China "asserted" rather than "exerted" authority over Tibet. In practice the Tibetans governed themselves, fought small wars with Ladakh and Nepal with no Chinese assistance, and made commercial agreements with Nepal and British India.[9] The garrison established by the Chinese in 1910 was meant to be a permanent one, but after the Qing dynasty collapsed in late 1911, Tibetan forces drove the Chinese out. Thereafter, Tibet maintained a precarious independence until its military occupation by China in the autumn of 1950.

A REVIEW of Tibetan history reveals not only a pattern of repeated, brief foreign interventions and military campaigns (by Mongols, Manchus, British) followed by long periods in which the Tibetans were left to pursue their own complex and fractious politics, but also a pattern of Tibetan willingness to give lip service to the claims of foreign intervenors or protectors. Tibetans expected any foreign army's occupation of their land to be short-lived. Tibet's geography and climate made it a difficult and unwelcoming environment in which to campaign or to maintain an alien military force. Historically, the difficulties of supplying a foreign army or of successfully squeezing enough revenue from a scattered and mobile population to support an alien army or alien administrators had always guaranteed Tibet's de facto independence. The costs of control were simply too high.

The small number of the Tibetan elite who engaged in political struggle with each other were also perfectly willing to solicit foreign patronage and support. These aspects of Tibetan political culture, which were appropriate or adaptive in the 16th and 19th centuries, proved to be severe obstacles to Tibet's half-hearted efforts to preserve its independence in the 20th century.

One of the many virtues of Melvyn Goldstein's book is his understated, empirically based, and therefore very convincing account of Tibetan political culture and values. He makes it very clear that although Tibet was a state and was in practice independent from 1912 through 1950, the Tibetan leadership did not think of Tibet as a state in the European sense. More specifically, they did not think of Tibet as one of a number of countries participating in a system of international relations among formally equal, sovereign states.

Tibetan leaders viewed the preservation of the Tibetan Buddhist religious establishment as their highest priority, and they saw the state

[8] I follow the principle of historical interpretation set out by W. C. Sellar and R. J. Yeatman, who in *1066 and All That* (London, E. P. Dutton and Co., 1931) distinguish "A Good Thing" from "A Bad Thing."

[9] See van Walt van Praag and Goldstein; also, Hugh M. Richardson, *Tibet and Its History*, 2nd ed., rev. and updated, Boulder, CO, Shambhala, 1984, pp. 70–72.

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structure as a means to that end. Even in the face of the constant threat of Chinese invasion and incorporation during the period 1912–50, the Tibetan leadership chose not to raise an effective army because it feared such a army might pose a threat to religion and the monastic establishment. Tibetan independence during this period probably owes more to Chinese civil strife and Japanese invasion than to Tibetan policy or military prowess. Tibetans were not nationalists in the modern sense, and although most did not care for the Chinese, many were willing to put up with some degree of subordination to China as long as Tibet's core religious institutions were preserved.

The point here is that the arguments about Tibet's independence or lack of it in the 18th, 19th, or early 20th centuries are misconceived in their imposition of a European and postcolonial frame of reference on a situation where none of the political actors—Tibetans, Chinese, Mongols, Nepalis, or even British—were thinking or acting in such terms. Up until the very last moment in 1947–50, Tibetan leaders made no determined effort to assert their right to be treated as an independent, sovereign state, and to engage in the normal routines of international relations—with ambassadors, passports, treaties, and so on. Rather, they tended to avoid problems and crises, and preferred conciliation, compromise, and vague formulas that permitted many interpretations.

THE CHINESE, on the other hand, mastered the forms of European diplomacy and international law in the middle of the 19th century, and since then have displayed an impressive consistency in vigorously claiming authority over Tibet on all possible occasions. Today, China's official position is that foreign imperialists have attempted to detach Tibet from the Chinese motherland, and that contemporary Tibetans who call for independence or greater autonomy are agents, witting or not, of hostile foreign powers.

Goldstein's research in British and United States records reveals that the British in Delhi and London and later the Americans in Washington have deliberately and consistently avoided any action implying recognition of Tibetan independence, because of their wish to avoid harming relations with the Chinese government. A 1934 letter from the Chief of the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India to the political officer in Sikkim (who was responsible for British contacts with the Tibetan government) illustrates this point well. The letter cites Britain's large commercial interests in China, as well as the desire not to be seen as detaching Tibet from China in the same way that the Japanese had recently (1931) detached Manchuria, as the reasons why Britain was very reluctant to put pressure on the Chinese government over Tibet. Although the government of India was interested in maintaining a friendly government on its northern borders, London clearly was weighing this consideration against the costs of antagonizing the Chinese government.[10] (Such statements express the logic of imperialism and great power politics far better than do Chinese assertions of British or United States plots to "occupy" Tibet and sever it from its Chinese motherland.) China's repeated assertion of its authority over Tibet after 1912 thus paid off by helping to prevent Tibet from receiving international recognition as a sovereign state.

Grunfeld, speaking for China, avoids discussing Chinese claims to authority over Tibet before the 18th century, but makes much of 19th century British and Russian imperial designs on Tibet. He interprets Tibetan contacts with British and United States officials and the visits of citizens of those countries to Tibet in the 1940's as "foreign involvement . . . threatening China's territorial integrity" (p. 102).

In Grunfeld's view, the 1959 Tibetan uprising (set off by Tibetan fears that the Chinese were about to destroy Tibet's core religious institutions) was the direct result of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) involvement, with some assistance from the Kuomintang and the Government of India (pp. 147–60). Although there is little question that the CIA and India's Research and Analysis Wing (at least after the Sino-Indian border war of 1962) attempted to use Tibetan resistance forces for their own purposes, Grunfeld's characterization of the extensive Tibetan resistance in 1958–59 to Chinese rule as due largely to foreign intrigue and manipulation unfairly casts the Tibetans in the role of helpless dupes, easily misled by agents of foreign powers.

Although Grunfeld constantly expresses sympathy for the sufferings of the Tibetan people, he does a very good job of echoing Chinese attitudes of scorn for Tibetan society and people. His introductory chapter summarizing Tibetan life before 1950 paints a picture of unrelieved blackness. He describes an abject population of serfs and slaves being cruelly exploited by a few nobles who lived in "opulent splendor." Tibetans are described as dirty, diseased, ignorant, promiscuous, superstitious, and perpetually on the verge of starvation.

[10]Letter from H. Metcalfe to his subordinate, F. W. Williamson, dated September 17, 1934, and quoted in Goldstein, pp. 246–47.

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According to Grunfeld, Tibet had no codified laws, but only traditional customs and grisly tortures and mutilations. He sums up Tibetan religion in six pages, stressing its (to a Western sensibility) exotic and bizarre manifestations. For example, two of the six pages are devoted to discussing whether or not Tibetans actually practiced human sacrifice. Although he concludes that the issue is unresolved and that human sacrifice could not have been practiced with great frequency (p.22), the very fact that he raised the question and discussed it at length effectively damages sympathies for Tibetan religion.

What one sees in Grunfeld's exposition and in many Chinese descriptions of pre-1950 Tibetan life is the use of what can be called a "Black Legend," such as the Northern European Black Legend that attributes extraordinary cruelty and fanaticism to the Spanish. In the Tibetan version of this legend, Chinese invasion and occupation are justified by attributing to the Tibetans extreme depths of degradation, cruelty, and blind superstition. Like other Chinese accounts of the cultures of minority peoples, it consists of a laundry list of bizarre customs, with no hint of any underlying coherence or internal logic.

Such presentations serve to magnify the gulf between "us" (who may be either European or Chinese) and the savage "them." Grunfeld's account, which stresses what Tibetans were not rather than what they were, and what they lacked rather than what they had, renders them "unbelievable."[11] The author himself seems to notice this at one point (p. 31), when he asks rhetorically why the serfs did not revolt and why so many youths trooped willingly off to monasteries. The only explanation he offers is the Tibetan belief in karma, a belief common to other Asian societies.

In a more formally argumentative vein, Grunfeld provides (Appendix B, pp. 223–31) a list of arguments for and against Tibetan independence. He counters the Tibetan argument for independence—namely, that Tibet had a distinct government and armed forces, and had in effect not been under the control of any Chinese central government—by pointing out that China in the 20th century had many warlord-based regional governments with their own armies and currencies, but that this transitory condition did not make these regions any less a part of China. Grunfeld puts much weight on the continued refusal of the governments of Britain and the United States to formally recognize Tibet as a sovereign state—a refusal that, as Goldstein demonstrates, was a tribute to the effectiveness of Chinese diplomacy.

A question that inevitably occurs to anyone reading about Tibet is why any foreign power would want it. It is remote, poor, and the sort of place any ruler would wish his enemies to invade. Grunfeld deserves credit for at least touching on the issue when he refers (p. 230) to Chinese resentment over the loss of (Outer) Mongolia and Japan's efforts in the late 1930's to use minority resentment of Han rule to establish ethnically-based puppet states. In the early 1950's, the Soviet Union retained a major role in Manchuria and in Xinjiang, but Tibet was an area in which Beijing's authority and willingness to defend the maximal frontiers of the Qing dynasty could be demonstrated with little opposition.

THIS line of argument represents the first step toward considering Tibetans and all other Chinese minority nationalities in a larger historical and political framework. One of the major obstacles to understanding the Tibetan situation is the myth of Tibetan exceptionalism, which is the notion that because the landscape is extreme and exceptional, the people too must be exceptional. The positive version is that Tibetans are exceptionally spiritual, religious, and unworldly; the negative version is that they are exceptionally superstitious, backward, and cruel. Both versions of exceptionalism deny Tibetans common humanity. The great advantage of Goldstein's work is his success, based on his command of the Tibetan language and extensive interaction with Tibetans, in portraying Tibetans and their behavior as different but, in context, perfectly understandable.[12]

Once this is established, it is possible to bring Tibetan politics into the ordinary realm of historical and political discourse, and consider Tibet in a wider comparative perspective, as Goldstein does. Tibet's Lamaist state (which never included all ethnic Tibetans) was a weak, small-scale state appropriate to a thinly-populated highland region. It was comparable to the series of hill states ranging from Bhutan and Sikkim through Afghanistan and perhaps as far as Armenia. In the 20th century, practically all of these states were absorbed into larger, lowland-based states such as India, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union. Many modern historians are focusing on the interactions between these highland and steppe states and the agricultural states and demonstrating the extent to which they all formed a single political and economic field.[13]

[11]The intellectual processes involved in this operation, which is a common if inadequate way of perceiving alien cultures, are examined by the anthropologist Frederick O. Gearing in his *The Face of the Fox*, Chicago, IL, Aldine, 1970.

[12]A particularly charming example of this approach is provided by Hugh Richardson, compiler of *Adventures of a Tibetan Fighting Monk*, Bangkok, Tamarind Press, 1986.

(Fn. 13 follows on p. 89.)

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The obvious study waiting to be done is a comparison of India's incorporation of the Himalayan states with China's. A comparison of India's policies toward its ethnic minorities with China's would also be illuminating. Tibetan history, which in Shakabpa's book is like the famous summary of Dante's Inferno ("one damned thing after another"), becomes much more intelligible when viewed in the context of Central Asia as a whole.

The point of the comparative perspective is to make it clear that no East Asian or Central Asian ethnic group can be understood in isolation, and that familiarity with the dynamics of ethnic boundary creation and maintenance and with the constant exchanges across such boundaries allows us to envisage a much wider range of possible political arrangements than those consisting either of total assimilation or totally homogenous and independent ethnic-based states. This is "A Good Thing" since neither of those alternatives seems likely in China.

[13]See, for example, Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China*, Cambridge, Blackwell, 1989; Sechin Jagchid and Van Jay Symons, *Peace, War, and Trade Along the Great Wall: Nomadic-Chinese Interaction through Two Millennia*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1989; and the papers in Gary Seaman, Ed., *Ecology and Empire: Nomads in the Cultural Evolution of the the Old World*, Los Angeles, CA, Ethnographics/USC, University of Southern California, 1989.

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Peasants and Regime in Vietnam: Perspectives on Transition

Ronald J. Cima

NANCY WIEGERSMA. *Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution: Patriarchy and Collectivity in the Rural Economy*. New York, St. Martin's, 1988.

ANDREW VICKERMAN. *The Fate of the Peasantry: Premature "Transition to Socialism" in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, Monograph Series, No. 28, 1986.

VIETNAM in 1990, some 15 years after the "liberation" of the South, is seemingly on the verge of a major transition, uncertain of its place in an emerging international order that appears to favor complex economic interdependence over ideological conflict, democratic pluralism over one-party rule, and market-controlled economies over centralized economic planning. Despite the momentous changes undertaken in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990 and the surprisingly swift dissipation there of Marxism-Leninism, Vietnam has thus far resisted change in its basic ideology. Along with China, North Korea, and Cuba, it remains among the world's last Marxist-Leninist holdouts.

A peasant nation dependent upon a rural economy in an increasingly industrialized world, Vietnam ranks as one of the world's three poorest countries. It has a population in excess of 64 million (81 percent of it rural), which is growing by more than 1 million annually, and an economy that until this year was prone to food shortages and a yearly inflation rate bordering on 700 percent. Its unemployment rate, already 20 percent or higher in most urban areas, rose in late 1989 and early 1990 as thousands of demobilized troops returned from action in Cambodia and most of the 200,000 individuals previously working on contract in Eastern-bloc countries were sent home.[1] The economic infrastructure lacks basic facilities such as ports and roads. Factories tend to produce at half capacity because of material shortages, and there is an almost total absence of technology and adequately trained technicians.

Fear that a collapse of the Vietnamese economy was imminent without a significant boost in international trade and aid contributed to Hanoi's decision to withdraw from Cambodia in September 1989. The international response to this gesture was, however, less magnanimous than anticipated.

Still led mostly by first-generation communists—the same leaders who brought about the victory over the United States–supported South Vietnamese forces in 1975—the country remains burdened, in a sense, by its past military successes. Its leadership has been slow to recognize that the ethos of the society has changed substantially since the war and that the party's successes in wartime do not necessarily translate into effective peacetime

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[1]Jean-Claude Chapon, "Return of Workers from Europe Threatens Economy," Hong Kong, AFP (Hong Kong) in English, Apr. 10, 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report East Asia* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-EAS*), Apr. 11, 1990, p. 42.

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governance. There is a growing sentiment among today's Vietnamese populace that this particular generation of communist leaders —whatever their past accomplishments—is not up to dealing with the country's current problems. Most observers of Vietnam would agree that a leadership change is long overdue, but what it will take to bring it about and how extensive it will be remains an open question.

Two recently published books exploring Vietnam's transition to socialism provide some insight into the issue. Nancy Wiegersma's *Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution* discusses the critical role played by the peasantry in the revolution and argues that the Vietnamese communists gained peasant support by identifying with the needs of traditional peasant culture. The author views the peasant family and the village in Vietnam as fundamental contributors to change of any kind, and attributes the differences that developed between the socialist policies employed in the countryside by the Northern-dominated Viet Minh in the 1940's and 1950's and those instituted by the National Liberation Front (NLF) in the South in the 1960's to the distinct rural experiences of each region. She contends that in both regions, the traditional family patriarchy undermined the process of collectivization.

Andrew Vickerman's *The Fate of the Peasantry* examines the drive to collectivize rapidly in the North and suggests that in the efforts to push peasants into cooperatives, the communists ignored peasant culture. This effort was misdirected and ultimately failed. The author suggests that such programs were undertaken by the communist leadership with the full knowledge that they were antithetical to peasant traditions. The proven wisdom of the party's past identification with such traditions was rejected, however, in order to pursue ideologically-derived policies that were initially conceived and implemented in the Soviet Union and in the People's Republic of China.

WIEGERSMA suggests that by undertaking such policies, the Vietnamese communists unwittingly fell heir to a long history of failed government programs that were alien to the country's traditions. The pattern, initiated by China's attempt to impose Confucianism on the Vietnamese, was followed by France's introduction of the Western concept of individual property rights to replace the Vietnamese system of communal property, and was continued by the United States' effort to preserve the French system through support of land reform in the South that was based on individual property rights.

The author suggests that the strength of the communist resistance movement was based on programs designed to unite the peasantry. Such programs, she argues, attracted peasant support because they resembled collective institutions based on the pre-colonial principle of village-held communal land. Under such a system, peasants' rights to land were adjudicated by village elders and enforced by custom. The Western concept of private property rights, based on ownership of land, was unknown until introduced in the South by the French in the 19th century. This French stress on Western-style property rights—designed to facilitate the amassing of large-scale landholdings—clashed with Vietnamese custom, which tended to protect the rights of family, commune, and the state. Socialism, Wiegersma contends, more closely approximated the principles of landholding established in traditional Vietnamese society and was, therefore, more successful in the North than in the South, where it collided with the French-established institution of individual property rights.

In assessing why peasants in the South chose the communist National Liberation Front (NLF) over the US-supported South Vietnamese government, Wiegersma writes that because Americans understood little of the system they were preserving, they in effect replaced the French in protecting the interests of the South's large landholders. An Agency for International Development survey taken in 1965 provides a classic example of the prevailing US outlook. The survey concluded that peasants had little interest in owning land because they failed to show an interest in land titles. However, the design of the survey, as Wiegersma points out, asked about titles instead of about rights, and thus insured that the conclusions reached would be erroneous. Similarly, the US-directed 1970 land-to-the-tiller law in the South specifically provided cultivators with land and imposed limits on amounts owned by landlords, but continued to stress the importance of preserving individual ownership.

In focusing on the role played by the introduction of individual property rights during the colonial period, Wiegersma presents a novel explanation for peasant support of socialism that scholars will find worthy of further examination. The remainder of her analysis is largely in agreement with others who have attributed the success of the Marxists to the comprehensiveness of their strategy and deliberate use of the traditional idiom to express socialist concepts.[2]

[2]Studies supporting this view include Alexander Woodside, *Community and Revolution in Vietnam*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1976; William Duiker, *Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam*, (Footnote continued on p. 92)

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Wiegersma rejects, however, the premise, advanced by some,[3] that peasant support of socialism was derived from rational decisions based on concerns for economic welfare. She suggests, instead, that economic decisions were not made by individual peasants at all but rather were made by village leaders and family patriarchs who acted in the context of a combination of traditional and modern realities. Peasants were predominantly motivated by a "mixture of old and new political-economic interrelationships and old and new technologies" (p. 15).

Patriarchy, she proposes, continues to influence decision-making and has played a major role in limiting socialist development, particularly in the South. She suggests that the patriarchal system is so firmly entrenched that the reforms initiated by the party following the Sixth National Party Congress in December 1986 were, in part, derived from the party's need to accommodate the patriarchy, a gesture, not surprisingly, similar to those made by Vietnam's emperors long before the French entered the picture.

THE study by Andrew Vickerman of the collectivization effort in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) from 1945 to 1975 is encyclopedic and includes an abundance of quantitative detail. Often bordering on the arcane, it is, nevertheless, a comprehensive agrarian economic history of a seminal period of socialist development. Vickerman attributes the virtual stagnation of agriculture in the years 1960–75 to the Communist party's adoption of policies, derived from Soviet and Chinese models, that were inappropriate to conditions in the DRV.

During this period, the DRV's strategy of economic development was basically Stalinist both in favoring industrial growth over agricultural development and in believing that agricultural production had to be collectivized and brought under state control in order to have an assured and cheap food supply for the workers during the rapid industrialization drive. Vickerman argues that this rationalization was fallacious and that if growth in industrialization was achieved in the USSR, China, or Vietnam, it occurred in spite of the neglect of agriculture, not because of it.

The implementation of collectivization was based on the premise that cooperatives were more productive than private agriculture and that they would insure state control over agricultural production and surplus. Vickerman argues quite conclusively that there was, and still is, no evidence that the productive capability of cooperatives is superior to that of family-owned agriculture, particularly when there is no mechanization—as was, and continues to be, the case in Vietnam. A fundamental limitation that he mentions, and one little questioned by party policy-makers, was the failure of cooperatives to realize their purported economies of scale. Nevertheless, the party chose to support collective cultivation because it concentrated output in the hands of the state and away from the family.

Land reform policies instituted in the DRV represent another illustration of the party's adoption of practices inappropriate to Vietnam's rural conditions. The communist movement gained the cooperation and support of the peasants by promising them land. However, the problems associated with applying a somewhat simplistic class policy to a complex rural structure were demonstrated when the limited amount of land held by "landlords" was found to be insufficient to satisfy the demands of "poor" peasants. To compensate for the scarcity of land and the impossibility of fulfilling its promise, the party inflated official estimates of the number of landlord families per village by adding middle peasants to their ranks and seizing land from them if the size of their holdings was merely above-average.

The discontent that this policy engendered among peasants who lost land under its application led the party to admit in 1956 that it had erred in its implementation of land reform. Vickerman, however, suggests that the difficulties encountered derived not only from errors in implementation, but from the nature of the land reform program itself. He argues that the program achieved an essentially ideological objective —the destruction of the landlord class—at the expense of the traditional family-based peasant economy—and that the temporary land redistribution it accomplished simply compounded the problems traditionally posed by land scarcity.

According to Vickerman, the period of war with the United States exacerbated the North's existing agricultural problems by reinforcing the emphasis that had been placed on heavy industry. The reduction in state influence and control, resulting from the leadership's preoccupation with the war did, however, lead to an increased degree of production autonomy and de facto privatization of some areas of cultivation. Vietnam's leaders during this period, nevertheless, continued to believe that the superiority of cooperatives could be

1900–1941, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1976; and John T. McAlister and Paul Mus, *The Vietnamese and Their Revolution*, New York, Harper and Row, 1970. Each argues that the communists linked themselves to Vietnamese traditions more satisfactorily than did the non-communists. McAlister and Mus suggest that because the communists understood Vietnam and Vietnamese traditions better than their opponents, they were able more effectively to combine Western ideas with traditional ideals.

[3]See, for example, Samuel L. Popkin's *The Rational Peasant*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1979.

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demonstrated by introducing bigger and more carefully managed ones.

Even the landmark 1974 Thai Binh Conference, which displayed a greater awareness of the problems than had been demonstrated previously, repeated the same arguments in favor of the cooperaives that had been used for 15 years. The conference concluded that the policies were right but had been inadequately implemented. The policies themselves, Vickerman explains in a postscript, were not questioned until the Fourth Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party in 1976, the first such gathering to be convened after reunification of the country.

Actual changes in policy did not occur, however, until 1979, when several economic innovations—including the contracting out of land and the assignment of output quotas to individuals and families—were introduced and some liberalization of private trade took place. Although Vickerman's analysis ends here, his critique of this period of agricultural policy is a clear exposition of the basic shortcomings of the ruling ideology, shortcomings that the party finally confronted at the Sixth National Party Congress in December 1986. Under the party's new leader, Nguyen Van Linh, the Sixth Party Congress reaffirmed the initial steps taken in 1979 and manifested a new level of commitment to reform. To stimulate agricultural production, for example, the regime turned over more responsibility for the rice-growing process to individual farmers, and implemented a new land-tenure system that guaranteed farmers a 10-year tenure on the land. Peasants also were permitted to keep as much as 50 percent of their output.

FUELED by the country's economic stagnation, popular disaffection had noticeably eroded party authority by the time the Sixth Congress met. This alerted the leadership to the necessity of initiating reform measures. Although the emphasis initially was on shifting economic policy in order to salvage the economy, expectations remained high among the populace that political reform also would be forthcoming.

However, political reform was impeded by the resistance of party conservatives, who questioned the need for change and feared the party would be displaced if political changes were introduced. Economic reforms were stressed because the economic sphere was judged to be in the greatest need of change, but they were also seen by reformist leaders as more acceptable to the ideological hard-liners remaining on the Political Bureau, who thought that even economic liberalization invited political liberalization and risked a decline in party power from which the party might not recover. As the 1980's unfolded, it became increasingly obvious that the pace of reform was too slow and that unrelieved economic hardships were causing unprecedented disenchantment and disillusionment with the party.

Wiegersma suggests that the socialist revolution in Vietnam was won because, among the political groups competing for peasant support, the communists appeared the best-prepared to satisfy traditional peasant needs. However, as Vickerman more than adequately documents, they failed to live up to their promise. Historically, a Vietnamese ruler was believed by his subjects to govern by the authority of heaven. The peasantry's disenchantment with a regime was often interpreted as a sign of the regime's loss of its heavenly mandate and thus its impending downfall. The traditional Vietnamese peasant had no concept of evolutionary change. A government's abuse would simply be tolerated until the moment when the populace, faced with crisis, determined that the time had come for the emergence of a government with a new mandate from heaven.[4]

An exploration of the extent of opposition to party policies in Vietnam in the 1980's and 1990, however, reveals few cases of outright social unrest. The few known demonstrations of dissent tended to be isolated, stemming from single issues that, in some cases, could be addressed by local communist authorities. Because they were localized rather than national in scale, they did not appear to be particularly alarming to Vietnam's leaders.

The worst unrest in the South since the end of the war, and the first public protests to be officially acknowledged in communist Vietnam, occurred in 1988. The demonstrations, held in district and provincial capitals throughout southern Vietnam, culminated in a Ho Chi Minh City protest that involved 300 farmers carrying banners demanding the ouster of local "mandarins" and the return of confiscated farmland. The protests stemmed from a Central Committee decision of April 1988 to cut back state cooperatives and farms whose size made them impossible to manage and to redistribute the land to peasants. Although generally a popular decision, it touched off numerous instances where former landowners dispossessed from their land in the late 1970's or early 1980's as a result of agrarian reform reclaimed their land from the peasant beneficiaries of the state action.

Student protests at several Hanoi colleges in May 1989 were viewed seriously by the leadership because they coincided with the student demonstrations for democracy in China. The authorities quickly calmed the students by acceding to their demands for larger stipends

[4]McAlister and Mus, op. cit., pp. 116–19.

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and better living conditions.[5]

Other signs of dissent included a call to replace the current constitution, and the activities of an organization called "The Club of Former Resistance Fighters," formed in 1988 and composed of southern communist revolutionaries dissatisfied with the collapse of the Vietnamese economy since the communist victory. The organization published a newspaper entitled *Truyen Thong Khang Chien* (Resistance Tradition) until it was declared illegal, and it allegedly continued to print large numbers of open letters and distribute them in the streets of Ho Chi Minh City once the newspaper ceased publication. One of these letters, which appeared in late 1989, condemned the Communist party for its antidemocratic policies in refusing "to listen to the opinions of party members and the masses . . . ."[6]

Dissent has never approached the scale of a national movement capable of challenging party authority. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese government was shaken by the 1989–90 collapse of orthodox communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the turmoil sweeping the Soviet Union. Vietnam's leaders assured themselves that they were not as dependent upon the Soviet Union as were the governments of Eastern Europe, and that they did not feel compelled to refuse to admit mistakes as did China's leadership. They did, however, seem to perceive that political as well as economic reform was required in order to avoid a national upheaval.

In a March 1990 interview, Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach stated that the party leadership was seeking to avoid the "political errors and arrogance" that caused the East European regimes to collapse and was in the process of debating whether or not to end direct party control of the state apparatus. Vietnam's leaders, he observed, were convinced of the benefits of a market economy and were not about to reverse economic changes already introduced. Perhaps reflecting his own views rather than a party consensus, he claimed that political and economic reform were "two sides of the same coin," and needed to be pursued jointly.[7]

This position tended to be supported by Political Bureau liberals such as Tran Xuan Bach, who publicly implied that Vietnam was not immune to what was happening in Eastern Europe. Tran also reportedly stated that Marxist ideology was "not a bible," and that it would be "irresponsible" for Vietnamese communists to be "indifferent" to the reform process occurring in Eastern Europe. Although statements of this nature made by these two leaders were interpreted by some analysts as a sign that the balance of power within the party was shifting in favor of those who sought accelerated change, Tran was subsequently removed from the Political Bureau at the Eighth Plenum of the party in mid-March 1990 for his apparent advocacy of political pluralism, particularly among the party's young intellectuals.[8]

The Eighth Plenum met with the explicit purpose of discussing the introduction of political reforms. The fear that protests in favor of democracy might erupt and threaten the party's monopoly on power was expected to motivate the plenum to establish a more democratic line. The plenum was preceded by a debate that was described in the Vietnamese press as "the most animated in 15 years." In an unprecedented gesture, the party circulated a draft of the party platform beforehand and invited comment. Individuals and mass organizations throughout the country heatedly criticized cadres for corruption and called for a purge of the party, party renewal, and increased democracy. However, the criticism was not allowed to challenge party rule per se. For example, none of the published statements mentioned the possibility of introducing a multiparty system. Ultimately, the plenum reaffirmed the party's leading role and focused on the question of making the party itself more moral and democratic.[9]

SUCH a decision was shortsighted with respect to the nature of social and political changes evolving in Vietnamese society and blind to the traditional patterns of change in Vietnamese history. As pointed out by Wiegersma and Vickerman, Vietnam's communist rulers are not necessarily immune to the general tendency of predecessor regimes to misinterpret social trends and to misunderstand the Vietnamese

[5]Reported by Alain Boebion for AFP (Hong Kong), June 17, 1989, in *FBIS-EAS*, June 17, 1989, p. 116.

[6]*Que Me* (Paris), Nos. 105 & 106, January 1990, p. 64, translated in Joint Publication Research Service, *Southeast Asia Report* (Washington, DC), JPRS-SEA-90-008, Mar. 8, 1990, p. 17. For a description of the Club of Former Resistance Fighters, see Gareth Porter, "The Politics of 'Renovation' in Vietnam," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1990, p. 84; and Murray Hiebert, "Vietnam Says No To Pluralism," *The Washington Post*, Sept. 15, 1989.

[7]Jim Hoagland, *The Washington Post*, Mar. 15, 1990.

[8]AFP (Hong Kong) in English, Mar. 29, 1990, in *FBIS-EAS*, Mar. 29, 1990, pp. 64–65. For an informative discussion of Tran Xuan Bach's dismissal from the Political Bureau see Jacques Bekaert, "The Downfall of Tran Xuan Bach," *Bangkok Post*, Mar. 31, 1990, reproduced in *FBIS-EAS*, Apr. 3, 1990, pp. 54–55.

[9]For more detailed discussion of the plenum see "AFP Reports Comments on Upcoming Plenum," AFP (Hong Kong) in English, Mar. 10, 1990, in *FBIS-EAS*, Mar. 13, 1990, p. 69. See also Jacques Bekaert, "Eye on Indochina: A Look at Vietnam's 8th Plenum." *Bangkok Post*, Mar. 19, 1990, in *FBIS-EAS*, Mar. 21, 1990, pp. 53–54.

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peasant. Although the communists used their understanding of traditional peasant values and Vietnamese history to bring about Vietnam's revolution, their connection with the people gradually weakened after the war's end.

This gap has become increasingly noticeable, as the regime's ability to respond to world and local events has diminished. Historically, a regime in such a position would have been viewed as being in the process of losing its "mandate from heaven," and rejected. One cannot dismiss the possibility that this historical cycle may be repeated and that the Vietnamese will reject and discard yet another system that does not work for them.

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Contemporary Russian Nationalism

Robert Otto

MIKHAIL AGURSKII. *The Third Rome: National Bolshevism in the USSR.* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1987.

JOHN B. DUNLOP. *The New Russian Nationalism.* New York, Praeger, 1985.

ALEXANDER YANOV. *The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000.* New York, Basil Blackwell, 1987.

IN THE whirlwind unleashed by Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost'* and *perestroyka,* the Russian nationalists have come forward as political actors. The image projected by them in the period from the start of *perestroyka* to the first elections for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, however, is not appealing. *Glasnost'* has allowed the pervasive anti-Semitism of Russian nationalists of all persuasions to come out into the open. Bad enough in and of itself, this anti-Semitism is joined to a profound distaste for the West that frequently expresses itself in condemnations of Western mass culture and often of the entire Western democratic tradition. Anti-Semitism, often masked as anti-Zionism or anti-cosmopolitanism, has also had no little influence in preparing the ground for the ascendancy of National Bolshevik themes among the Russian nationalists as a group.

The books under review form a part of the necessary core reading for an understanding of contemporary Russian nationalism. Mikhail Agurskii's work analyzes early efforts to combine Russian nationalism with elements of Bolshevism in the period from 1917 through 1928. Whatever its weaknesses, Agurskii's is a book that one wishes many contemporary Russian nationalists would read and ponder. John B. Dunlop's *The New Russian Nationalism* continues the story he began in his pioneering *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism,*[1] which analyzes the period from 1968 to 1983. Finally, Alexander Yanov's book represents a consolidation of arguments and themes that have appeared in his writings in both English and Russian since 1969.

AGURSKII'S thesis is that Russian communism as developed by Lenin and Stalin needs to be understood against the background of a Russian-German geopolitical struggle. According to Agurskii, Lenin's writings, for example, should not be taken at face value. Rather, Agurskii argues that they should be read for the meaning Lenin sought to mask and that Russian nationalists read into them. For Agurskii, the real meaning of Lenin's writings becomes clear only when they are seen through the prism of Lenin's quest for power on a world scale, with Russia as his launching point. Agurskii marshals a wealth of evidence for his argument but by concentrating on what he supposes to be the hidden meaning of Lenin's writings he virtually ignores the more obvious interpretation. Nonetheless, Agurskii successfully demonstrates how the winning side in the factional struggles within the Soviet party and government co-opted and exploited Russian nationalist themes during the 1920's.[2]

Agurskii's book possesses a good deal more relevance for the present period than might appear

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[1]John B. Dunlop, *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1983.

[2]For a discussion of National Bolshevism, see ibid., pp. 254–65, and Agurskii, p. xv. Agurskii contends on the same page that "It is not excluded that in some circumstances National Bolshevism might limit itself to the etatist concept of a Russian superpower."

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at first glance. The Soviet regime, or factions within the regime, continued to exploit Russian nationalism well after 1928. This marriage of communism with Russian nationalist themes has left unmistakable traces on contemporary Russian nationalist thought and behavior.

Both Dunlop and Yanov concentrate on the manifestations of Russian nationalism since 1968, although Yanov also discusses Russian nationalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The two are on opposites sides of the fence. Dunlop argues that Russian nationalism needs to be understood in terms of its diverse strands. He acknowledges that many worrisome, repugnant trends persist within the Russian nationalist camp as a whole, particularly anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, Dunlop argues that there are significant differences between those he terms the *vozrozhdentsy,* represented by such people as Igor' Shafarevich, Vasiliy Belov, and Valentin Rasputin, and the current crop of National Bolsheviks, who include such people as Yuriy Bondarev and Petr Proskurin. Dunlop sees the former as primarily concerned with a spiritual rebirth (*vozrozhdeniye*) of Russia, while the National Bolsheviks regard the Soviet state as the current embodiment of the Russian imperial tradition and seek to retain the strong centralized empire.

In 1985, Dunlop believed that because the *vozrozhdentsy* presented a clear alternative to the communist regime, they deserved Western sympathy and understanding. In his view, although the more aggressive National Bolsheviks were in a better position actually to assume power, they would eventually give way to the *vozrozhdentsy*—with whom they share emotional and ideological links, but who have better ideas and are more intellectually sophisticated (p. 92). The *vozrozhdentsy* are the group Dunlop termed "centrists" in 1988, a group whose shortcomings he readily acknowledged, but whose views—particularly their anti-Semitism, he believed—could be moderated by an astute use of Western radio broadcasting.[3]

Dunlop leaves open the question concerning the circumstances under which a National Bolshevik interregnum might come about. However, he was certain that the most likely vehicle for the National Bolsheviks would be the Soviet military.

Yanov argues, in sharp contrast, that Russian nationalism traverses a path that begins benignly but degenerates into fascism. According to Yanov, such an evolution occurred in Russian nationalist thought during the 19th century and has recurred again at a more rapid pace in the period since 1968. He sees contemporary Russian nationalism as a greater threat to the West than the one posed by communism.

To be sure, Yanov is not unaware of the different strands of nationalist thought, but according to his paradigm, Russian nationalism renders its liberal directions hopelessly marginal and politically irrelevant. The logic of Russian nationalism leads to a militant anti-Westernism, as Yanov raises the specter of the emergence of a Russian fascist dictatorship controlling nuclear weapons that is aggressively hostile to Western interests and values.

Yanov's scenario for the emergence of such a dictatorship is tied to his rather schematic, but exceptionally intriguing, view of the overall evolution of Russian history since Ivan the Terrible. Yanov contends that periods of tyranny have been followed by periods of reform and then stagnation. Periods of stagnation (Yanov counts seven of them in Russian history) are fraught with danger because, precisely during this time, the establishment Right prepares a new period of tyranny. In Yanov's view, throughout Russian history, reform coalitions within Russia have proven unable to stabilize themselves and will prove so again in the absence of Western help. In the meantime, Yanov argues, Russian nationalism, given the intellectual exhaustion of Marxism-Leninism, remains the ideology of choice for this upcoming period of tyranny.

Yanov is a historical polemicist as well as an alarmist. He virtually ignores, and appears to have no sympathy for, the religious component of contemporary Russian nationalist thought. At the same time, one should not ignore the fact that his reading of Russian history led him in 1982 to predict, in a fashion, the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev as a reformer—a new "Khrushchev" in his terminology.[4]

Dunlop, for his part, is a prodigious researcher but often appears overly sympathetic to the Russian nationalists. He is right to emphasize the impact on contemporary Russian nationalist thought of the well-nigh catastrophic social dislocations and demographic losses suffered by the Russian people. Yet, this leads him to some strange assertions regarding what he terms the "historical context" (p. 42) for the resentment of Jews by Russian nationalists. The fact that Jewish communists were involved in the persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church decidedly is not a "historical context" for Russian resent-

[3]John B. Dunlop, "The Contemporary Russian Nationalist Spectrum," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), Dec. 19, 1988, pp. 9–10.

[4]Alexander Yanov, "Toward a Method to Madness: The USSR in the 1980's," in Richard Melanson, Ed., *Neither Cold War nor Detente?* Charlottesville, VA, University Press of Virginia, 1982, p. 66.

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ment of Jews. Rather, it is the historical context for Russians to resent communists. As Dunlop himself acknowledges, the motivations of Jews who persecuted Russian Orthodoxy were not religious or ethnic. Moreover, Jewish communists were usually quite hostile to Judaism as well. Sufficient information is available to Russian nationalists to make this distinction, should they so desire.

THE evidence emerging as a result of *glasnost'* suggests that the Russian nationalists—the National Bolsheviks as well as those belonging to the "centrist" camp—do not make such distinctions. In 1986, one of the "centrists," the writer Viktor Astaf'yev, provided a stunning illustration of the role anti-Semitism plays in Russian nationalist thought. In his response to the late Natan Eydel'man's allegations of Great Russian chauvinism in his work, Astaf'yev declared, "Any national renaissance, especially the Russian, should have its opponents and enemies." Although Eydel'man's letter demonstrated his thorough acquaintance with the Russian literary tradition, Astaf'yev accused Eydel'man of having written a letter "filled not simply with evil, but boiling over with the pus of Jewish, hyper-intellectual haughtiness."[5]

Or take the case of another "centrist," the writer Vasiliy Belov. In 1986, he published the novel *Vse vperedi* (Everything Lies Ahead) in *Nash Sovremennik*. In the following year, Sovetskiy Pisatel' published the work in book form. The frontispiece to this edition features a short statement citing Belov's chief worry as a writer and a citizen: "everything that concerns the contemporary family! The destruction of the family, which is happening, can cost our state dearly. This is already being felt in the moral, economic, and demographic dimensions."[6]

The plot of *Vse vperedi* concerns this destruction of the family and, in Belov's view, it is the consequence of a satanic conspiracy against Russia, which finds its agents in Jews and Western consumer goods. On a trip to Paris, the "heroine" Lyuba Medvedev is seduced by one of her traveling companions as the result of a bet. The bet is for a bottle of Scotch—not the traditional Russian drink—and Belov chose the brand name *White Horse*, no doubt for its symbolic echo of the Trojan Horse. Lyuba succumbs to the seduction after viewing her first pornographic film. The seduction leads her to divorce her rather ineffectual Russian husband and to a certain emotional estrangement from her children. The winner of the bet is the energetic Jew, Misha Brish.

The novel received an extremely favorable review in *Molodaya Gvardiya*,[7] but it was panned elsewhere in the central press. In a novel ostensibly about the problems of the contemporary family, a topic worthy of serious artistic treatment, Belov does little more than present Russians as the victims of conspiracy.

Just as Belov sees Jews behind the destruction of the contemporary family, he finds them when he confronts one of the most painful episodes of Soviet history, the destruction of the peasantry during the collectivization campaign. As far as Belov is concerned: "The chief Trotskyist was Stalin, although some specialists *pretend* that Stalin was anti-Trotskyist" (emphasis added).[8] It is, of course, no accident that Trotsky was a Jew, but in Belov's view presumably it is irrelevant that Stalin had Trotsky murdered.

Both Belov and Astaf'yev in these instances demonstrate a pronounced tendency to seek enemies, if not invent them, rather than to confront issues. Seeking enemies has been a standard feature in Russian nationalist behavior in the Gorbachev era.

Belov's attitude also raises severe questions concerning the effect of foreign radio broadcasting on the Russian nationalists. In October 1988, for example, at a session of the Secretariat of the RFSFR Writers' Union, Valentin Rasputin delivered a speech in which he deplored some of the consequences of cultural pluralism in an effort to discredit pluralism as such.[9] This and other speeches delivered at the meeting prompted an editorial in the journal *Kommunist* that sought to defend pluralism.[10] Belov dismissed the editorial out of hand because he claimed it echoed the negative view of Rasputin's speech already broadcast on Radio Liberty.[11] Stanislav Kunyayev, appointed the chief editor of *Nash Sovremennik* in 1989, has claimed that one can no longer tell whether Radio Liberty is a branch of *Ogonek* or vice versa.[12] Kunyayev has gained a certain notoriety, it needs to be added, for his insistence that the prophecies contained in *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* are actually being realized.[13]

INDEED, as the rhetoric of *perestroyka* has taken on a more Western sound with increased talk of plu-

[5]*Strana i Mir* (Munich), December 1986, pp. 56–57.

[6]Vasiliy Belov, *Vse vperedi* (Everything Lies Ahead), Moscow, Sovetskiy Pisatel', 1987.

[7]Vyacheslav Gorbachev, "Everything Lies Ahead?" *Molodaya Gvardiya* (Moscow), March 1987, pp. 250–78.

[8]*Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 15, 1988.

[9]*Literaturnaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Oct. 28, 1988.

[10]"Old Myths, New Fears," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 17, 1988.

[11]*Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Dec. 30, 1988.

[12]*Nasha Strana* (Buenos Aires), Mar. 17, 1990.

[13]Stanislav Kunyayev, "A Double-Edged Sword," *Nash Sovremennik* (Moscow), June 1989, pp. 160–61. He repeated this argument in his appearance at the Kennan Institute (Washington, DC) in the spring of 1990.

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ralism, democracy, law, and markets, the nationalists have taken greater and greater offense. This is clearly demonstrated in the writing of Mikhail Antonov, a man regarded by Western specialists as the economic spokesman of the Russian nationalists.[14]

Antonov is not an economist by training and has been variously identified as a sociologist and an architect. He contributed to *Veche,* a Russian nationalist samizdat journal of the mid-1970's, and his efforts then at developing what Dunlop has termed an "anti-Marxist Leninism" resulted in his incarceration in a mental hospital.[15] Since the advent of *glasnost',* Antonov has written a series of articles in *Molodaya Gvardiya, Nash Sovremennik,* and *Moskva* (on whose editorial board he sits). In a sense, he is still attempting to produce an "anti-Marxist Leninism," although he claims he is reinvigorating Marxism-Leninism by incorporating the spiritual values and heritage of Russian economic and social thought.

His view of this spiritual heritage involves exploring the understanding of wealth elaborated over the ages beginning with Vladimir Monomakh, a ruler of ancient Kiev.[16] Other thinkers he relies on include the 18th-century economic thinker Ivan Pososhkov, Fedor Dostoevsky, Sergey Bulgakov, Rasputin, and Belov. The understanding of wealth that he elaborates is diametrically opposed to the one found in 19th-century English political economy that served as the basis for Marx's writings. Antonov relishes the opposition. He claims that by incorporating the so-called Russian view of wealth into Marxism-Leninism, this ideology will be transformed into "a universal theory for the salvation and rebirth of mankind."[17]

Antonov cites a passage from the memoirs of the 19th-century revolutionary Aleksandr Herzen to buttress his contention that Russians have developed an understanding of wealth that is superior to that of Western economic theorists. In this passage, Herzen related that on his way into exile, he was quartered in the house of a peasant. In the morning, when Herzen asked how much he needed to pay for his lodging, the peasant requested five kopecks. Herzen had only a 20-kopeck piece, which he offered to the peasant. The peasant replied that taking 20 kopecks would be a sin, and he therefore refused to accept the money. Antonov suggests that moral norms inhibited the development of commodity market relations among the Russians. The influence of these moral norms is evidence, not of backwardness, but of a "higher way of life."[18]

The practical path to this higher way of life for Antonov comes from Lenin. Antonov argues that Lenin's understanding of socialism as a "social system of civilized cooperators with social ownership of the means of production combined with the class victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie" ought to form the basis of present Soviet economic policy.

Antonov sees the threat to this higher way of life primarily in the policies advocated by Tat'yana Zaslavskaya, Abel Aganbegyan, Nikolay Shmelev, and Leonid Abalkin. His most strident publication to date—"There Is a Way Out: How and When *Perestroyka* Will End"—was occasioned by Abalkin's favorable comments about capitalism published in *Ogonek.*[19]

In this article, Antonov contends that the current direction of *perestroyka* will transform the Soviet Union into an economic appendage of transnational corporations, or, in other words, a mere "raw materials supplier to the West." Predatory transnational corporations will agree only to those deals advantageous to themselves and will "extract the juice from the body of Russia."

In an article preceding "There Is a Way Out," Antonov had claimed that joint ventures and free economic zones are "insulting to me as a Russian person and as a Soviet citizen."[20] In "There Is A Way Out," he argues that joint ventures and free economic zones represent a triumph for the combined influence of international finance capital and the "comprador element" within Soviet society. The origins of this "comprador element" are to be found, according to Antonov, in that part of the bureaucracy imbued with a "cosmopolitan spirit" and typified by people such as Trotsky.

The economic strength of the

[14]On Antonov, see Darrell Hammer, "Glasnost' and 'The Russian Idea'," *Report on the USSR,* Dec. 19, 1988, pp. 20–21; and Geoffrey Hosking, *The Awakening of the Soviet Union,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1990, pp. 109–10. For a different view of Antonov's ideas, see Nicolai Petro, "Rediscovering Russia," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Winter 1990, pp. 36, 47.

[15]Dunlop, *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism,* p. 42.

[16]This discussion draws on the following articles by Antonov: "The Harmony of Progress," *Nash Sovremennik,* January 1986, pp. 130–42; "Acceleration: Possibilities and Obstacles," ibid., July 1986, pp. 3–20; "Restructuring and Ideology," *Moskva* (Moscow), September 1987, pp. 153–170; "To Go One's Own Way," *Molodaya Gvardiya,* January 1988, pp. 195–200; "At the Turning Point," *Moskva,* March 1988, pp. 3–26; "Time to Set One's House in Order," ibid., March 1989, pp. 146–67; and "There is a Way Out," *Nash Sovremennik,* August 1989, pp. 71–110, and September 1989, pp. 139–58.

[17]Antonov, "Time to Set One's House in Order," p. 163.

[18]Ibid., pp. 160–61.

[19]Antonov, "There Is a Way Out," pp. 71–72. The title of this article probably is meant as a refutation of the title of a collection of essays by the supporters of *perestroyka* entitled *Inogo ne dano* (There is No Other Way).

[20]Antonov, "To Go One's Own Way," p. 197.

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"new compradors" is quite apparent, Antonov claims, but the solidification of their political position is only now coming into view. This new comprador element, whose ideologists are Shmelev and Zaslavskaya, has it in mind to sell out the motherland—*rodina* is Antonov's favored term. This same element also seeks to raise prices and import more Western goods, and would permit unemployment.

Antonov is not an apologist for the state of affairs that brought forth the need for *perestroyka*. He views the command-administrative system as a dead end. He derisively terms as "cavaliers" those who want to "turn the screw" by strengthening the planning principle and who refuse to unfetter the initiative of the people. On the other hand, he reserves greater disdain for the "merchants"—those who would rely on market mechanisms and the unlimited expansion of commodity market relations. Nonetheless, he cautions his readers that the real struggle is not between the "merchants" and the "cavaliers"—both camps possess a comprador element—but between those who would sell out the motherland, and hence socialism, and those who would preserve its independence and integrity.

In a similar vein, Antonov argues that any attempt to merge the Soviet Union into the world economy will deprive the motherland of any chance for independent development. Unless it is able to develop independently, the motherland will not create a "just and humane society" and will never become an example for "the entire planet" and "the world's spiritual leader."

In Antonov's view, all current inter-ethnic disputes are at root disputes over material wealth. He claims that all peoples of the Union are equally insulted by the apparent need to rely on Western experience and they will all band together when they understand the danger confronting them. In the meantime, popular fronts and independence movements both undermine socialism and represent illegitimate, dangerous threats to the integrity of the Soviet Union.

Antonov states in "There Is A Way Out" that the intention to cut military spending threatens the technological, economic, political, military, and spiritual independence of the motherland. He believes that if the economy is strengthened there will be no need to cut defense spending. One need only look at a map, he claims, to see the threat of invasion from states with large populations. In any event, NATO strategists, desiring to increase NATO's military power, might attempt to push *perestroyka* into channels advantageous to the West. This can be seen, he claims, in current trends in the conclusion of joint ventures, the Western partners to which are seeking to undermine the Soviet Union's military might by sapping its resources.

Antonov's hostility to certain business dealings with the West leads him to make some rather strange assertions. A proposed 99-year lease of the Blue Gulf in the Crimea to Great Britain represents an attempt by the British to obtain what they failed to get by conquest during the Crimean War, ignoring both the fact that the British won the war and the conquest of the Crimea was not a war aim. Antonov also argues that the United States was to blame for the Chernobyl' disaster. American physicists consciously utilized the agreement on cooperation in exploring the peaceful applications of atomic energy to persuade Soviet physicists to build reactors based on faulty technology.

Antonov warns that the people, despite the tricks of such respected theorists as Zaslavskaya, Shmelev, and Abalkin, are beginning to become aware of who is who. He claims that, just as at other crisis moments in Russian history, "morally pure people" will arise to save the country, citing as an example Kuz'ma Minin, who rose from obscurity to cleanse Russia of foreign invaders during the Time of Troubles in the early 17th century.

IN THE literary-political manueverings that have characterized so much of the Russian nationalists' recent thought and action, Antonov has allied himself with Igor' Shafarevich. Prior to *glasnost'*, Shafarevich gained some renown as one of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's collaborators in the essay collection *From Under The Rubble*. His collaboration with Antonov, however, provides a clear demonstration of the political consensus that has emerged among the Russian nationalists and of the ideological links pulling the "centrists" further to the right. It is, for example, doubtful that Shafarevich shares Antonov's passion for reinvigorating Marxism-Leninism. Yet, he does share with Antonov a passionate obsession with Russophobia.

At one level, Russophobia is easily defined. It is the deep, consuming hatred of Russia, its history, and its people. According to the nationalists, Richard Pipes and Nikolay Bukharin, for example, are both Russophobes. On another level, Russophobia is more amorphous and means whatever the Russian nationalists say it means. Thus, Lithuania's attempt to secede from the Union is mentioned as an instance of Russophobia. Russophobia is also the title of an essay that establishes Shafarevich's more recent claim to fame.[21] In this essay, Sha-

[21]Igor' Shafarevich, "Russophobia," *Nash Sovremennik*, June 1989, pp. 167–92, and November 1989, pp. 162–72.

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farevich delineates the demise of "Big Nations" at the hands of a "Little Nation," which he identifies as the Jews. Shafarevich has traveled a long way from the nobility of vision he expressed in *From Under The Rubble*.

The incident of Russophobia that prompted Antonov's collaboration with Shafarevich occurred in what might be termed the "*Oktyabr'* affair." In 1989, the editor of *Oktyabr'*, Anatoliy Anan'yev, published excerpts from Andrey Sinyavskiy's *Progulki s Pushkinym* (Strolls with Pushkin) and Vasiliy Grossman's *Vse techet* (Forever Flowing). In addition, the journal announced its intention to publish an article by Yanov. In response, Antonov and Shafarevich wrote a letter to the Secretariat of the RSFSR Writers' Union demanding that it reevaluate Anan'yev's stewardship of the journal. The letter appeared in the newspaper *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, which had earlier undergone a change of editors.[22] (The previous editor, Mikhail Kolosov, prompted the calls for his dismissal when he had reprinted the *Kommunist* editorial defending pluralism mentioned above. He was replaced by Ernst Safonov.)

This attempt to remove Anan'yev met with apparent success in November 1989, when the Secretariat dismissed him. As of this writing, however, Anan'yev has refused to leave his post. In defending himself, Anan'yev has claimed, quite sensibly, that Russian readers have the right to read authors such as Sinyavskiy and Grossman and make up their own minds. Indeed, the behavior of Antonov and Shafarevich, both of whom were repressed under Leonid Brezhnev, brings to mind an episode recalled by Sinyavskiy 11 years ago. During his time in the camps, Sinyavskiy remembered, he was astounded by arguments among camp inmates over which books they would ban if they came to power.[23]

Shafarevich discusses the Western liberal tradition and its applicability to Russia in his "Two Paths to the Same Precipice."[24] In this intriguing if somewhat confused piece, Shafarevich considers with some eloquence the consequences of modernity and its tendency to reduce individuals to easily manipulable automatons interested only in material consumption. He laments the passing of the "cosmos-centered," sensibly bounded and defined world of the peasantry. Yet, at the same time, Shafarevich confuses the failure of some Western liberals to denounce Stalin's collectivization with the Western belief in progress. This confusion leads him to assert that the same spirit and ideals underpin both the Stalinist command system and Western liberalism, that their apparent antagonism is merely a reflection of the different methods used by each system to attain the same ends.

In order to make this argument, of course, Shafarevich either ignores large parts of the Western liberal tradition or claims that the principle of respect for individual rights is meant only to apply to the citizens of Western countries and therefore has no value for other nations. Consequently, the entire Western legal tradition appears to have no relevance for Shafarevich's vision of Russia's future.

SINCE the end of 1989, the Russian nationalists have begun to organize politically in reaction against the emergence of political organizations founded by the liberal reformers. These Russian nationalist organizations also represent an attempt to lay the groundwork for the promotion of what the Russian nationalists define as the interests of the Russian republic and the Russian people in an increasingly pluralistic political system.

At the plenum of the Secretariat where Anan'yev's dismissal as editor of *Oktyabr'* was "confirmed," the RSFSR Writers' Union endorsed a split in the Leningrad Writers' Union. The *Aprel'* Committee of the Leningrad Writers' Union was created in the spring of 1989 to fight for the reform both of the RSFSR Writers' Union and of society in general. The committee, in September 1989, had given its tacit support to independence for the Baltic republics, arguing that "those who are for Russia must be for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania."[25] The *Aprel'* Committee also sent a letter to the Secretariat of the RSFSR Writers' Union in which it defended Anan'yev, deplored the firing of Mikhail Kolosov, questioned the wisdom of placing Kunyayev at the helm of *Nash Sovremennik*, and condemned the anti-Semitism found in *Nash Sovremennik*, *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, and *Kuban'*. The letter was signed by 125 people, including Anatoliy Strelyanyy and Alla Latynina, and accused the leaders of the RSFSR Writers' Union of "allying themselves with the most reactionary organizations, even *Pamyat'*."[26]

Part of the nationalists' response was to back 25 members of the Leningrad organization in creating the so-called *Sodruzhestvo* (Harmony) Association. Both Rasputin and Belov figured prominently in this effort. At the plenum of the Secretariat of

[22] *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Aug. 31, 1989.

[23] Andrey Sinyavskiy, "Solzhenitsyn and Russian Nationalism," *The New York Review of Books*, Nov. 22, 1979, p. 5.

[24] *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), July 1989, pp. 147–65.

[25] *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Sept. 22, 1989.

[26] Ibid., Dec. 1, 1989.

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the Writers' Union, after the leader of *Sodruzhestvo,* Sergey Voronin, pointed to the vast number of Jews in the Leningrad organization, Rasputin said, to stormy applause in some accounts, that "one actually cannot leave to the slaughter that national minority [meaning Russians] which remains in Leningrad."[27] In addition, the RSFSR Writers' Union condemned the *Aprel'* statement as full of "suppressed hostility against Russia" and accused its members of sowing discord among peoples and ethnic groups.

In March 1990, *Literaturnaya Rossiya* printed a similar attack on the *Aprel'* Committee by the Secretariat of the RSFSR Writers' Union. This attack was prompted by the *Aprel'* Committee's platform, which advocated, among other planks, human rights, freedom of conscience, free expression, political pluralism, and the rule of law. In the judgment of the Secretariat, *Aprel'* was sowing inter-ethnic discord and represented a destructive force similar to those of the Communist party's "Democratic Platform," the Interregional Group of Deputies in the Supreme Soviet, and the representatives of "Democratic Russia."[28]

In an effort to combat these political groupings, the nationalists formed the "Rossiya" Deputies Club in October 1989. The club's declaration was published in the December 1989 *Nash Sovremennik*. The sponsoring council of the deputies club includes both the "National Bolshevik" Yuriy Bondarev and the "centrist" Vasiliy Belov.

The declaration maintained that four factors necessitated the formation of the club. First, the Russian delegation in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies was fragmented. Second, the current neglect of the political interests of the Russian republic and of Russians in other republics is fraught with danger for the whole country. This part of the declaration condemns both the "hotheads" in the ranks of the separatists and those party officials who, after having repudiated their "internationalism," indulge in separatism themselves. Third, the RSFSR as a republic and the Russians as a nation have been deprived of political representation. Finally, the Interregional Group of Deputies spends too much of its effort on general political matters and not enough time on Russia and the Russians.

The declaration proceeds to enumerate several problems the group will seek to redress. This part provides a stunning demonstration of the contradictions in the Russian people's "imperial mentality" that have been explored by Roman Szporluk in this journal and elsewhere.[29] The document welcomes the unification of all "healthy forces" and the deepening of national awareness on the part of the non-Russians. It cautions, however, that as long as the Russian people find themselves in such a calamitous situation, no plans for the improvement of the lot of other Soviet peoples can be realized. The document also laments the "pumping of resources from Russia into a number of republics," as well as the possibility that Russians living in the union-republics might have to learn the language of the titular nationality. Current separatist trends, moreover, stand in "howling contradiction" to world experience. Self-determination, understood mechanistically, leads toward "medieval isolation," which is contrary to the long-term political and economic interests of all peoples of the USSR and will lead to a series of new Nagorno-Karabakhs.[30]

The declaration expresses serious disquiet with "attempts to discredit the army" and the decline in the level of state patriotism. As an antidote, the young people of all republics should be raised on the

idea of the greatness of the common Soviet fatherland, the indestructibility of its borders and the monolithic integrity of the state. State power [derzhava] *as an idea, state power as consciousness, state power as a military structure—it is on this that youth needs to be raised.*

The coalition of national groups that produced the pre-election platform of the bloc of 12 patriotic movements for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet elections intends to preserve the Union.[31] This platform is far more apocalyptic than the declaration of the deputies club. The platform, moreover, reflects the think-

[27]The various accounts of this meeting are worthy of a small essay in themselves. "Stormy applause" is attributed to the remark in *Ogonek* (Moscow), Nov. 27–Dec.1, 1989, p. 7.

[28]*Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Mar. 9, 1990.

[29]Roman Szporluk, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1989, pp. 15–35; and "Roman Szporluk and Valerii Tishkov Talk about the National Question," *Report on the USSR*, June 1, 1990, pp. 19–24.

[30]One Russian nationalist who is willing to contemplate the dissolution of the Union does so with obvious disdain for the hopes and aspirations of other nationalities. According to Eduard Volodin, the desire for independence among other nationalities is a form of Russophobia. The leaders of these independent movements, he claims, manipulate an "abstraction" he terms "the center." This abstraction, however, becomes very real for Volodin when applied to Russia, as he accuses it of a "strange creation of myths which is more like a game of give-away at the expense of the national dignity of Russia and the Russians." Volodin refuses to grant legitimacy to feelings shared by both Russians and non-Russians. Only Russians, it seems, have been victimized within the Union. See Eduard Volodin, "The New Russia in a Changing World," *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Jan. 26, 1990.

[31]Ibid., Dec. 29, 1989.

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ing of extremist elements of the RSFSR Writers' Union. Nonetheless, an instructor of the Central Committee's Socio-Economic Department, Dmitriy Barabashov, participated in the group that drafted the platform.[32] The platform seeks to retain the Soviet Union in its current form, but also to increase the power of the Russian republic within the Union. The document stridently denounces the liberal reformers and accuses them, in language similar to Antonov's, of selling out the country.

The platform is intended to place the reformers on the defensive. It accuses the Communist party of appeasing separatists and radicals and of failing to consolidate society to preserve the state in its present form. By the same token it seeks to preserve the status of the Russians within the state while lamenting the economic condition of the RSFSR. More ominous, the document's defense of the army and other public security agencies, as Paul Goble has noted, stands a good chance of being interpreted within the Soviet Union as a call for revolutionary action by these groups.[33]

The sense of frustration that pervades this platform reflects the Russian nationalists' inability or unwillingness to reflect carefully on the origins of the present crisis. This is particularly true of the "centrists" who, before the advent of *glasnost'*, devoted the bulk of their energy toward promoting the rebirth of spiritual values. These people still express a verbal allegiance to this rebirth, but their behavior and writing exhibit nothing so much as meanness, narrow-mindedness, and a desire to settle old scores.

It is almost certain that the prejudices of the nationalists will overwhelm good judgment. For example, Anatoliy Rybakov's *Children Of The Arbat* provoked quite a controversy among the nationalists. In 1988, *Nash Sovremennik* published three articles that took the novel to task. The most thought-provoking of these was Vadim Kozhinov's "Truth and the Truth" (*Pravda i Istina*).[34] Kozhinov decries Rybakov's tendency to portray the Stalin era as a result merely of intrigue, claiming that this depiction represents a refusal to come to grips with Stalinism. With historical truth on his side, Kozhinov wants to know why the plot of Rybakov's novel about Stalinist terror begins in 1934 when so many people had been subjected to terror before that year. Kozhinov claims Rybakov cares only for the fate of communist intellectuals, not for the vast majority of the people. Nonetheless, he uses Mikhail Lobanov's notion of "enlightened philistinism" to explain Rybakov's motivations. This term is taken from the title of Lobanov's 1968 article in *Molodaya Gvardiya,* in which his "enlightened philistines" turn out to be deracinated individuals —mostly, but not exclusively, of Jewish origin—who have conspired to wreak havoc on Russia and Russian tradition since 1917.[35] By referring to Lobanov, Kozhinov repeats the very mistake he attributes to Rybakov; that is, he uses conspiracy as a simplistic explanation for a very complex historical phenomenon.

This same suspicion of intrigue and, more particularly, the perception of Russians as innocent victims of intrigue, underlie the pre-election platform of the bloc of patriotic movements and are mixed with a sense of impending disaster at the prospect of the loss of the empire. What is just beneath the surface in this platform, however, is made all too explicit in the "Letter of the Writers of Russia," a document that can be termed the "philosophical" underpinning of the platform.

The "Letter" is a diatribe that virtually equates *glasnost'* with a Zionist plot.[36] All the Russian nationalists mentioned in this essay have signed the letter in one or another of its versions. The letter alleges that the campaign of Russophobia, with its alarm over the emergence of Russian fascism, has been fomented in an effort to beat down the Russians psychologically, annul the foreign policy consequences of World War II, destroy the Soviet army, provide the "moral background" for the reunification of Germany, and prepare the country for a ruinous political fate. The letter maintains that under the banner of "democratization" and the building of a "law-governed state"—the letter places both terms in quotation marks—the forces of social destabilization have been unleashed and the proponents of racism have taken over the central media.

The central media, according to the letter, have also engaged in the thoroughgoing rehabilitation and blind idealization of Zionist ideology. With its twisted logic, the letter holds Zionism responsible for Auschwitz and Dachau while, at the same time, it claims that alarm over the emergence of Russian fascism confuses Russia with Hitler's Germany or, in other words, the aggressor with the aggressor's victims. At the Kennan Institute this past spring, the letter was described by one of its signatories, Ernst Sa-

[32]On Barabashov, see *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Jan. 19, 1990.

[33]Paul Goble, "Platform of the Russian Patriotic Bloc," *Report on the USSR*, Jan. 12, 1990, p. 12.

[34]*Nash Sovremennik*, April 1989, pp. 160–74. For a different view of this article, see Dmitry Pospielovsky, "Russian Nationalism, an Update," *Report on the USSR*, Feb. 9, 1990, pp. 12–13.

[35]*Molodaya Gvardiya*, April 1968, pp. 296–306.

[36]*Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Mar. 2, 1990.

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fonov, as an appeal to healthy forces in society.

The letter originally appeared in Safonov's *Literaturnaya Rossiya* and was republished in the April 1990 issue of *Nash Sovremennik,* the April 1990 issue of *Moskva,* and the May 1990 issue of *Molodaya Gvardiya.* These newer versions add material to the original. However, there is one significant omission in the version appearing in *Nash Sovremennik.* The original letter treats *Pamyat'* with a certain disdain because its leaders are seen to be self-appointed and its activities are said to serve as a cover for the growth of Zionism. The original reads:

Shouting hysterically about the odious figures from Pamyat' *and the threat they represent to mankind, to all peoples of the USSR, the central press doggedly shades or shamelessly embroiders . . . .*

The republished version removes the words "the odious figures from" and places in parentheses after the word *Pamyat'* "and in essence—from any patriotic organization."[37] Although a public controversy over these changes has yet to surface, the equation of *Pamyat'* with any other patriotic organization certainly accords with Kunyayev's assertion that *Pamyat'* may yet prove useful.[38]

Under what circumstances *Pamyat'* may yet prove useful may well become an urgent question. The candidates who ran on the platform of the patriotic forces suffered a crushing defeat in the March 1990 elections to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. The Russian population, it appears, wants nothing to do with the vision of the future presented in the platform. Predictably, the losers cried fraud at the polls.[39] Yet, the nationalists are not democrats, and inasmuch as the crises in Soviet society have not been solved, circumstances may yet emerge in which the nationalists' might gain widespread appeal. Conservative forces within the party, army, and KGB might exploit their particular brand of resentments.

In the meantime, the nationalist wooing of the disaffected elements in the Soviet army continues apace. For example, during 1989, the *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* published a series of articles by Karem Rash entitled "The Army and Culture," in which the author glorifies the role played by the Soviet army in defending the Union and treats the institution as the embodiment of the empire.[40] Rash devotes many lines to the late Marshal Georgiy Zhukov, whose symbolic function for Rash is the same as that of Kuz'ma Minin for Antonov. Presumably, in part as a reward for this series of articles, Rash was recently appointed a member of the editorial board of the journal and, soon thereafter, the open-minded Dmitriy Volkogonov was dropped. Rash's article is reprinted in abbreviated, one is tempted to say concentrated, form in the May 1990 issue of Kunyayev's *Nash Sovremennik.* Along similar lines, Aleksandr Prokhanov, whose "United Council of Russia" supported the election platform of the patriotic bloc, has claimed at the most recent plenum of the RSFSR Writers' Union that the patriotic bloc actually represents an embryonic political party, one of whose aims is the building of a powerful army capable of preserving the integrity of the Russian empire. Within the confines of this embryonic party he includes Nina Andreyeva's "Unity."[41]

THE ascendancy of National Bolshevik themes among the Russian nationalists would, of course, prove disastrous to them as individuals and to Russia as a nation, should this ideology prevail over the country at large. As many democratic Russians are coming to realize, the empire has been detrimental to the interests of the Russians in the past and will continue to be so in the future.[42] After all, the consequences of empire explain in part why so many non-Russians were among the original Bolsheviks. The emphasis on martial values in National Bolshevism bodes ill even for a Russia shorn of its "Soviet domain." The current crop of nationalists should recall the fate of the original National Bolsheviks, who believed that, under the banner of Bolshevism, the empire could be retained. They were, of course, correct, but the empire that was retained proved inimical to them and their beliefs.

At the first plenum of the RSFSR Writers' Union after the Nina Andreyeva affair, Vladimir Bondarenko made a fair and reasonable point in observing that Andreyeva's article was no less a part

[37]*Nash Sovremennik,* April 1990, p. 139.

[38]*La Repubblica* (Rome), Jan. 27, 1990, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Feb. 1, 1989, p. 67.

[39]Julia Wishnevsky, "Patriots Urge Annulment of RSFSR Elections," *Report of the USSR,* Apr. 6, 1990, pp. 18–21.

[40]*Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* (Moscow), February 1989, pp. 3–15; March 1989, pp. 3–10; April 1989, pp. 3–13; May 1989, pp. 3–11; July 1989, pp. 3–13; August 1989, pp. 3–13; and September 1989, pp. 3–14.

[41]*Literaturnaya Rossiya,* Mar. 23, 1990. For an example of Prokhanov's writings, see "Notes of a Conservative," *Nash Sovremennik,* May 1990, pp. 85–98. This article contains his "The Tragedy of Centralism," published earlier in the year in *Literaturnaya Rossiya.* Andreyeva's "Unity" was formed in May 1989 with the slogan "Socialism or Death".

[42]Vera Tolz, "Democrats Start Their Own Discussion of Russian National Problems," *Report on the USSR,* Mar. 30, 1990, pp. 1–3.

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of *perestroyka* than the *Pravda* editorial that attacked it.[43] The Russian nationalists are not willing to extend this same tolerant attitude to their reform-minded opponents, for whom they—like conservative members of the party apparatus—display nothing but contempt, as is demonstrated by their use of the derisive term "foremen of *perestroyka*." Indeed, the Russian nationalists seem to fear Vitaliy Korotich and *Ogonek* much more than they fear Nina Andreyeva and her ilk. Bondarenko, at least, has recently come to rue the nationalists' tacit alliance with the party apparatus.[44]

In the immediate aftermath of the the elections to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev appointed Rasputin to the new Presidential Council. Dunlop viewed this development as "ironic" and surmised that Gorbachev's motivation entails "playing the Russian nationalist card."[45] This action on Gorbachev's part might also cause Yanov to rethink his rather benign view of the Soviet president.[46] Nonetheless, as Agurskii has demonstrated, "playing the Russian nationalist card" has been a traditional tactic of the Communist party elite. A far harder question to ponder is not the irony of Gorbachev's selection but why the "centrist" Rasputin chose to accept.

[43]*Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Oct. 28, 1988. For a sampling of Bondarenko's views, see "There is No Going Back," *Molodaya Gvardiya*, May 1989, pp. 218–41.

[44]*Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Mar. 23, 1990.

[45]John B. Dunlop, "Moscow Voters Reject Conservative Coalition," *Report on the USSR*, Apr. 20, 1990, p. 17.

[46]Alexander Yanov, "Perestroika and Its American Critics," *Slavic Review* (Austin, TX), Winter 1988, pp. 716–25.

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The Destruction of East-Central Europe, 1939–41

Robert Blobaum

ERWIN OBERLÄNDER, Ed. *Hitler-Stalin Pakt 1939: Das Ende Ostmitteleuropas?* (The Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939: The End of East-Central Europe?). Frankfurt am Main, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989.

JAN T. GROSS. *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1988.

KAROL LISZEWSKI. *Wojna polsko-sowiecka 1939 r.* (The Polish-Soviet War of 1939), 2nd ed. London, Polska Fundacja Kulturna, 1988.

Zbrodnia katyńska w świetle dokumentów (The Katyn Crime in Light of the Documents), 13th ed. London, Gryf, 1989.

ANTHONY READ and DAVID FISHER. *Hitler, Stalin, and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939–1941.* New York and London, W. W. Norton and Company, 1988.

HISTORY, it seemed, had come full circle in the autumn of 1989. The recent resurfacing of East-Central Europe on the world's political map coincided with the anniversary of a treaty between two totalitarian regimes whose collaboration had brought about the region's devastation 50 years earlier. The Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 23, 1939, with its secret protocols and division of East-Central Europe into spheres of influence and occupation, may have been binding on its cynical signatories for less than two years, but its victims would be counted in terms of generations.

The central question posed by Erwin Oberländer in the title of his edited volume of essays devoted to the Nazi-Soviet Pact has been answered by the revolutions of 1989. The Pact was not the last word on East-Central Europe. Indeed, in a region that was subsequently dominated by the Soviet Union, for decades the Pact was not a word at all, but instead one of the largest "blank spots" of an officially-administered and interpreted history. The postwar Soviet leadership, not surprisingly, refused to permit an open discussion of the Pact or its direct and indirect consequences. Yet, even this most gaping of memory holes, though covered with denials, disinformation, and dialectical materialism, could not hide the full and active Soviet participation in criminal conspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity from 1939 to 1941.[1]

Since Mikhail Gorbachev's public pronouncement of February 1987 encouraging frankness and new thinking about Soviet history,[2] much in the way of historical reclamation has been accomplished.[3] Yet, Soviet historians, and Gorba-

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[1]At the Nuremberg trials of major Nazi war criminals in 1946, the defense, sensing the differences between the Soviet and Western prosecutors, attempted to introduce the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Katyn Forest massacre as evidence of Soviet criminal behavior under the four counts of the Nuremberg indictment. The Tribunal, however, rejected the introduction of "any new issues" that might have produced an irreparable breach among the judges. See Bradley Smith, *Reaching Judgment at Nuremburg,* New York, Basic Books, 1977, pp. 104–06.

[2]*Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 15, 1987.

[3]For a detailed treatment of the fits and starts in this process of reclaiming history, see R. W. Davies, *Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution,* Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, Indiana University Press, 1989.

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chev himself, have found it far easier to deal with crimes against Soviet humanity than with crimes against the East-Central European victims of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Despite his statement about filling in the blank pages of Soviet history, during his major address on November 7, 1987, the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Gorbachev continued to defend the Nazi-Soviet Pact in traditional terms, describing it as a wise political stratagem that guaranteed the physical survival of the Soviet state. The secret clauses of the treaty, moreover, remained state secrets, an indication of Soviet officialdom's fear of the potentially serious repercussions that their revelation would have triggered, especially in Poland and the Baltic republics.

It was soon recognized, however, that official reluctance to tell the truth about the Pact could have equally damaging consequences. Concessions followed. A joint Soviet-Polish team of historians was formed to "re-investigate" the painful history of the Katyn Forest massacre of Polish officers. More significant, however, was the publication of the secret protocols, first in an Estonian newspaper in July 1988, and then in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* a month later.[4]

MEANWHILE, with the approach of the 50th anniversary of the Pact, new questions were being raised in the West about the nature of Soviet actions in the territories Moscow acquired in 1939–41. Of the works under review, Jan T. Gross's *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Occupation of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* is especially noteworthy for it goes beyond a straightforward history of the invasion and occupation of East-Central Europe to reexamine and redefine the essence of Soviet state power under Stalin.

By virtue of its secret protocols, the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact was a misnomer from the beginning. As Rolf Ahmann rightly observes in his essay in the Oberländer collection (p. 28), it provided for immediate, joint aggression against the European order. The issue of Soviet co-responsibility for the outbreak of World War II is also raised by Estonian historian Heino Arumae in the same volume. Refuting the long-standing Soviet justification of the Pact as a tactical security measure, Arumae convincingly demonstrates that Stalin chose war over peace in August 1939. Poland and the balance of power that preserved European peace were the first victims of Nazi-Soviet collaboration.

As a co-belligerent of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union secretly assisted the German invasion of western and central Poland before launching its own invasion of eastern Poland on September 17. Eastern Poland or "Poland B," as Gross aptly puts it, was "the backward half of a backward European country" (p. 4). The eight eastern provinces of Poland that were subsequently conquered by the Soviet Union were an impoverished agrarian backwater, in which Belorussians and Ukrainians made up an overwhelming majority of the population. With a wary eye still cast on Western opinion, the Soviet leadership, following due consultation with its German ally, justified the Red Army's march into eastern Poland as an "intervention" necessitated by the "non-existence" of Polish state authority in the wake of the Nazi invasion. The Soviets also argued that the "restoration of order" by the Red Army made possible the "liberation" of western Ukrainians and Belorussians from Polish oppression, although this claim was designed more for domestic than foreign consumption.

As minorities in what was defined by the Poles as an integral Polish nation-state, the Belorussian and Ukrainian inhabitants of "Poland B," as well as the Jews living in these territories, had legitimate and long-standing grievances against a state administration whose policies alternated between discrimination and outright persecution. Yet, in the interwar period, as Gross notes, "the material, spiritual, and political life of the national minorities was richer and more complex than ever before or after" (p. 6).

The Soviet campaign was uncomplicated militarily, but there was sufficient resistance from units of the Polish Border Defense Corps as well as from Polish civilians to belie the image, projected by Soviet propagandists, that moving into Poland was a simple operation for the Red Army. That resistance, documented in detail by Karol Liszewski in his book on the Polish-Soviet War of 1939, also turned against a local population understandably unsympathetic to the Polish cause. The sporadic violence of the scattered Polish army units, the civilians who accompanied them, and the Citizen's Guards who attempted to fill the power vacuum in the first days of the Soviet invasion contributed to an atmosphere of civil war.

This atmosphere is carefully reconstructed by Gross from responses to questionnaires later distributed by the Polish government-in-exile to repatriated Polish survivors of the Soviet occupation. To balance the ethnically skewed nature of these materials, the author also conducted interviews with Ukrainian and Jewish witnesses. Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews all pointed to the generally friend-

[4]See Mark von Hagen, "History and Politics under Gorbachev: Professional Autonomy and Democratization," *Harriman Institute Forum* (New York), November 1988, pp. 2–3.

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ly reception of the Red Army by the local population, despite some evidence of coerced attendance at welcoming ceremonies, particularly among the passive Belorussian population. Jews, who were especially vulnerable to pogroms in the initial power vacuum, greeted the Soviet army with joy. Most Ukrainians were also glad to see the collapse of the Polish state, although they may have preferred German to Soviet occupation. Many Poles even preferred the Soviet administration to none at all.

Instead of moving to arrest the chaos, however, the conquering army decreed a period of lawlessness that allowed the long-persecuted minorities to take their revenge. Rampaging peasant bands were frequently given recognition as militias, while appeals of the Polish victims to Soviet authorities for protection were ignored. The immediate political aim of the invasion—the removal of the old leadership stratum from every community—was thereby accomplished without direct intervention from above. Subsequently, social outcasts were often put in charge of the new provisional administration in the villages while large numbers of criminals assumed important positions in the militias (and they abused their positions by appropriating goods and services illegally).

For the Soviet occupier, the arbitrariness of power permitted at the local level served two purposes. Not only were the remnants of the old regime quickly eliminated by the voluntaristic system, but the local communities themselves were undermined by the resulting chaos and corruption, and thus their ability to resist the subsequent infusion of Soviet reality into their everyday existence was weakened.

The first, heavy dose of that reality, according to Gross, came in the form of elections to the newly constituted national assemblies of western Ukraine and western Belorussia held in October 1939. The pre-election campaign, although it sought to enlist local cooperation, refused to tolerate any community initiative. Where such cooperation could not be ensured, intimidation and coercion were used to prevent abstention. Those who refused to participate, on electoral commissions or as candidates, in election meetings or at the ballot box, automatically incriminated themselves. The Soviets drew up inventories of the population, which were in turn used to compile lists of voters. These lists deprived even the lazy and indifferent of anonymity.

While the occupation regime thus became intimately acquainted with the electorate, most candidates remained shrouded in obscurity. Those who were known to the community were mainly social misfits or had criminal records. Only a few proposed candidates enjoyed the electorate's respect. Participation in the voting therefore remained modest by Soviet standards, despite the varied means used to mobilize the population. Those voters who did go to the polls frequently met with "persuasion" and intimidation, but even these tactics did not ensure the results desired by the election organizers. Official candidates were defeated in 11 districts and election organizers falsified the results in several others.

Where the occupier remained dissatisfied with the results, another vote was held. After the elections, the authorities moved to arrest those voters who had not been successfully "persuaded" to vote for the official candidates. The identities of these voters was not a problem because the principle of secret balloting had been crudely violated by the authorities.

The resolutions of the national assemblies in Białystok and Lwów at the end of October were foregone conclusions in any case. After two days of "deliberations," they sent delegations to Moscow to request incorporation into the Belorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics. Only after meeting with Stalin and other top Soviet officials in the Kremlin did the delegations proceed to Minsk and Kiev, the capitals of the republics they were formally seeking to join.

Soviet "acceptance" of these requests created the need for another round of elections to Union and republic institutions in March 1940. This time nothing was left to chance. The elections were preceded by a two-month campaign in which the ratio of propagandists to voters, Gross estimates, ranged between 1:20 and 1:30. Again, terror and coercion were used to round up voters. At voting stations, even the pretense of secrecy was abandoned and open ballots were used. Not surprisingly, all approved candidates scored electoral victories.

In this "spectacle" of elections, the Soviet authorities never sought the support of the population, only its complicity. For Gross, this practical lesson of intimidation and collaboration, in which "all are shown to each other in an act of betrayal for fear of sanction" (p. 113), suggests the necessity for rethinking the nature of social control exercised by the totalitarian state. Whereas existing theories of totalitarianism have emphasized the state's confiscation of the private realm, leaving a direct, unmediated relationship between the individual and the state, Gross focuses on the "privatization of the public realm" (p. 117), in which everyone not only has access to the state apparatus, but is encouraged to use it against other members of society. In his case study of the Soviet-occupied Polish territories, Gross demonstrates how the state's encouragement of vio-

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lence led to a privatization of the instruments of coercion. As authority was vested in a mafia-like network of families throughout western Ukraine and western Belorussia, the pursuit of private interests became the principal way for carrying out official duties.

If, as Gross argues, the real power of the totalitarian state "results from its being at the disposal of every inhabitant, available for hire at a moment's notice" (p. 120), then the Leninist phrase "*kto kogo*" is more properly translated as "your life or mine." The dekulakization of the early 1930's, Gross reminds us, was accomplished by imposing on communities quotas that had been arbitrarily set by the central government, thus condemning them to be all-powerful and powerless at the same time. Similar means were used to promote the self-destruction of peasant communities in western Ukraine and western Belorussia. Here, as in Stalin's Soviet Union of the 1930's, the decision of who would go to jail was left to the discretion of ordinary citizens. Gross thus explains the well-known social atomization under totalitarianism as the result of the fear and distrust promoted by a state "that allows individuals to cause harm to one another and at the same time renders each defenseless against such attempts by others" (p. 122).

THE second part of Gross's study, entitled "Confinements," analyzes the various means by which civil society was destroyed in the occupied territories. He begins with the subversion of traditional educational processes and the "socialization" of youth. Young people, incited by the occupation authorities to follow their natural inclination of rebellion against their teachers and parents, were especially attracted to the new regime. The occupier encouraged youth to participate in a broad assault on the traditional culture, religious beliefs, and family relations of the indigenous population. Breaking down discipline and promoting disorder, whether at home or in the schools, were essential to a regime bent on changing the population's perception of the source of authority.

Mass arrests and deportations were also used as more immediate means to the same end. At first, only the old elite was removed, but in time arrests swept from one social group to another so that, in Gross's words, "anyone, at any time, in any place, and for any reason" became vulnerable (p. 151). The quotas and categories came from the top, but the actual choice of victims was left to local enforcers who themselves became vulnerable as the system of denunciation was institutionalized. Class and ethnicity, in the end, proved irrelevant in this system. Moreover, as Gross points out, the social and ethnic conflicts that had typified life on the outside subsided in the grim conditions of the improvised and overcrowded Soviet prisons. Ironically, the shared experience of a prison system that drove prisoners to the outermost limits of human endurance nurtured the very forms of spontaneous social interaction that were fast disappearing among those who retained their "freedom."

The deportation to the Soviet Union of half a million civilians, along with hundreds of thousands of prisoners from the occupied territories, though known generally to the interested Western public, is analyzed in detail for the first time by Gross. Early relocations involved the depopulation of the frontier strip, the displacement of many urban residents by new tenants, and the voluntary departure of approximately 50,000 people for work in the Soviet Donbas. The first and largest coordinated shipment of civilians took place in February 1940. This deportation was carried out on the basis of a secret administrative order, yet depended heavily on the complicity of ordinary citizens. With this measure, the regime sought to remove the Polish element from the countryside with the aid of community resolutions. By contrast, a deportation in April 1940, which affected mainly families of arrested individuals, was a straightforward police operation.

A third major deportation, which took place in June 1940, began with the registration of refugees, ostensibly for repatriation to German-occupied Poland or for applying for Soviet citizenship. Ironically, many of those registering for return to the territory of the General-Gouvernement were Jews who had reevaluated their earlier view of the Soviet regime as the lesser of two evils. They were wrong, of course, but according to Gross their decision to return to Nazi-occupied territory "tells us much about the experience of Stalinism in the lives of common people" (p. 207). But in the end, even those refugees who had opted for Soviet citizenship were not spared forcible deportation to the east.

The children and elderly who were among the deportees in the February shipment died in large numbers from exposure to freezing conditions, suffocation in freight cars locked-up for days at rail stations before departure, and lack of food and water on the road. Those not singled out for resettlement were physically liquidated. Again, class or ethnicity did not necessarily determine a deportee's fate. As many as half the deportees came from the non-Polish and therefore underprivileged population.

The fourth and final deportation, which began on June 20, 1941, was curtailed because of the German invasion. Still, despite the reassignment of transportation for other pri-

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orities, the rapidly spreading chaos, and German bombardments of rail lines, the Soviets managed to remove another contingent of 60,000 to 80,000 people. At the same time, the Soviets either evacuated or killed the remaining prisoners. Survivors' accounts, attached to the new edition of *Zbrodnia katyńska w świetle dokumentów* (The Katyn Crime in Light of the Documents),[5] provide terrifying testimony to the massacre that was carried out in orderly fashion at the Lwów prison, to the death by torture of prison inmates in the smaller towns, and to the killing of weak, ill, or exhausted prisoners during long marches. Gross, whose study is based on these accounts, provides eloquent commentary on this "final spasm" of Soviet state power (pp. 184–85).

AS THE author of the definitive study on the German General-Gouvernement,[6] Gross is unable to resist the temptation to compare the Soviet activities in eastern Poland to those of the Nazis in western and central Poland. Restricting his discussion to the years 1939 to 1941, he argues that Soviet actions were far more injurious. That Soviet measures against private property were far more comprehensive than those on the German side is not surprising. Although neither regime hesitated "to tamper with the biological substance of nations" through mass deportations (p. 224)—according to Gross, the same proportions of population on each side suffered forced resettlement—on the German side the conditions of deportation and the ultimate fate of the deportees were far less harsh. For many, this meant the difference between life and death.

One saving grace for the Soviets was that they lacked the *Übermensch* mentality, the sense of pervasive contempt for the conquered peoples that accompanied German actions. Still, the total list of casualties was much longer on the Soviet side during the first two years of the war.

In the era of *glasnost'* and *perestroyka,* one may soon expect studies of the impact of Soviet totalitarian state power in the Baltic states and Bessarabia, which were also incorporated into the Soviet Union as a consequence of its alliance with Nazi Germany. This scholarship would do well to take as its premise Gross's theory of Soviet totalitarianism. Although much of what Gross describes in western Ukraine and western Belorussia occurred somewhat later in the Baltic republics and Bessarabia—mainly after their liberation from German hands in 1944—the destruction had already begun in earnest in 1940 during the brief Soviet occupation. Most immediately affected, according to Gert von Pistohlkors in *Hitler-Stalin Pakt,* were the more than 100,000 Baltic Germans, whose removal from Estonia and Latvia to German-occupied Poland came as a "dictated option" that ended their 700-year presence in the region. However, the fate of Baltic Germans pales in comparison with that of the hundreds of thousands of Estonian, Latvian, and especially Lithuanian victims of Soviet deportations.

IN MARKED contrast to the bold interpretations presented by Gross, the interesting new questions raised in *Hitler-Stalin Pakt,* and the detailed reconstruction of Polish resistance to the Soviet invader as presented by Liszewski, *The Deadly Embrace* by Anthony Read and David Fisher does little to advance existing scholarship, despite its 650 pages.[7] The authors, a producer and writer, respectively, for BBC television, have composed a popular history of the "chess game" that characterized relations between the two totalitarian regimes between 1939 and 1941. The book is filled with digressions about the major and minor personalities of the Pact that make for lively reading but fail to address the larger issues.

Read and Fisher accept uncritically, for example, the traditional Soviet justification for the Pact, as well as the Red Army's aggression against Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, and Romania, as tactical defensive moves against a future Nazi opponent. Since they do not consider any other possible motivations for Soviet actions in East-Central Europe beyond "power politics," it is small wonder that they are forced to speculate, without result, as to why the prescience that led Stalin to enforce his control on East-Central Europe betrayed him on the eve of conflict with the Nazi war machine. Finally, *The Deadly Embrace* concludes with the dramatic understatement that "the legacy of the broken pact is with us still," but merely defines the legacy in terms of the most obvious features of postwar Soviet foreign policy.

BY CONTRAST, Gross and the contributors to the Oberländer collection seek to view the legacy of 1939–41 from the perspective of nations and countries occupied by the Soviet partner to the Pact. These nations and countries witnessed wholesale

[5]Most of the materials in the *Zbrodnia katyńska* collection inform a far more readable study by J. K. Zawodny. See *Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre,* South Bend, IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 1962.

[6]Jan T. Gross, *Polish Society Under German Occupation: The Generalgouvernement, 1939–1941,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979.

[7]Even as diplomatic history, *The Deadly Embrace* adds little to such older works as Gerhard L. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939 to 1941,* New York, Lounz, 1954, which Read and Fisher nevertheless failed to consult.

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destruction of their societies methodically carried out by what Gross defines as a totalitarian "spoiler state." The fact that no distinction was made between those responsible for and those subject to the public order in a system based on the participation and vulnerability of all led to the demolition of individual conscience. The state implored people to hate each other, but the people also grew to hate themselves. The first victim of Soviet "spoilation" was therefore the individual, now transformed into "Soviet man" or "a ragged urchin, aimless and alone" (p. 240).

The destruction of the individual was the key to the destruction of civil society, the means by which the "spoiler state" achieved absolute political power. Yet, with that power the Soviet regime could only destroy and prevent, not create or produce. Gross thus becomes the first to formulate a theory of totalitarianism that addresses "its historically unprecedented waste of human potential" (p. 235). The Soviet state could and did launch a universal effort to prevent all association; it could and did corrupt language to the extent that people could neither make moral judgments nor draw independent conclusions. By destroying civil society, it ensured that "no one else could get things done" (p. 234).

But the Soviet state couldn't get things done either. Having monopolized political power at the expense of civil society, the "spoiler state" could never become "all-powerful," as measured by its own performance. Although Gross could not have anticipated the revolutions of 1989 in East-Central Europe, his theory of Soviet totalitarianism is useful in explaining recent events. A Stalinist-style communist regime, whether in Lithuania or East Germany, could destroy but not replace civil society—the repository of "real power," the power to create and produce. The ultimate bankruptcy of the wasteful Stalinist "spoiler state," despite its possession of absolute political power, was inevitable. By the same token, the first, most difficult tasks of the new post-communist regimes are the rehabilitation of the individual and the reconstruction of civil society from the atomized, or at best, clump-like remains left behind by totalitarianism. Only then will it be possible to speak of the rebirth of the entity once known as East-Central Europe.

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